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This dissertation consists of three parts; Part 1 provides two applied studies for the 
current issue of the global natural gas market, Part 2 presents the World Gas Model 
(WGM) 2014 version-a significant extension of WGM 2012, and Part 3 develops a 
novel Benders decomposition procedure with SOS1 reformulation to solve 
mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPECs) and then is applied to 
several applications in natural gas and additional test problems.  
Part 1 presents two applied studies related to the impacts of U.S. liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) exports on global gas markets as well as the influence of the Panama Canal 
tariff selection on global gas trade. The first study within Part 1 investigates the effect 
  
of the U.S. LNG exports on the global gas markets using the WGM 2012 (Gabriel et. 
al., 2012), a market equilibrium model for global LNG markets based on a mixed 
complementarity problem (MCP) format.  The second study within Part 1 focuses on 
the influence of the Panama Canal tariffs on global trade using WGM 2012 as well. 
After a planned expansion, the Panama Canal waterway will accommodate more than 
eighty percent of LNG tankers, providing significant potential time and cost savings 
for LNG buyers and producers. The aim of the second applied study is to address how 
the Panama Canal tariffs affect global gas trades 
In Part 2, a significant extension of the World Gas Model 2012 is developed.  This new 
version called WGM 2014, distinguishes itself from the previous version in the sense 
of more detail for LNG markets including more market participants e.g., liquefiers, 
regasifiers, LNG shipping operators, and a canal operator as new players with separate 
optimization problems and market-clearing conditions. Moreover, the LNG shipping 
costs and congestion tariffs for canal transit fees are endogenously determined inside 
the model as opposed to being exogenously determined before. Also, WGM 2014 has 
flexible LNG routes. In particular, there are three route options for each LNG shipping 
operator: 1. Sending LNG via the Panama Canal, 2. the Suez Canal, or using a regular 
route without a canal. Moreover, WGM 2014 takes into account the limitations of 
maritime transportation by limiting the size of the LNG tankers that can pass through 




In part 3, the method we develop uses an SOS1 approach based on (Siddiqui and 
Gabriel, 2012) to replace complementarity in the lower-level problem's optimality 
conditions. Then, Benders algorithm decomposes the MPECs into a master and a 
subproblem and solves the overall problem iteratively. This methodology is applied to 
small, illustrative examples and a large-scale MPEC version of the World Gas Model 
where the Panama Canal operator is a Stackelberg leader with a reduced version of the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Motivation 
1.1 Significance of Natural Gas 
1.1.1  Overview of Global Gas Markets 
Natural gas is a key fuel source for cooking, heating, industrial operations, and power 
generation. It is composed of methane and other elements and is found in underground 
rock formations or associated with other hydrocarbon reservoirs. It is produced from 
either onshore or offshore wells. Natural gas is delivered to the markets by pipelines in 
gaseous form or transported as liquefied natural gas (LNG) by tankers to destination 
globally. Natural gas is important to energy sectors due to many reasons. First, it is the 
cleanest-burning fossil fuel, producing the lowest greenhouse gas emissions as 
compared to other fossil fuels such as coal or oil. Second, natural gas is considered to 
be a major input fuel for electricity production.  Third, still on the subject of energy, 
natural gas is used as a backup source for intermittent renewable energy sources e.g., 
wind and solar. For example, twenty five percent of the total power produced in the 
U.S. in 2012 came from natural gas (EIA, 2013). Fourth, natural is used as the feedstock 
for many consumer products such as plastics. Lastly, various countries use natural gas 
(e.g., compressed natural gas) as an alternative fuel source for transportation, especially 
in Asia.  
Because more countries aim to use environmentally cleaner fuel to meet future 
economic growth, the global demand for natural gas is expected to expand 
significantly. According to EIA (2013a) the world natural gas consumption is projected 
to increase approximately 1.8% per year, see Figure 1-1. In terms of natural gas supply, 
European domestic production declined by approximately 10% from 2012 to 2011. 





Statistical Review, 2013). The ramped-up production in North America mostly came 
from U.S. shale gas climbing up by 29% compared to shale production in 2011 (EIA, 
2014). Given advanced drilling techniques, EIA predicts that by 2040 shale gas 
production is estimated to account for 39% of the total U.S. gas production (EIA, 
2013a).  Many countries attempt to follow the U.S. shale gas development path. For 
example, China has recently begun to focus on shale gas as a potential new clean source 
of gas supply to meet growing demand. The government also announced its national 
shale gas policy and is targeting shale gas production of 6.5 Bcm by 2015 and 60 Bcm 
by 2020. The Ukraine is attempting to reduce dependence on Russia by exploring its 
own shale gas resources and signed a drilling deal with Shell in early 2013.  For Europe, 
The shale exploration in Poland is slowing down after disappointing early attempts at 
extraction.  Although Europe has large unconventional gas reserves, France, Bulgaria, 
and the Netherlands passed laws banning hydraulic fracturing (hydrofracking) 
procedures for environmental reasons (Scott, 2013).  
The history of gas markets began in the 1960s. Two market models were created 
(Jensens, 2004). A hub pricing mechanism was developed in the U.S. and UK markets. 
In particular, natural gas prices are determined by supply and demand of natural gas 
itself. In contrast, a different pricing model, oil-indexation pricing, was developed in 
the rest of Europe. Gas prices are linked to the prices of substitute fuels, e.g., oil, to 
establish long-term supply contracts. Long-term contracts are agreed to ensure 
adequate amounts of off-take of gas during indicated time periods and to secure supply. 
In addition, long-term contracts are made to guarantee sufficient payments for large 





gas trades in Asia are conducted using a combination of these two market mechanisms. 
Historically, all pipeline-trade volumes of gas transported to Asia use oil indexation 
pricing while gas-to-gas pricing is used for LNG spot trade (EIA, 2013).  Currently, 
the global gas markets are still divergent with the prices varying in different regions. 
During the middle of 2012, Henry Hub gas prices dropped to $2 per million British 
thermal units (MMBtu) – the lowest prices in a decade, while the average import prices 
in Japan reached $17 per MMBtu. German import and UK prices were between $8-10 
per MMBTU (BP Statistical Review, 2013). The North American gas market is 
expected to remain isolated from other regional markets. This phenomenon is 
recognized by the gap between Japanese liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices and Henry 
Hub gas prices which rose from around about $7 per MMBtu in January, 2011 to over 
$14 per MMBtu in March, 2012.  
 
 
Fig.1-1 Projection of world demand (left) and supply (right) for natural gas 2014-















1.1.2 The Development of U.S.  LNG Exports 
 
The United States became a main natural gas importer in the early 2000s and continued 
as such until the mid-2000s (EIA, 2012c). A number of regasification facilities were 
proposed so that domestic consumption never reached the total import capacity 
(Henderson, 2012). However, as a result of the shale gas revolution, the total natural 
gas production has gradually increased over time since 2006. Indeed, shale gas 
production has increased sevenfold from 2007 to 2012 and accounted for 34% of the 
total U.S. natural gas production in 2012 (EIA, 2014).  Shale gas production in the U.S. 
is projected from 9.7 Tcf/y in 2012 to 19.8 Tcf/y by 2040, constituting 51% of the total 
U.S. production, see Figure 1-2. 
 
 
Figure 1-2 U.S. dry natural gas production (tcf) (EIA, 2013a) 
 
The increased domestic shale gas production not only decreased the U.S. imports of 





2008 to about $3 MMBtu in 2013. However, the gas prices in Asia and Europe remain 
the same so that this large price spread creates an arbitrage opportunity to U.S. natural 
gas exporters. As a result, a number of natural gas producers are eager to apply for 
natural gas export licenses (Ratner, 2011), as indicated in Table 1-1. However, the 
future of U.S. LNG exports is being questioned due to uncertain factors e.g., shale gas 
reserves, negative environmental externalities of hydrofracturing to produce shale gas 
and the global influence of exports on price and contracts. 
 Table 1-1 U.S. LNG exports as of March 5, 2014. (DOE, 2013) 
  
Total of all 
applications Approved  Pending 
FTA 1application 
38.50 Bcf/d                                     
(377.4Bcm/y ) 
37.80 Bcf/d                         
(370.3 Bcm/y) 




35.58 Bcf/d                
(348.5 Bcm/y) 
9.7 Bcf/d                                  
(95.03 Bcm/y) 
25.88 Bcf/d                     
(253.56 Bcm/y) 
 
1.1.3 Problems and Research Questions  
 
Although it is clear that the future of U.S. LNG exports will influence the global gas 
market over the next decade, the U.S. LNG will be only one element of the emerging 
global gas market. New supply from Australia, East Africa (e.g., Mozambique and 
Tanzania), and the Middle East will be supplied to the global market as well. Likewise 
Russian gas is competing with other suppliers in the European gas market since the 
Nord Stream and South Stream pipeline projects represent a long-term strategy for the 
                                                 
1FTA (Free Trade Area).  FTA countries include Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, 






European gas market. Also, future oil prices will also be important since traditional 
LNG trades are linked with oil indexation.  
Despite these factors, U.S. LNG exports have merited special attention from the U.S. 
as these exports can have both negative and positive effects on the U.S. economy, 
environment, and employment level. Some experts believe that gas exports will result 
in a net benefit for the U.S. economy. Opponents argue that free trade in the LNG 
markets will harm U.S. consumers. Higher U.S. domestic gas prices could reduce a 
competitive advantage for the manufacturers who use natural gas to produce plastics 
and chemicals. Furthermore, some people are concerned that exporting LNG would 
lead to increased hydraulic fracturing activity, or “fracking,” thus threatening the health 
of local residents and increasing water usage and contamination. As debates among 
various groups continue, the U.S. must ask how LNG exports will affect both the 
domestic and international markets and possibly the following key questions should be 
addressed: 
• How could U.S. LNG exports affect prices in domestic and global markets? 
• Which countries might benefit from U.S. LNG exports and which ones might 
be disadvantaged? 
• How will the U.S. LNG exports compete with other supplies e.g., Qatari and 
Australian LNG? 
• How will the U.S. LNG exports affect Russia given new pipeline projects 
completed in Europe?  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation will investigate the future of global gas markets given an 





Model 2012. To do so, different levels of U.S. LNG exports have to be analyzed. In 
addition Chapter 2 considers hypotheses about how the various additional assumptions 
e.g., rapidly growing demands in Asia, competitiveness of LNG and pipeline supplies, 
future environmental policy, could impact future global gas markets. 
1.2. Significance of Panama Canal Expansion on LNG Shipping   
1.2.1 Global LNG Trade 
Recently, the LNG market has just a few dominant exporters. In fact, one-third of LNG 
in 2012 was supplied from Qatar, see Figure 1-3. Qatar, Malaysia, Australia, and 
Nigeria contribute more than 75% of the total supplies. In the near future, more LNG 
supply is from Australia, the U.S. and East Africa. In fact, by 2016 Australia will 
become the largest LNG exporter after completion of several LNG terminals while the 
U.S. is aiming to start exporting LNG by 2016.  
Figure 1-3 Overview of LNG market (MTPA) in 2012 and change related to 
2011 (IGU,2013) 
 
Asia is the largest LNG market and has the greatest growth prospects (IGU, 2013). 
Recently, Russia and China agreed on 30-year deal whereby Gazprom will deliver at 





have an impact on the volume of LNG that China needs to import and impact on the 
level of the spot price for LNG in Asia. However, Europe, South America, and North 
America are also LNG consumers. Over time, LNG trade has been divided into two 
basins, the Pacific and Atlantic Basins, and most LNG trade is confined within one 
basin (GIIGNL, 2013). Atlantic LNG producers such as Norway and Yemen supplied 
Atlantic consumers with approximately 75% of their LNG in 2012. Likewise, more 
than 98% of Pacific LNG production was sold to Asian consumers (GIIGNL, 2013). 
Before the 2010 nuclear disaster in Japan, LNG prices in these two basins were similar. 
According to the BP Statistical Review (2013), the LNG wholesale price averaged 
$9.06/MMBtu in Japan in 2009 compared to a German imported gas price of $8.52. 
Due to the similarity in prices, LNG trade between basins was unprofitable due to high 
shipping costs and financial disadvantages. The price gap between the basins has 
increased since mid-2010 due to strong demand in Asia, especially Japan. In 2012, 
LNG prices were $16.75/MMbtu in Japan but only $9.70 in Europe and $4.73 in the 
U.S. 2 Therefore, exporting LNG between basins became cost effective depending on 
the shipping costs.  
1.2.2 LNG Shipping Cost  
 
In general, LNG shipping costs involve three main elements: the LNG carrier’s capital, 
the operating cost, and the voyage cost, i.e., marine fuel cost. The capital cost is 
considered a fixed cost, while the operating and voyage costs are variable. LNG 
projects require large investments. A new, standard-size LNG tanker (170,000 m3) 
                                                 





costs more than $200 million USD to build because it requires costly materials and 
sophisticated cargo-handling equipment (Petroleum Economist, 2011). The operating 
cost includes manning3, maintenance, and insurance. Because LNG tankers are 
sophisticated ships, they require specialized crews. As a result, the manning costs are 
high, accounting for 35% of the operating cost (Petroleum Economist, 2011). The 
majority of the voyage cost is associated with fuel and port costs. The fuel cost is based 
on the speed and engine performance, whereas the port costs depend on the destination 
port; they can be complex and variable depending on the size and volume of the tanker. 
In addition, the voyage cost also includes transit fees, such as canal tolls. Because the 
capital cost is fixed, the main variable cost is the voyage cost, which depends on the 
distance of the trip. The shipping cost from the Atlantic Basin to Japan is three to four 
times higher than that for the Pacific Basin. However, the Panama Canal route (after 
canal expansion) will significantly reduce the time and shipping cost of transportation 
between the two basins.  
1.2.3 Panama Canal expansion 
 
The Panama Canal is currently restricted to vessels with beams4 of less than 32 meters 
(Platt, 2012). Historically, no LNG tanker has passed the Panama Canal due to special 
structure of LNG fleets.   The expansion of the Panama Canal will allow for the first 
time, large tankers with a maximum of 50-meter beams to pass, reducing the travel 
time from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Tokyo, Japan from 41 days to 25 days. Additionally, 
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the expansion will accommodate more than eighty percent of the existing LNG takers 
to pass through. The distance to transport U.S. LNG from Gulf of Mexico will decrease 
from 16,000 miles to approximately 9,000 miles.   
Because a significant portion of the voyage costs depend on the fuel, which is a function 
of the distance, the use of the Panama Canal will greatly reduce the voyage costs from 
the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. IHS CERA (Reuter, 2013) estimated that the 
route via the Panama Canal will reduce the shipping cost from the Gulf of Mexico to 
Japan by approximately $1.50/MMBtu. However, at the time of this thesis research, 
the Panama Canal Authority has not determined what transit fee is it will charge LNG 
tankers to pass through the canal, so the final toll is unknown. IHS CERA assumed a 
toll of $0.30/MMBtu based on a $1 million round-trip fee for a medium-sized LNG 
tanker, which leaves a significant savings of $1.20/MMBtu. Regardless of the toll, the 
larger canal will likely improve the economics of LNG shipping between the two basins 
and will create incentives to exploit pricing differences between the Pacific and 
Atlantic markets. The price difference between the basins might be narrowed and may 
benefit Asian consumers as well as North American, East Coast suppliers. 
1.2.4 Problems, Research Questions, and Modeling  
Although using the Panama Canal can save time (approximately 14 days to Japan from 
the U.S. East Coast) and transportation costs, the canal fee is still uncertain thus 
motivating the research in Chapter 3 of this dissertation and related project work.  
Expansion of the Panama Canal expansion brings about several important questions. 
First, how will the Panama Canal tariffs affect the decision of LNG exporters and LNG 





distance or go to Europe? The initial question centers on U.S. exports: a parametric 
study in Chapter 3 focusing on canal fees and transportation costs for LNG Shipping 
are performed using the WGM 2012. In this study, the canal tariffs on U.S. LNG 
exports were varied. The canal tariff was exogenously given for specific LNG routes. 
Several scenarios were compared against those from a Base Case. The initial research 
questions related to that study are:  
1. How will the Panama Canal expansion affect LNG shipping and trades?  
2. What will be the effects of the Canal fee on natural gas prices?  
3. How will the natural gas flow pattern change given different tariff regimes?  
4. How will the U.S. gas trade affect other producers given the expansion of the 
Panama Canal?  
Moreover, the issue of influence of the Panama Canal is dealt with in two different 
ways. Chapter 3 applied the existing WGM 2012 in a parametric study related to the 
Panama Canal tariff selection and its influence on global gas markets.   By contrast, 
Chapter 4 presents the new WGM 2014 where the Canal operator is modeled by a 
separate optimization problem and interacts with LNG transporters. The advantage of 
modeling the Canal operator as the separate player is that the model can take into 
account canal limitations e.g., size of the tankers and congested tariff to endogenously 
determine tariffs and other key factors.  
1.3 Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)  
1.3.1 MPECs Overview 
The mixed-complementarity form of the WGM represents the global gas market with 





WGM allows for market power of the global gas market with Nash-Cournot behavior 
for the traders, the export arm of the producers. By contrast, in Chapter 5, a Stackelberg 
leader-follower game version of WGM is formulated with the Canal operator as the 
leader having an unequal influence on the other market players. The Canal operator 
anticipates the reactions of these other market participants in making its own decisions, 
especially the canal tariff. The leader’s objective function is a profit maximization with 
constraints for the canal operator consistent with WGM 2014 but also the KKT 
conditions of the other market players’ optimization problems taken in to consideration.  
The resulting model is a mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) 
(Gabriel et al., 2013).  
MPECs are challenging problems to solve on a large-scale. In general, in order to find 
a solution to an MPEC, a two-level optimization needs to be solved. The computational 
complexity arises mostly from the equilibrium conditions at the lower level imposed as 
non-closed-form, non-convex constraints in the upper-level problem.   These 
equilibrium conditions can arise from a single optimization problem, more than one, or 
more generally equilibrium problems such as mixed complemenarity problems (MCP) 
or variational inequalities (VI) to name a few examples (Facchini and Pang, 2003)  
The MPEC formulation is as follows: min , 	 
                                                 . . , 	 ∈ Ω        (1.1)                                                       
           ∈ 	 
where the continuous variables  ∈ ,  ∈  are the vector of upper-level and lower-
level variables, respectively, , 	 is the objective function and  Ω is the joint feasible 





lower-level problem parametrically defined as a function of the upper-level variables 




Figure 1-4 the structure of a general two-level problem (MPEC) 
 
MPECs can be solved in a variety of ways such as:  by a commercial solver (i.e., 
NLPEC), piecewise sequential quadratic programming (Kojima and Shindo, 1986), 
penalty interior point algorithms (Luo et al., 1996), an implicit function-based approach 
(Outrata et al., 1998), disjunctive-constraints (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981), and 
special ordered sets of type 1 (SOS1) variables methods, (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012) 
to name several examples. However, the disjunctive-constraints method is 
computationally expensive for large models (Luo et. al, 1996) due to the large number 
of binary variables that are needed to replace the complementarity conditions from the 
lower-level problem (or problems) while the SOS1 approach requires a good starting 
point with a heuristic approach for solving a large problem. In addition, other methods, 
for example, a relaxation scheme (Steffensen and Ulbrich 2010) and exact penalty 
functions with nonlinear perturbations (Uderzo 2010) also exist but have not been 
shown to work for large-scale models. Larger problems of MPEC are more difficult to 
solve (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012) due to non-convexity of MPECs.  One particular 
Minimize f(x,y) 
Upper-level problem 
X is fixed and calculate y 







example of large-scale MPEC can be found in Chen et al. (2006). Chen et al. (2006) 
found that no single NLP solver could solve their large-scale electricity model, but they 
needed several solvers, SNOPT and FILTER, to obtain a solution. More details for 
MPECs will be discussed in Chapter 5.  In this dissertation, we propose a new method 
based on Benders decomposition combined with the SOS1 approach (Siddiqui and 
Gabriel, 2012) that so far is promising to solve large-scale instances of MPECs.  
Besides some smaller test problems, we have successfully implemented this new 
approach on a large-scale natural gas market model.   
1.3.2 Benders Decomposition 
Benders Decomposition (Benders, 1962) is a classical solution algorithm for 
optimization problems, based on the ideas of partitioning of the variables into 
“complicating” and “non-complicating” ones as well as constraint generation.  The 
constraints are generated on the fly to better approximate the optimal value function 
describing a subproblem when the complicating variables are fixed.  In particular, the 
method partitions the model to be solved into two simpler problems, namely a master 
and one or more subproblems. The master problem is a relaxed version of the original 
problem, containing only a subset of the original variables and the associated 
constraints that approximate the optimal value function mentioned above. The 
subproblem is the original problem with the variables obtained in the master problem 
fixed and is therefore a more-constrained version of the original problem. Later, 
Geoffrion (1972) extended Benders algorithm and proposed a Generalized Benders 
decomposition (GBD) for a broader class of problems using nonlinear convex duality 





1.3.3 Research Questions and Algorithm Development  
The objective in this part of the dissertation is to provide alternative solution procedures 
for solving MPECs. In particular,   a Benders Decomposition approach for MPECs is 
proposed. The advantage of this method over traditional ones is that the computational 
time is much lower for larger problems discussed in Chapter 5. 
1.4 Contribution of This Dissertation 
There are three main contribution of the dissertation:  
The first contribution is to provide two insightful policy studies. The first study 
(Chapter 2) is related to U.S. LNG exports using the existing World Gas Model (WGM 
2012 version). The proposed study not only investigated the effects of U.S. LNG 
exports on the domestic markets but also the European and Asian gas markets as well. 
Ten scenarios related to U.S. LNG exports are presented in this study. Also, the 
scenario related to fast growing demands in Asia and the new pipeline project in Europe 
e.g. Nord Stream, South Stream, and Southern Corridor projects are investigated. These 
results offer a better understanding for energy system stakeholders, policy makers, 
decision makers, and government organizations. The second applied study (Chapter 3) 
also used WGM 2012 to gauge the impact of exogenous Panama Canal tariffs on global 
gas markets. 
 
A second contribution of this research is the significant extension of the World Gas 
Model to include much more detail on LNG markets.  The novel features of the World 





o The level of detail wherein the LNG transportation routes are 
incorporated: WGM 2014 has more than one possible route from the 
origin LNG export terminal to the destination LNG receiving terminal. 
o The limitations of maritime transportation e.g., availability of tanker and 
Canal maximum tanker size allowance are considered.  
o The LNG transportation cost is endogenously determined. 
o The level of details for LNG shipping e.g., size of LNG tanker, average 
speed, and investment cost. 
The main difference between these two versions are depicted in Table 1-3. This 




Table 1-3. Differences between WGM 2012 and WGM 2014 
 
  WGM 2012 WGM 2014 
Market players with separate 
optimization problems 
Producers                                        
Traders                                             
Pipeline 
operator                                   
Storage operator            
Marketers 
Producers                    
Traders           
Pipeline operator              
Storage operator           
Marketers                   
Liquefier                          
Regasifiers                                  
LNG shipping 
operator                               
Canal operators 
LNG shipping cost $8 kcm/1000 
nautical miles 
Endogenous 
Investment for producers Exogenous Endogenous 
Investment for LNG tanker No Yes 








A third contribution is the development and implementation of a new Benders-type 
decomposition approach (Benders-SOS1 method) for MPECs on a variety of test 
problems as well as a  large-scale natural gas model as discussed in Chapter 5. This 
model has the Panama Canal operator as a leader with the rest of the market (using a 
modified form of the World Gas Model) as followers. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 and 3 deliberate two applied studies 
for the current issue of the global natural gas market and dedicate the first contribution. 
Chapter 2 is the policy analyses on the issue of U.S. LNG exports using the World Gas 
Model 2012. Chapter 3 considers a study on the impact of Panama Canal tariffs on 
global gas markets using the World Gas Model 2012. Chapter 4 discusses the second 
contribution and presents the World Gas Model 2014 with the issue of the effects of 
the Panama Canal capacity level for LNG shipping and LNG exports from the Gulf of 
Mexico. In Chapter 5, the Benders-SOS1 method for MPECs is presented and solves 
the MPEC version of WGM where the Panama Canal operator is the leader. Lastly, 






LNG routes Only1 route 
origin-
destination  
Flexible up to 3 
routes 





Chapter 2: Investigating the potential effects of U.S. LNG 
exports on global natural gas markets 
 
In the mid-2000s a revolution of shale gas production in the U.S. depressed the 
domestic natural gas prices so that they reach the lowest level in decade, leading to the 
emergence of U.S. LNG export era.  Chapter 25 analyzes the effects on both U.S. 
domestic and global gas markets and presents the results with respect to domestic 
prices, production, and consumption. In addition, this chapter considers several 
possible scenarios related to U.S. exports, including the CO2 reduction policy, 
increased demands for gas in Asia, and the new European pipeline projects, which are 
likely to influence global markets in the next decade.   
 
2.1 Introduction 
The United States became a large natural gas importer in the early 2000s and continued 
as such until the mid-2000s (EIA, 2012c). US gas imports have been increasing from 
1988 to 2007 (to 4.6 tcf) and then began to decline.  Most of US imports were from 
Canada. Many liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals and regasification 
terminals were built, but the demand never reached the total import capacity 
(Henderson, 2012). The import of natural gas in the United States began to decline after 
2007 (EIA, 2010a) because of the development of unconventional domestic gas, 
particularly shale gas, of which the United States has abundant resources. According 
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to the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) (2011b), 862 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) or 
equivalently 24,411 billion cubic meters (Bcm) of technically recoverable shale gas 
resources—or approximately 40 times the annual U.S. consumption in 2010—are 
distributed throughout the contiguous 48 states. With advanced drilling technology, 
shale gas production has increased fivefold from 2006 to 2010 and accounted for 23% 
of the total U.S. natural gas production in 2010 (EIA, 2011a).  Shale gas production in 
the U.S. is projected to reach 12 Tcf/y (339.84 Bcm/y) by 2030, constituting 46% of 
the total U.S. production (EIA, 2011a).  The evolution of shale gas in the U.S. creates 
export opportunities for natural gas producers when the anticipated domestic 
production exceeds the domestic consumption requirement (EIA, 2012d). 
The emergence of shale gas has shifted the U.S. from a natural gas importer to LNG 
exporters. U.S. natural gas companies are motivated to export for several reasons. First, 
natural gas prices in the U.S. are substantially lower than in other natural gas markets. 
The US natural gas prices peaked in 2008 and then collapsed thereafter due in part to 
the strong emergence of shale gas. Recently,  the prices at Henry Hub were between 
$3-4 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in 2012, which is relatively low 
compared with Asian prices ($15-16/MMBtu) and European prices ($9-11/MMBtu), 
as indicated in Figure 2-1 (BP Statistics, 2013). Asian natural gas prices continue to 
increase, particularly the LNG prices, which are among the highest prices in the world 
(Federal Energy Commission, 2012). Thus, the substantial price differences create 
arbitrage opportunities for natural gas exporters. As a result, a number of natural gas 





Figure 2-1 Comparison of prices from 1996 to 2012 ($/MMBtu), (BP Statistics, 2013).  
Second, because natural gas is considered a key fuel source that exhibits the lowest 
carbon content among fossil fuels (EIA, 2011d), its demand is rapidly growing, 
especially in Asia due in part to current or anticipated environmental advantages over 
other fossil fuels (EIA,2010). Of these markets, Japan is the largest LNG importer.  An 
upswing in LNG imports has been driven by the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 
since that country has required additional LNG to compensate for the lost nuclear 
power, leading to a 12% increase in natural gas consumption between 2010 and 2011 
(EIA, 2012a). Likewise, the Chinese government aims to increase the use of natural 
gas as the country’s primary source of energy by 8.3% by 2025 (IEA, 2011). According 
to forecasts from the China National Petroleum Cooperation (Zhaofang, 2010), the 
projected Chinese natural gas consumption based on its 12th five-year energy plan will 
reach 400 Bcm/year by 2030. Furthermore, the Chinese National Petroleum 





for the transportation sector by expanding LNG import terminals (Bai and Aizhu, 
2012). Moreover, European natural gas usage is encouraged because of environmental 
considerations. Also, with the requirement for renewable portfolio standards in Europe, 
intermittent renewable power such as wind and solar, require natural gas as a thermal 
backup source since natural gas combined cycle turbines ramp up quickly and allow 
more flexible grid integration in addition to their environmental benefits. The 
International Energy Outlook (IEO) (EIA, 2011c) expects an average growth of 0.7% 
per year for OECD European natural gas consumption and the IEO projects reaching 
23.2 Tcf (657 Bcm) in 2035 because of increasing demand in the power sectors of 
Europe. Although a small rate of demand growth is predicted, Europe will still require 
more imports because there is a considerable gap between the declining endogenous 
supply and the demand. Europe currently imports natural gas from five sources: Russia, 
Norway, Africa, Central Asia and overseas LNG imports. Therefore, U.S. LNG exports 
from the East Coast and the Gulf of Mexico would provide an alternative for Europe 
because of the close proximity, reliability, and political considerations. 
A third reason for the emergence of the U.S. as an LNG exporter is that in the past 
many European countries have experienced negative consequences resulting from the 
Russia-Ukraine gas price disputes in 2006 and 2009 (Pirani et al., 2009).  Supply 
security has led the European Union (EU) to try to mitigate these situations and to assist 
EU members in diversifying their natural gas suppliers by proposing a number of 
pipeline projects to deliver more gas to Europe (Ratner et al., 2012). Many rival 
European pipeline projects are competing with one another. The Southern Corridor 





and South Stream are two underwater pipelines that will supply gas directly from 
Russia to Europe without requiring transit countries such as Ukraine. The total capacity 
of these two Russian projects is larger than the current volume of gas flowing through 
Ukraine into Europe.  These projects should increase natural gas flows to Europe, but 
the market power of Russia over Europe cannot be underestimated. In addition to the 
aforementioned pipeline projects, numbers of large LNG import terminals are in the 
process of construction, such as the GATE Terminal in the Netherlands and the Polskie 
terminal in Poland. The routing of LNG cargoes not only provides flexibility, but also 
allows for rapid responses to uncertain demands (Hayes, 2006).  Proposed LNG 
projects enable more LNG to be distributed throughout Europe as well as an export 
opportunity for LNG exporters.   Any volumes of LNG exported from the U.S. 
potentially provide an additional option for European supply diversity to mitigate 
Russian market power. 
Finally, U.S. LNG import facilities can be readily converted into LNG export terminals. 
Construction costs for LNG terminals have increased greatly due to the high price of 
steel. It costs approximately $1,000 per ton per annum (tpa) in 2012 as compared to 
$200 in the early 2000s to build a new liquefaction plant. However, the cost of 
converting an LNG import terminal to one that can export is approximately half of 
building a new terminal, at $625 per tpa, as indicated by the Sabine Pass project ($5 
billion for a capacity of 8 Mtpa) (the Economist, 2012). There are twelve LNG import 
terminals in the United States, with a total capacity of 19.1 billion cubic feet per day 
(Bcfd) (Henderson, 2012). In the recent past, most of these terminals have been used 





import terminals have been redundant because of the rapid growth of the U.S. domestic 
shale gas production. To maintain their operation, there have been a number of re-
export applications filed with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). In these cases, 
natural gas companies can use LNG import terminals to receive LNG cargo from 
different sources; they will then wait for higher prices and sell back to the LNG spot 
markets (Ratner, 2011). However, some of the terminals have also been developed to 
export domestic natural gas to import countries such as Sabine Pass Terminal. As of 
March 2012, the DOE had approved a total export capacity of 84 Bcm/y, accounting 
for approximately 15% of the total U.S. consumption in 2011. Seven export terminals 
will be fully operational by 2018. With this capacity, the U.S. will be the third largest 
exporter of LNG behind Qatar and Australia. 
Although natural gas producers are considering exporting U.S. LNG for a number of 
reasons and in spite of already approved export licenses, this issue of U.S. LNG exports 
remains a subject of debate. The topic has gained special attention from Americans, as 
it has raised concerns regarding the influence of U.S. LNG exports on domestic gas 
prices and consumers, the U.S. economy, and the environment. Some experts believe 
that gas exports will result in a net benefit for the U.S. economy. Revenue from LNG 
exports can contribute to enhancing the U.S. trade balance (The Washington Post, 
2012), taxes and royalty fees on natural gas producers increase state and local 
government revenue, and one LNG project can create 5,000 jobs (Folks, 2012). In 
addition, LNG exports could create revenue and jobs in upstream natural gas 
production.  In 2010, the Pennsylvania State government received $1.1 billion in state 





140,000 jobs to date (Considine et al., 2011). 
Opponents argue that free trade in the LNG markets will harm U.S. consumers. They 
claim that U.S. prices will increase as no gap between the global price and the domestic 
price exists (Olson, 2012). The higher domestic gas prices could reduce the competitive 
advantage for the manufacturers who use natural gas to produce plastics and chemicals 
(Dlouhy, A., Jennifer, 2013). Furthermore, some people are concerned that exporting 
LNG would lead to increased hydraulic fracturing activity, or “fracking,” thus 
threatening the health of local residents and increasing water usage and contamination. 
Environmental groups would rather retain U.S. natural gas for domestic power 
generation to reduce carbon pollution in the power sector.   
As debates among various groups continue, the U.S. must ask how exports will affect 
both the domestic and international markets. Several studies have been conducted to 
examine the influence of U.S. exports on domestic prices. The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA, 2012) has considered two different volumes of LNG exports (6 
Bcfd and 12 Bcfd) in combination with other assumptions (e.g., shale estimated 
ultimate recovery (EUR) and economic growth) and found U.S. domestic prices will 
increase from 9.6% to 32% by 2025 under different assumptions. The Deloitte Center 
for Energy Solutions (Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, 2011) assumed 6 Bcfd of 
LNG export using a dynamic model and calculated a 1.7% increase between 2016 and 
2035. Navigant Consulting (Navigant Consulting Inc., 2012) investigated the effects of 
two export scenarios (3.6 Bcfd and 6.6 Bcfd) from three different export terminals and 
determined that LNG exports would result in a 6% increase compared to the reference 





by assuming a particular volume of LNG exports from the U.S. but did not allow for 
global trade interactions. Medlock (2012) suggested that the impact of U.S. LNG 
exports should be done in the context of international trade and conducted an analysis 
using the Rice World Gas Trade Model. This study found that exporting U.S. LNG 
from the Gulf of Mexico is not profitable when land costs (the total cost of feed gas 
costs, liquefaction, and transportation) are compared with European and Asian market 
prices in the long term.  Henderson (2012) concluded that the U.S. price, at $5/MMBtu, 
is no longer profitable in European markets in the short term. However, in Asian 
markets, U.S. gas prices can go up to $10/MMBtu before they become unprofitable. 
Although these two studies investigated the influence of U.S. gas exports in the context 
of international trade, there have been no attempts to numerically analyze the potential 
effects of U.S. LNG exports on global markets as well as market dynamics. 
In contrast to previous studies, this study analyzes the effects on both U.S. domestic 
and global gas markets and presents the results with respect to domestic prices, 
production, and consumption. In addition, this study considers several possible 
scenarios related to U.S. exports, including the CO2 reduction policy, increased 
demands for gas in Asia, and the new European pipeline projects, which are likely to 
influence global markets in the next decade. These results offer a better understanding 
for policy makers and decision makers. 
Section 2.2 presents a discussion of the study methods and model calibration. Section 
2.3 provides an overview of the study. Section 2.4 discusses the potential effects of 





of U.S. LNG exports on Asian markets. Finally, Section 2.6 summarizes the research 
and presents a list of recommendations for future work. 
2.2 Study methods and model calibration 
2.2.1 The World Gas Model  
As a tool for studying the global influence of U.S. LNG exports, this study uses the 
World Gas Model (WGM), developed at the University of Maryland (UMD) with 
cooperation from DIW Berlin (Gabriel et al., 2012) and was originally based on the 
works by Gabriel et al. (2005a, 2005b). WGM is a large-scale mixed complementarity 
model of the global gas markets where agents include natural gas producers, traders, 
storage operators, an integrated pipeline and system operator, and marketers. The role 
of each market agent in WGM is summarized as follows: 
• Producers supply natural gas to their dedicated traders and the producers are 
modeled as optimizing their profits subject to engineering bounds on daily and 
time-horizon production levels; 
• Traders also are modeled as maximizing their profits and buy gas from either 
producers or storage operators during high-demand seasons and selling it to the 
local market or exporting it internationally via high-pressure pipelines and/or 
LNG vessels; 
• Storage operators optimizing their profits by buying gas in low-demand 
seasons and selling it back to traders during high-demand seasons taking into 





• An integrated pipeline and system operator assigns the pipeline capacity to 
traders and makes decisions regarding the expansion of the pipeline capacity 
in order to maximize its profit;  
• Marketers distribute gas to end users represented by an inverse demand curve. 
Collecting the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for all market agent 
optimization problems along with market-clearing conditions connecting among the 
players leads to the overall mixed complementarity problem. (Gabriel et al., 2012) 
provides more details regarding the mathematical formulation of the WGM.  In the 
WGM, traders have a weighted combination of both price-taking and price-making 
behaviors. On one extreme, they can be price-takers with no market power consistent 
with perfect competition.  Conversely, they can also be Nash-Cournot players who can 
manipulate market prices along with other traders or some weighted combination of 
these two extremes. The particular weight is determined by the node (country) in 
question and the calibration with historical values.   Another feature of traders is that 
they consider long-term LNG contracts as lower-bound constraints in their 
optimization problems. Lastly, the WGM uses LNG transportation costs, and losses are 
taken as constant, distance-dependent values in terms of nautical miles. The application 
here differs from this previous paper by extending the time horizon to 2050 and 
including environmental considerations and other scenarios as described later in this 
study. 
In the current version, the WGM takes into consideration environmental aspects. The 





market. In addition, we can impose regional CO2 prices ($/ton of CO2e) as a cost on 
market participants. This new feature is a benefit for conducting CO2 reduction policy 
analysis.  Although natural gas produces the least carbon dioxide relative to other fossil 
fuels, the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 1999) stated that one million cubic 
meters (Mcm) of natural gas emits approximately 2.76 metric tons of carbon dioxide 
emission equivalent along the natural gas supply chain from the natural gas producers 
to consumers. The gas industry (INGAA, 2000) assumes that 27% of the carbon dioxide 
is emitted from the production process, 12% in the processing process, 28% in 
transmission, 24% from the distributing process, and 9% from storage. The shares of 
emissions for each market participant based on the proportion of CO2 emissions are 
summarized in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 Carbon dioxide equivalent emitted by market participants in metric tons (Mt) 
per million cubic meters (Mcm)  
Market participants CO2e (MT/MCM)  
Producers 0.105  
Traders 1.194  
Storage operators 0.017  
Transmission and system operators 0.249  
Marketers 1.194  
Total emissions  2.760  
 
The inclusion of CO2 emissions values allows for the analysis of carbon policy impacts 
on the global natural gas industry and measures the magnitude of the influence of policy 
at the country or regional level. To account for carbon dioxide equivalent emissions, a 
carbon cost term and adjusting factors are incorporated into the WGM. The carbon 





(GCAM) developed by the Joint Global Change Research Institute (JGCRI); see Clarke 
et al. (2008) and Calvin et al. (2009). This cooperation between UMD and JGCRI is a 
part of the project “Linking Global and Regional Energy Strategies” (LinkS) (SINTEF, 
2012).  The purpose of this project is to analyze the impact of climate policy by linking 
the global climate model and the energy model. Therefore, the input data from GCAM 
for the carbon policy analyses includes carbon prices that are generated for each region 
modeled in the WGM. The carbon cost term was later extended to a newer version of 
the WGM, in which the effect of carbon costs can be applied to both the supplier side 
of the market and the consumer side but it was not used in this study; see Avetisyan 
(2013) for details. 
In the current version, the WGM also characterizes three types of producers: 
conventional gas, shale gas, and non-shale unconventional gas in each region of the 
U.S. The production capacity is calibrated based on data from the U.S. Department of 
Energy’s Annual Energy Outlook (2010). The U.S. contains a total of 24 natural gas 
producers, of which seven are shale gas and seven are unconventional. The rest of the 
U.S. producers are conventional producers. In addition, WGM also distinguishes 
between two types of natural gas producers in China: conventional gas and shale/coal 
bed methane producers. Finally, in the version of the WGM used in this study, U.S. 
shale gas exports to Asia and Europe were allowed different from previous versions of 
the model. This addition is an important feature that enables the analysis of the current 





2.2.2 Model calibration   
The World Gas Model outcome is calibrated to fit global natural gas market trends in 
2010 and incorporates natural gas market projections from multiple sources, such as 
the EC European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030 (European Commission, 2008) 
and Natural Gas Information (IEA, 2007). Moreover, because of concerns regarding 
the dramatic growth in unconventional gas production in North America, the 
unconventional production reference from the forecast presented in the Annual Energy 
Outlook (AEO, 2009) is used. The model outcome for China considers the development 
of shale gas in China and the rapid growth of China’s natural gas demand upon release 
of China’s 12th five-year energy plan in 2011. China’s natural gas consumption is 
specifically calibrated according to the forecast from China’s Natural Gas Market 
Outlook (Zhaofang, 2010), and the work by Henderson (2011) is used as a reference 
for unconventional Chinese production.  
2.3 Overview of the study 
The organization of this study is divided into two parts due to different hypothetical 
U.S. LNG export scenarios and market assumptions that are likely to influence global 
gas markets in the next decade. The scenarios and assumptions are as follows; 
• U.S. LNG export study part I: “Domestic and Global Impacts” uses the market 
assumptions in Section 2.2 and assumes contracts with minimum levels and 
specific destinations for the U.S. LNG exports to Asia and Europe. Part 1 





• U.S. LNG export study part II: “Asian LNG Focus” includes three scenarios 
and assumes that the U.S. can export globally without restriction to the 
destinations in question. In addition, to capture strong demand growth in Asia, 
the WGM incorporates Asian demand projections from 2015-2035 based on the 
World Energy Outlook, 2011 New Policy Scenario (WEO, 2011) Section 2.5 
discusses scenarios and results for Study Part II.    
2.4. U.S. LNG export study part I:   
2.4.1 Domestic and Global Impacts: scenario description  
This section describes the six scenarios that assume a lower bound on the contracted 
gas volumes for U.S. LNG exports. In the Base Case, the U.S. has export contracts of 
21.9 Bcm to Europe and Asia. This amount is minimum where the WGM determines 
any extra amount. We have defined two increased U.S. LNG export contract levels, 
99.7 Bcm (Medium Exports) and123Bcm (High Exports), to examine the effect of 
increased U.S. LNG exports on domestic markets, as well as global markets.  Then the 
Medium Export scenario is combined with three additional scenarios with alternative 
assumptions: first, Medium Exports with renewable policies gauges how the climate 
policy with CO2 prices might affect natural gas markets. Second, Medium Exports with 
pipeline projects are used to observe the competition facing U.S. LNG exports and new 
European pipeline projects. Third, Medium Exports with low U.S. production focuses 
on how a ten percent reduction in U.S. production may affect the markets. Table 2-2 
summarizes the scenarios that we consider in this study. 






Name  Abbreviation Description 
Base Base 
Reference Case: U.S. 
exports 21.9 Bcm/y from 
the Sabine Pass terminal to 




U.S. exports 99.7 Bcm/y to 
Asia and Europe  
High Exports High Exports 
U.S. exports 123 Bcm/y to 







 U.S. exports 99.7 Bcm/y 








U.S. exports 99.7 Bcm/y 
along with the 
development of the 
European pipeline projects 
(Nord Stream, South 






Medium Exports/ Low U.S. Prod 
U.S. exports 99.7 Bcm/y 
with a 10% decline in 
production beginning in 
2035 
 
2.4.2 U.S. LNG export scenarios 
First, we consider the Base Case, which includes U.S. LNG contracts with Cheniere 
Energy (Cheniere Energy, 2012). The Base Case results are not intended as a forecast 
of natural gas production, consumption, prices, and other elements but rather as a point 
of comparison for the analysis. We investigate two LNG export scenarios based on two 
different volumes of U.S. LNG exports over the 2010-2040 periods. We assume that 
the U.S. begins exporting natural gas in 2015 based on long-term contracts between 





Table 2-3 Cheniere Energy long term take or pay contracts 
   
 BG Group 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa GAIL KOGAS 
Annual contract 
(Bcm/y) 7.87 5.013 5.013 5.013 
Annual Revenue  $723 Million $454 Million $548 Million 
$548 
Million 
Revenue  $/MMBtu $2.25  $2.49  $3.00  $3.00  
Term 20 years  20 years  20 years  20 years  
(Source: Cheniere Energy, 2012)  
The first scenario, namely Medium Exports, considers the global export of up to 99.7 
Bcm/y of LNG. This scenario is based on one third of the total export capacity of the 
Non-FTA6 export applications that were filed with the U.S. Department of Energy in 
August 2013, as indicated in Table 2-4. This fraction is based on an earlier total 
capacity when the study was initiated. In this analysis, we assume that the U.S. exports 
from three locations: the East Coast, the West Coast, and the Gulf of Mexico as 
indicated in Table 2-5. WGM uses port-to-port distances to calculate the transportation 
costs of LNG shipping. A longer distance increases transportation costs.   Hence, we 
expect the LNG export behavior to involve shipping to closer consumers first, as 
indicated in Table 2-5.  For the second export scenario, (e.g., High Export), we assume 
that the U.S. has an export capacity of up to 123 Bcm/y. 
Table 2-4 Applications received by DOE to export domestically produced U.S. LNG 
as of August, 2013  
                                                 
6FTA with the U.S. requires national treatment for trade in natural gas, including Australia, Bahrain, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Mexico, 







Total of all 
applications Approved Pending 
FTA 
application 
30.62 Bcf/d                                     
( 316.51 Bcm/y ) 
29.93 Bcf/d                         
(309.38 Bcm/y) 
0.69 Bcf/d                     





5.6 Bcf/d                                  
( 57.88 Bcm/y) 
23.61 Bcf/d                     
(244.0 Bcm/y) 
Table 2-5. WGM export terminals 
WGM Terminal  Capacity  Actual Terminals  Export to 
West Coast terminal 1.2 Bcf/d Jordan Cove  Asia 
East Coast terminal  1.0 Bcf/d Cove Point  Europe 
Gulf Coast terminal 7.3 Bcf/d  Sabine Pass 
Cameron LNG                 




In addition to the two considered LNG export volumes, the Medium 
Exports/LowU.S.Prod scenario represents the analysis of a reduced U.S. production 
due to a rapidly declining rate of unconventional production. To analyze the potential 
influence of U.S. LNG exports, we implement long-term contracts as a lower bound in 
a constraint in the U.S. trader optimization problem in WGM and then observe the 
dynamic changes in the global and domestic markets between the various scenarios 
outlined above. 
2.4.3 Global 20-20-20 policy scenario 
The third scenario (e.g., the Renewable Policy scenario) is the global 20-20-20 policy 
scenario obtained from JGCRI. The main policy assumptions are based on the EU 20-
20-20 (The EU climate and policy package, 2012). The purpose of the EU 20-20-20 





improve energy efficiency by 20%, and ensure the use of 20% renewable energy by 
2020. The global 20-20-20 scenario from JGCRI differs from EU20-20-20 because it 
is expanded across the world, and new targets are established every fifteen years, as 
indicated in (Kalvin et al., 2014). The policy involves developed and developing 
countries.  We assume that the policy is initiated in Europe in 2015. Subsequently, 
developed countries participate in 2030, and developing countries enter in 2045. 
However, there is no policy commitment for the least developed countries. Details 
regarding each target are provided in (Kalvin et al., 2014). 
For the policy to be successful, regional CO2 prices ($/ton of CO2e) obtained from 
(Kalvin et al., 2014) appear in the natural gas supply chain. The higher costs are likely 
to force producers in the developing and developed countries to reduce their 
production, whereas lower-cost producers (e.g., producers in the least developed 
countries) will have production incentives. The countries that do not participate in the 
policy (e.g., Nigeria and Qatar) will increase their output and export levels. To 
determine impacts on U.S. LNG exports, we combine the Medium Export scenario 
(99.7 Bcm/y) and the global 20-20-20 policy to address the hypothesis pertaining to 
how a climate policy involving additional CO2 cost will influence the natural gas 
market.  It is important to note that the WGM only endogenously considers the natural 
gas markets across the world.  Thus, the effects of increased carbon taxes from such a 
global 20-20-20 policy will only be reflected by spatially heterogeneous CO2 prices.  
However, these prices as determined by the integrated assessment model GCAM do in 





2.4.4 European pipeline projects 
In this scenario, we investigate the competition between U.S. LNG exports and selected 
pipeline projects that involve Europe and/or Russia. As shown in Table 6, the Nord 
Stream, South Stream, and Southern Corridor Projects have been incorporated into the 
WGM. The WGM allows new pipelines to be built and expanded as a function of the 
pipeline operator’s investment decision in an endogenous manner. We set the 
maximum expansion per year according to the expected capacity as indicated in Table 
2-6. Initially, the pipelines potentially have the capacities described in Table 2-6. 
However, the expected capacity or expansion will be determined through the pipeline 
operator’s optimization problem. The pipeline operator considers expanding a 
particular pipeline endogenously if it is profitable. Some pipelines can be expanded 
every time period, but others may not be expanded at all if the pipeline operator finds 
that the expansion cost is higher than the anticipated benefits. The WGM considers the 
cost of pipeline expansion in terms of the length and type (on-shore or off-shore) of 
pipeline and distinguishes an initial cost for new construction and expansion. In this 
analysis, we largely focus on how new pipelines and increased LNG exports affect the 
markets, especially the flows from Russian pipelines into Europe, and observe future 
pipeline investments.  
Table 2-6 European pipeline projects 






Nord Stream  Russia-Germany 55 
2011 (27.5 Bcm) 
2012 (55 Bcm) 
South Stream  Russian-Bulgaria  63 
2015 (15.5 Bcm) 





Southern Corridor  
Part 1: Turkey-Azerbaijan 16 2018 (16 Bcm) 
Part 2: Turkey-Romania  10 2018 (10 Bcm) 
Sources:  (Nord Stream, 2012), (South Stream, 2012), and (Berdikeeva, 2012) 
 
2.4.5 Results and analysis of part I (Domestic and Global Impacts, 
scenarios 1-6) 
2.4.5.1 Base case 
To describe the Base Case, the projected regional production and consumption for 
2020 are presented in Figure 2-2.The outcome presents the development of 
production and consumption in 2020. Remarkably, large differences can be observed 
between the production and consumption of Europe (350.9 Bcm) and China7 (140.1 
Bcm). The Middle East, the Former Soviet Union, and Africa are the main suppliers 
to Europe, Asia, and China. Production and consumption are nearly balanced in North 
America and South America.  
 
                                                 
7In the current version of WGM we separated China from Asia Pacific because model output for China 
was recalibrated to specific sources. Also, we pay attention to the development of shale gas in China as 
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Figure 2-2 WGM production, consumption (Bcm/y), and wholesale prices 
($/MMBtu) 
In terms of regional price results8, Figure 2-2 shows that in 2020, Europe and China 
will be in the highest range at $8.40-$8.90. N. America, S. America, and Asia-Pacific 
constitute the middle range at $7-$7.40. The producing regions, the Former Soviet 
Union, Africa, and the Middle East, represent the lowest range at $2.50-$3.50. 
Although the WGM accounts for the growth of unconventional production in North 
America, the price remains high because of a presumed increase in consumption for 
the Base Case in 2020. 
 
Figure 2-3 WGM Base Case, U.S. Natural Gas Production, Bcm 
Figure 2-3 suggests that in 2020, the U.S. will produce a total of 640 Bcm, including 
139.8 Bcm from shale gas production.  In Figure 2-3, shale gas will account for 20% 
                                                 
8In terms of country prices, Japan is projected to have the highest estimated wholesale prices ($10.12) 
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of total production with the Barnett and Haynesville shale basins, located in the West 
South Central part of the country contributing approximately 60% of the total shale gas 
production (87.2 Bcm). 
 
2.4.5.2 Domestic effects of U.S. LNG exports 
To understand the influence of U.S. LNG exports on the domestic market, we 
investigate the hypothesis that these exports could affect the domestic markets. Each 
of the possible export volumes is compared with the Base Case and with one another 
to gauge the magnitude of exports’ influence. Figure 2-4 shows the projected average 
U.S. price comparison from 2020 to 2040. The increased level of U.S. LNG exports 
will cause price increases of $0.70-$1 MMBtu in the Medium Exports and $1.03-$1.53 
MMBtu in the High Exports from 2020 to 2040. The average price increase as a 
percentage over the time horizon is 8.4% under the Medium Exports and 10.9% under 
the High Exports. 
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The maximum price effect is $1 for the Medium Exports and $1.30 for the High 
Exports. An explanation is that the U.S. is committed to exporting gas to Europe and 
Asia; thus, the total quantity produced becomes the domestic consumption plus the 
quantity exported and leads to increased domestic production levels. This change 
induces an increase in the logarithmic term in the Golombeck production cost function 
(Golombeck et al., 1995, 1998) used in the WGM, which reflects increasing marginal 
costs of production. Thus, less gas is available for domestic markets without higher 
prices. The Golombeck production cost function characterizes the nature of natural gas 
production because higher costs are expected when production is close to capacity.  
In terms of U.S. natural gas production, commitment to LNG exports results in 
increased production in the U.S., especially in shale gas, because of the anticipation of 
domestic consumption and long-term contract requirements. Figure 2-5 shows that the 
total U.S. production increases considerably by 3.8% under the Medium Exports and 
5.9% under the High Exports in 2020, and this effect appears to be more pronounced 
in 2040, with 4.5% growth under the Medium Exports and approximately a 7.3% 






Figure 2-5 U.S. Production and Consumption (Bcm/y) for 2020  
 
Figure 2-6 U.S. Production and Consumption (Bcm/y) for 2040  
Next, we closely examine U.S. production in details. Shale gas production plays a key 
role to satisfy future natural gas demands even without increased LNG exports.  Under 
the Base Case, shale gas production in 2040 will increase by approximately 24.9% 
relative to the 2020 level, and conventional production will increase by 6.2%. In 2040, 
shale gas production is projected to be higher in the Medium and High Exports 
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Although we see only small percent increases in domestic production, the total 
production still satisfies domestic consumption and export requirements. This is how a 
new equilibrium, where demand and supply are met, is adjusted by small increases in 
production and diminishing demands due to higher prices. 
The introduction of U.S. LNG exports will lead to reduced domestic consumption, 
presumably because of higher natural gas prices under two increased export scenarios. 
In 2020, U.S. consumption declines by 5.5% under the Medium Exports and by 7.9% 
under the High Exports relative to the Base Case, as indicated in Figure 2-6. Under the 
High Exports, the U.S. experiences the greatest effect of exporting LNG as domestic 
consumption declines nearly 60 Bcm in 2020 and approximately 50 Bcm by 2040. The 
difference in consumption between the export scenarios and the Base Case are smaller 
in subsequent years. Thus, the results may suggest that the long-term influence on 
consumption will recover if the supply is sufficiently elastic to respond to an increase 
in total production.  
To determine the influence on increased export policies, we must observe the welfare 
changes from the market participants, namely the producers and consumers, to 
ascertain the extent to which they are affected. Since exporting LNG results in higher 
domestic prices, we compared a consumer surplus in the export scenario with the Base 
Case to examine the effect of increased prices on the domestic consumer. As indicated 
in Table 2-7, the increasing loss resulting from consumer surplus reaches 10.23% under 





difference in 2020 will be smaller in 2040 as it is only 6.81% under the Medium Exports 
and 11.21% under the High Exports. 
Table 2-7 U.S. welfare in billions $ and percent difference 
  














2020 182.003 163.383 148.102 -10.23% -18.63% 
2040 301.502 280.959 267.704 -6.81% -11.21% 
Producer Surplus  
2020 51.804 70.570 87.206 36.23% 68.34% 
2040 86.081 106.980 124.176 24.28% 44.25% 
Social Welfare  
2020 233.807 233.953 235.308 0.06% 0.64% 
2040 387.583 387.939 391.880 0.09% 1.11% 
In contrast, because of an increase in export volume and higher domestic prices, the 
producer surplus will increase by approximately 36.23% under the Medium Exports 
and 68.34% under the High Exports in 2020 but will decrease in 2040. An increase in 
prices reduces the consumer surplus but increases the producer surplus.  As a result, 
export policies increase social welfare by approximately 0.09% under the Medium 
Exports and 1.11% under the High Exports in 2040.  Medium and High Exports have 
a positive influence on the economy in term of social welfare measurement, but the 
increase is relatively small. 
Overall, the WGM results indicate that increased natural gas exports will lead to 
increased domestic natural gas production, higher domestic gas prices, and reduced 
domestic natural gas consumption. We may conclude that the major domestic effects 





• 99.7 Bcm in exports will lead to a $0.84-$1/MMBtu increase in domestic prices, 
a 23-33 Bcm decrease in consumption, and an 18-30 Bcm/y increase in 
production levels between 2020 and 2040 
• Exporting 123 Bcm will lead to a $1.03-1.53/MMBtu increase in domestic 
prices, a 38-59 Bcm decrease in consumption, and a 31-50 Bcm/y increase in 
production levels between 2020 and 2040 
• Only small social welfare increases in the U.S. economy will be observed  
2.4.5.3 Global influence of U.S. LNG exports 
This section analyzes the global effects of U.S. LNG exports. Table 2-8 depicts the 
WGM results for production of natural gas around the world by region for 2020 and 
2040.  

















Africa 319 314.7 312.7 432.5 427.2 
426.
3 
Asia-Pacific 297 295 292.3 312.7 311.4 310.9 
China 146.7 146.7 146.7 176.4 176.4 176.4 
Europe 258.4 255.4 251.8 224.4 223.8 222.2 
F. Soviet U. 973.2 962.2 955.2 1121.6 1117.2 1114 
Mid-East 491.7 486 483.6 737.4 727.5 723.5 
N.America9 686.1 711.9 724.7 754.3 780.5 795.1 
S.America 221.7 222.1 222.1 315 314.8 315.3 
It is important to note that N. America’s production increases considerably under the 
export scenarios (especially the High Exports) compared with the Base Case. The 
difference between the Base Case and High Exports for N. American production will 
be approximately 38.6 Bcm/y in 2020 and 40.8 Bcm in 2040 as a result of the 
dramatic increase in U.S. LNG exports. Additionally, the production for the rest of 
the world is slightly affected by the increasing U.S. export volume. Due to an 
introduction of U.S. LNG, producing regions, such as Africa, the Middle East, and 
the Former Soviet Union, exhibit decreases in production of approximately 1.9%, 
1.6%, and 1.8%, respectively, in 2020. In 2040, the production trends are similar to 
those for 2020, with little change relative to the Base Case. A significantly smaller 
effect on production is observed in 2040 relative to that in 2020. For example, the 
Former Soviet Union will reduce production by approximately 18 Bcm/y in 2020 but 
only by 7.6 Bcm/y in 2040 under High Exports. In terms of the global effect on 
                                                 





consumption, Figure 2-7 and 2-8 present the selected region consumption by sources 
for 2020 and 2040.  
 
Figure 2-7 Regional consumption by sources (Bcm/y) for 2020 
 
Figure 2-8 Regional consumption by sources (Bcm/y) for 2040 
 
The most remarkable outcome is that N. American consumption declines by 4.2% in 
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2020, presumably because of the decreased availability of inexpensive gas for domestic 
consumption as a result of increased exports. However, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and 
China exhibit a slight 2%-4% increase in consumption as a result of increased flows 
from U.S. LNG exports. Likewise, the domestic consumption in producing regions 
such as the Former Soviet Union exhibits slight increases although the U.S. does not 
export LNG to the producing regions. An explanation is that this phenomenon is a side 
effect of U.S. LNG exports because the U.S. displaces market shares from prominent 
suppliers in Asia and Europe. Thus, there is more inexpensive gas available for 
domestic consumption for the Former Soviet Union. Under the High Exports, in 2020, 
LNG imports increase significantly, by 50% for Asia and 23% for Europe, with reduced 
domestic flows and imports from pipelines, as indicated in Figure 2-7. In 2040, similar 
patterns of consumption are recapitulated in most regions, but China is less affected 
than in 2020 as shown in Figure 2-8. Total Chinese consumption reaches approximately 
400 Bcm with increased pipeline imports. As a consequence of increased U.S. LNG 
exports, the consumption in importing regions exhibits a slight increase, and LNG 
simultaneously displaces gas importation from pipelines and domestic flows. 



















Table 2-9 shows that the presence of increased U.S. LNG exports will lead to lower 
prices relative to the Base Case, particularly in Asia-Pacific and Europe. In 2020, Asia-
Pacific wholesale prices are expected to be $0.33 and $0.61 less expensive under 
Medium Exports and High Exports, respectively. Likewise, using the same 
comparison, European wholesale prices are $0.24 and $0.46 lower than the Base Case. 
This effect will be less pronounced in 2040. The smaller price gap in later years reflects 
the elasticity of the supply in the long term. Because Asia-Pacific requires more supply 
to meet growing domestic consumption, production is adjusted by increasing 
production capacity in later years to form a new equilibrium. We can see this because 
under the High Exports scenario, Asia-Pacific prices as compared with the Base Case 
will decrease by 8.3 % in 2020, but only by 4.2 % in 2040. Nevertheless, the prices will 
increase greatly for North America. We see this because Table 2-9 shows higher prices 
relative to the Base Case for North America in 2020 (12.7% higher in the Medium 
Exports and 23% under the High Exports), and the same situation will repeat in 2040. 
Asia-Pacific $7.31 $6.99 $6.70 $10.03 $9.72 $9.60 
China $8.47 $8.41 $8.37 $10.89 $10.77 $10.73 
Europe $8.92 $8.68 $8.46 $11.88 $11.66 $11.48 
F. Soviet U. $3.42 $3.36 $3.33 $5.36 $5.27 $5.22 
Mid-East $3.10 $3.05 $3.03 $4.28 $4.20 $4.17 
N.America $7.13 $8.03 $8.84 $9.39 $10.57 $11.10 





Figure 2-9 Prices in importing countries for 2020 and 2040 ($/MMBtu) 
More precisely, Figure 2-9 allows us to investigate the importing countries in greater 
detail. Prices in the Medium and High Exports are lower than in the Base Case in both 
2020 and 2040. Among the importing countries, Spain exhibits the largest differential 
for both export scenarios because in the WGM, Spain has almost no natural gas 
production and relies on imports nearly one hundred percent. With the presence of U.S. 
LNG, inexpensive gas from the U.S. displaces some of the prominent suppliers and 
diminishes prices. Although in this analysis, the U.S. supplies gas to only four 
countries, the pipeline system in the WGM allows gas from the receiving countries to 
be distributed to other countries. Hence, these four countries can transport gas to other 
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Figure 2-10 Imports (+) and exports (-) in Bcm/y, 2020    
Figure 2-10 presents the trades in 2020.  Exports from N. America substantially 
increase by 60.18 Bcm in the Medium Exports and 105.09 Bcm in the High Exports. 
Under the High Exports, Asian and European imports increase by 3% and 
4.5%respectively as compared with the Base Case. However, the producing regions, 
namely, Africa, the F. Soviet U., and the Middle East, reduce their exports due to 
U.S.LNG exports. In 2020, Russia has the greatest effect on trade and exhibits the 
highest decrease (nearly 8.4 %) under the High Exports. 
The effects on producer profits follow the natural gas trades discussed above. Figure 2-
11 reveals that N. American producers generate 29.5% (45.9%) more profit in the 
Medium Exports (High Exports) than in the Base Case in 2040, but the profits for the 
remainder of the world are slightly lower (1-2% and 2-3% in the Medium and High 
Exports, respectively), likely because of an increase in U.S. LNG exports. The S. 
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Figure 2-11 Producer profits in billions, 2040 
We can conclude that a decrease in producer profits largely occurs in unbalanced trade 
regions10, importing regions and exporting regions. This result occurs because 
inexpensive U.S. LNG replaces market shares from both domestic and international 
suppliers and results in losses for existing suppliers compared with the Base Case.  
2.4.5.4 Other scenarios  
In this section, we consider the significance of European pipeline projects, a sensitivity 
analysis scenario, and renewable policy to assess questions such as the following. How 
would lower U.S. production influence domestic and global prices if the U.S. is 
committed to supplying LNG globally under long-term contracts? What is the result of 
competition between European pipeline projects and U.S. gas exports? Finally, how 
will climate policy change the magnitude of the markets? Additional scenarios are 
compared with the Base Case and the Medium Exports to investigate the hypothesis 
that U.S. LNG exports and markets are affected by climate policy, the uncertainty 
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surrounding unconventional gas production, and the introduction of new pipeline 
projects that will bring more natural gas to Europe. 
In the Medium Exports/Low U.S. Prod, we assume a decline in U.S. production to a 
level 10% lower than that of the Base Case in 2035 and 2040.  This decreasing 
production is characterized by a higher rate of decline in shale gas production and 
possibly limited resources for other natural gas types by future regulations and energy 
policies. In particular, extraction from shale gas resources is depicted as decreasing 
rapidly in the long term as stated in (Cohen, 2009). Hence, the U.S. may confront 
shortfalls in maintaining the production that is necessary to meet growing domestic 
demands and LNG export commitments. The results are shown in Figure 2-12 to 2-17. 
Figure 2-12 indicates that with declining U.S. production in 2040, prices increase by 
$0.50 domestically and $2.16 for N. American prices (see Figure 2-13). 
Moreover, N. American consumption decreases by 9.5%, as shown in Figure 2-14. 
Prices in Europe and Asia remain lower than the prices in the Base Case (Figure 2-13). 
Africa gains benefits from decreased U.S. production by increasing production (Figure 
2-15) and LNG trading in 2040 (Figure 2-16). Moreover, Figure 2-16 suggests that N. 
America will reduce LNG trading by approximately 28% as a result of lower 
production. Thus, we may conclude that even a merely ten percent decrease in 






Figure 2-12 U.S. production in Bcm/y and prices in $/MMBtu from 2020 to 2040 
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Figure 2-14 Consumption by region in 2040 Bcm/y  
Efforts to reduce CO2 emissions by establishing typical targets for regional policy are 
presented in (Kelvin et. al, 2009). Under the policy scenario abbreviated Medium 
Exports/ Renewable Policy the average prices are the most expensive relative to the 
other scenarios, particularly in N. America. Two reasons for this price disparity are the 
CO2 prices, which represent an additional cost to the producers of $45.33 per ton of 
CO2e in 2040, and the effect of exports. The prices in N. America are $2.21 higher than 
in the Base Case (Figure 2-13). Figure 2-13 indicates that prices in rapidly developing 
and developed regions, namely, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and China, exhibit an increase 
of $0.25-$0.55 because of increased CO2 prices. However, the prices in the least 
developed regions, expressly Africa and the Middle East, continue to increase for a 
different reason. Because no renewable policy has been implemented in Africa or the 
Middle-East, producers in these regions increase production output and export to a 




















developed regions, as shown in Figure 2-15-2-16. Therefore, there is an incentive for 
producers in the least developed regions to increase production. 












































































































Figure 2-16 LNG imports (+) and exports (-) for key regions in Bcm/y, 2020 and 
2040 
More interestingly, LNG imports by Europe and Asia increase dramatically, 
presumably because of reductions in domestic production. Similarly, in 2040, LNG 
exports from Africa and the Middle East also increase significantly by 22.42 Bcm and 
21.22 Bcm, respectively (Figure 2-16). LNG trading plays an important role in 
balancing demand in the Renewable policy scenario. Production has shifted to regions 
that have not implemented policies. This type of phenomenon demonstrates that when 
a policy is not applied equally, some participants will benefit from not being under the 
policy. Because global trading is allowed, this condition may affect the efficiency of 
the policy.  
Next, we gauge the effects of competition between European pipeline projects and U.S. 
gas exports under the Medium Exports/Pipeline Projects Scenario. Three pipeline 
projects are considered. The Nord Stream 11and South Stream pipelines will transport 
gas from the Russian reserves directly to European markets, whereas the Southern 
Corridor will bring gas from the Caspian region to Europe. Comparing this scenario to 
the Medium Exports, we initially note that U.S. production remains unaffected by the 
new European pipelines (see Figure 2-15). Likewise, the Medium Exports/Pipeline 
Projects scenario does not affect the remainder of the world in terms of production, as 
detailed in Figure 2-12. Figure 2-13 shows that prices remain the same in most regions, 
except for the Former Soviet Union and Europe. Europe has the most inexpensive 
                                                 





prices among all of the scenarios because of the increased supply from U.S. exports 
and the introduction of new pipelines. In contrast, the Former Soviet Union exhibits a 
price increase of $0.10 compared with the Medium Exports, perhaps because increased 
exports via the pipelines may result in less gas available for domestic consumption at 
low prices. Only a small rise in consumption occurs in Europe (Figure 2-14). The 
increased pipeline capacity in Europe slightly displaces some of the LNG imports, 
perhaps from Africa, Russia, and the Middle East, as indicated in Figure 2-16.  
Furthermore, we observe the flows from Russia. The Russian flow patterns for the Base 
Case and Medium Export/Pipeline Projects are summarized in Table 2-10. There are 
no flows from Russia to Germany or Bulgaria under the Base Case because the Nord 
Stream and South Stream Pipelines are not considered in the Base Case, which the 
Russian flows to European markets require to bypass transit countries, namely, Ukraine 
and Poland.12 However, flows through the Nord Stream Pipeline will increase greatly, 
from 0 Bcm/y to 63.7 Bcm/y (see Table 2-10), when the Nord Stream pipeline is 
available. Overall, the Russian flow patterns will change dramatically because Russian 
traders who want to maximize profit must consider avoiding transit fees by sending gas 
directly to Germany. The flows via transits will decrease significantly from the Former 
Soviet Union to Poland (Ukraine) by 20.54 Bcm (63.01 Bcm) in 2020, and the influence 
of the new pipelines will become more pronounced in terms of bypassing the Ukraine 
and Poland in 2040 (Table 2-10). Moreover, Russia will lose 74% of the European 
LNG markets because of the increased volume of U.S. exports to Spain and the United 
                                                 





Kingdom in 2040, as shown in Table 2-10. Therefore, Russia will increase the flow via 
the pipelines by approximately 16% in 2040 to compensate for the losses of LNG 
market share (see the total pipeline export in Table 2-10). In the Medium 
Exports/Pipeline Projects, three pipeline projects compete with one another and the 
U.S. exports. Consequently, these situations create a positive effect in Europe as the 
result in an increase in consumption with lower prices, as shown in Figure 2-14,2-15. 
However, although the new pipelines offer flexibility in the delivery of gas to Europe, 
Russian production levels do not significantly increase. The explanation is that Russia 
can increase profit at the same level of production, as evidenced in Table 2-11. New 
pipelines reduce transit fees ($1.1 billion in 2020 and $2.75 billion in 2040) and 
increase the profits of Russian traders ($1.88 billion in 2020 and $2 billion in 2040), as 
indicated in Table 2-11. 
Table 2-10. Russian natural gas flows (exports) in Bcm/y in 2020 and 2040 










Canada 0.00 2.58 0.12 1.95 
France 0.00 0.00 2.96 0.00 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 2.25 0.00 
Spain 4.97 1.46 5.47 3.12 
U.K. 1.94 0.00 9.25 0.00 
LNG Total 6.91 4.04 20.03 5.07 
Pipe 
Germany 0.00 63.77 0.00 105.82 
Bulgaria 0.00 21.24 0.00 23.90 
Kazakhstan  2.50 0.00 12.22 10.78 







Table 2-11. Total transit fees13 and profits for Russian traders in billion $/year, 2020 
and 2030 
 









e Policy  
2020 
Transit Fees 20.392 19.303 19.268 21.719 
Trader Profit  25.686 24.514 27.566 28.043 
2040 
Transit Fees 27.225 25.748 24.474 28.521 
Trader Profit  39.746 37.701 41.740 41.618 
It is interesting to note the investment for each pipeline. Initially, the Nord Stream 
pipeline will have a capacity of 55 Bcm/y; subsequently, it will be expanded to as high 
as 109.9 Bcm in 2040 (see Figure 2-17).  Nevertheless, the South Stream pipeline 
capacity will be only 24.83 Bcm/y in 2040. This figure represents only half of the 
expected capacity as indicated in Table 2-6. There are three reasons for the reduced 
expansion. First, this pipeline competes with another project, namely, the Southern 
Corridor, which can also deliver inexpensive gas from the Caspian region to the same 
consumption node. 
                                                 
13Transit fees in WGM are the total of regulated fee plus congestion fees. The regulated fee is an 
exogenous factor for each pipeline, but the congestion fee is the value of the dual variables associated 
with the flow conservation constraint in the pipeline operator optimization problem.  
Poland 50.24 29.70 63.82 28.91 
Ukraine 165.68 102.67 141.28 79.47 
Pipe Total 235.91 234.32 244.89 274.04 
Total 






Figure 2-17 Pipeline capacity expansion over time (Bcm) 
Second, the South Stream expansion costs more compared with the Southern corridor 
project because of the off-shore characteristics and longer distances. Finally, the WGM 
has a low pipeline capacity to connect from Bulgaria to other European countries due 
to model restriction. Therefore, this consumption node cannot be treated as a transit 
area, which results in decreased expansion capacity.  
2.5. U.S. LNG export study part II:   
2.5.1 Asian LNG Focus:  scenario description  
 
This section closely examines on the impact of the U.S. LNG exports on Asian markets. 
Recently, Asia has been considered to be the area with the fastest growing consumption 
in the next decades driven by the strong population growth as well as other factors 
(WEO, 2011). In World Energy Outlook (WEO)’s 2011 research data, with the increase 
of new policy scenario projects, the total demand in Asia will reach above 1,200 Bcm 
by 2035. Major expansion of gas use in Asia will result from implementing the 12th 
Five-Year Plan, announced by China in 2011. In particular, the new policy will push 





















the domestic consumption for China above 500 Bcm by 2035, from 100 Bcm in 2010. 
Also, the growth of gas demands for the power sector in Japan will increase because of 
the effects of the nuclear disaster in 2010. Therefore, to capture new demand trends in 
Asia, we incorporate Asian demand projections from 2015-2035 for this analysis as 
indicted in (WEO, 2011) 
Asian suppliers, namely Australia, have at least ten projects either under construction 
or under consideration, starting at the end of 2013. The seven LNG export terminals, 
which are under construction, should allow Australia to bypass Qatar as the world's 
largest LNG exporter by 2018 (Ross, 2013). However, additional supply expansion 
may be uncertain and more difficult to accomplish because of project delays, which 
will increase the cost of investment. In addition, cheap American gas could threaten 
Australia due to the difference pricing regimes. The LNG pricing in Asia is mostly 
linked to oil indexation under long-term contract while the LNG trades in North 
America are based on gas indexation, which offers lower prices depending on Henry 
Hub prices. The Australian LNG suppliers may need to reduce prices to make it more 
competitive with the U.S. LNG (Ross, 2013). Therefore, it is interesting to see how the 
U.S. LNG exports compete with the Australian gas. Therefore, three different scenarios 
are simulated to analyze the impact of the U.S. LNG exports on Asia and the 
competitiveness over Asian markets as follows: 
• The Reference Scenario, abbreviated “Reference”, uses the demand projections 
for Asia based on (WEO, 2011). The Reference Scenario assumes no LNG 





• The Export Scenario, abbreviated “U.S. Exports”, is based on the Reference 
Scenario, but it allows the U.S. to export up to 120 Bcm from the Gulf of 
Mexico without restricting the destination, representing the LNG contracts with 
flexibility.  It is assumed that the U.S. will start exporting in 2015. 
• The Competitive Export Scenario, abbreviated “Competitive”, is based on the 
U.S. Export Scenario. However, it also assumes the largest Asian LNG 
exporters, namely Australia, can ramp up their LNG export capacity by 50% 
more than the Reference Scenario. The construction for the capacity expansion 
will be completed by 2020. 
2.5.2 Results and analysis of Asian LNG Focus study 
2.5.2.1 Reference scenario results 
This section presents general results of Asian consumption and production projections 
for the Reference Scenario and the difference between WGM results and the 
projections from 2015-2035 in (WEO,2011)According to our simulation, Table 2-12 
indicates that as a whole, the percentage difference between the WEO and WGM 
figures is fairly low. Specifically, it is less than five percent. As shown in Table 2-12, 
there is a considerable difference between consumption and production. The gap will 
reach approximately 400 Bcm in 2035, from 161 Bcm in 2015. By 2035, Asia will rely 
on imports, equating to about one fourth of the total consumption.  
Table 2-12 World Gas Model Reference, Asian production and consumption in Billion 
Cubic Meters. 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Consumption 
743.6 927.3 1,045.70 1,169 1,280.10 
(-1.92%) (-4.57%) (-4.97%) (-3.47%) (-0.03%) 





(-0.63%) (-4.77%) (-4.99%) (-5.00%) (-4.79%) 
*The numbers in parenthesis are the WEO 2011 values less the World Gas Model 
values divided by WEO 2011 values. 
The next section compares the U.S. Export and Competitive Scenarios to the Reference 
Scenario. However, the comparison of three scenarios focuses only on the year 2035 
as a representative future year. The general results show dynamics in trade changes 
with broad impacts. U.S. LNG exports are expected to have worldwide impacts, mainly 
decreasing prices and increasing consumption in importing countries. 
2.5.2.2 Market share impact due to the U.S. LNG exports 
 The U.S.Exports Scenario indicates that the U.S., given a maximum destination-free 
export capacity of 120 Bcm/y, will actually export approximately half of that (53.75 
Bcm/y) to Japan/S. Korea14 and none elsewhere (Table 2-13). Part of the rationale is 
that the Japan/S. Korea node has the highest endogenously determined, wholesale 
prices, which is a motivation for concentrating U.S. exports there. Furthermore the U.S. 
LNG simultaneously displaces a significant market share of other suppliers. In the 
Japan/S. Korea market, Algeria and Nigeria lose their market share by approximately 
30%, while Australia, Indonesia, Qatar, Trinidad, and Yemen drop their market shares 
approximately 20%-30% Moreover, it is noted that not just the countries importing the 
U.S. LNG have market share changed. For example, Australia increased its market 
share 31.20% in the S.E. Asia/China15 market, whereas Nigeria and Algeria’s market 
share declined by approximately 10% under the same scenario. Because the Australian 
LNG is unable to compete with the cheap U.S. LNG, the Australian traders raise sales 
                                                 
14 Japan/S.Korea is one node in WGM aggregating Japan and South Korea into one country.  






in China to make up its profit. The explanation is that once the sales are displaced in 
one market, the traders try to maintain their profit by increasing their sales in other 
markets. This is due to the assumption of profit maximization and Cournot behavior. 
Under the Competitive Scenario, Australia is able to ramp up its export capacity by 
50%. Although Australia increases its export capacity, it displaces U.S. LNG by a small 
amount, 3 Bcm/y, in the Japan/S. Korea market. The U.S. still prevails over the Japan/S. 
Korea market. Most of the additional Australian LNG flows to S.E. Asia/China, over 
200% more in comparison to the Reference Scenario. However, African and Middle 
East suppliers are displaced significantly. The largest entry with displaced LNG 
sources is Algerian LNG (-58.28%) and Nigerian LNG (-41.26%) in S.E. Asia/China, 
Nevertheless, the domestic production does not change for all scenarios. 
Table 2-13 Scenario comparison of gas supplied to Asian countries by sources in 2035. 


























Production  379.74 379.74 0.00% 379.74 0.00% 
Algeria 10.06 9.04 -10.12% 4.20 -58.28% 
Australia 13.18 17.29 +31.20% 41.33 +213.68% 
Indonesia 66.75 70.02 +4.90% 68.67 +2.87% 
Kazakhstan 54.00 54.00 0.00% 54.00 0.00% 
Nigeria 7.45 6.45 -13.40% 4.38 -41.26% 
Qatar 20.64 20.09 -2.65% 14.85 -28.06% 
Russia 45.16 45.37 +0.47% 43.73 -3.17% 




Production  190.22 190.19 -0.01% 190.17 -0.02% 
Algeria 6.18 6.28 +1.58% 6.91 +11.81% 
Kazakhstan 48.85 48.39 -0.94% 47.85 -2.04% 
Qatar 34.27 35.31 3.05% 35.97 +4.99% 









Production  1.00 1.00 +0.01% 1.00 +0.27% 
Algeria 22.34 15.41 -31.00% 15.37 -31.20% 
Australia 24.18 18.21 -24.69% 23.56 -2.56% 
Indonesia 24.95 19.34 -22.48% 19.29 -22.69% 
Nigeria 21.86 14.94 -31.66% 15.41 -29.50% 
Qatar 24.56 17.72 -27.84% 17.60 -28.33% 
Russia 25.59 22.60 -11.69% 22.55 -11.91% 
Trinidad 24.43 18.61 -23.84% 18.05 -26.14% 
USA 0.00 53.75 >100% 49.81 >100% 
Yemen 24.05 17.26 -28.22% 17.02 -29.23% 
 
In summary, U.S. LNG exports provide an additional option to transport gas to Asia. 
However, they increase the competition over Asian Markets. U.S. LNG causes a 
reduction of flows to Japan/S. Korea for all other (non-domestic) suppliers. Moreover, 
even though Australia can increase its export capacity, the U.S. LNG exports will still 
dominate Australian gas in the Japan/S. Korea market. 
2.5.2.3 Other impacts on Asian market due to U.S. LNG exports 
Besides the market share changes discussed above, the U.S. LNG exports are projected 
to have other impacts such as changes in consumption and prices worldwide. Table 2-
14 shows that the Japan/S.Korea wholesale price goes as high as $16.06/MMbtu in 
2035. This represents the highest prices among Asian countries. S.E.Asia/China and 
India/Pakistan will see 2035 prices of $13.87/MMbtu and $11.24/MMbtu, respectively.   
All Asian countries exhibit lower gas prices for the U.S. Exports Scenario in 
comparison to the Reference Scenario but Japan/S. Korea has the highest improvement 
for prices -7.61% and -8.65% lower than the Reference Scenario for each U.S. exports 





but the prices are cheaper in comparison to the Reference due presumably to more 
supply from Australia shifting to China. 
Table 2-14 Comparison of  wholesale prices for 2035 in $/MMBtu and percent 


















/China 13.87 13.69 -1.34% 13.57 -2.15% 
India/ 
Pakistan  11.24 11.15 -0.73% 11.09 -1.26% 
Japan/ 
S.Korea 16.06 14.84 -7.61% 14.67 -8.65% 
 
In 2035, there is no significant difference between the Reference and U.S. Exports 
Scenarios for Asian consumption (Table 2-15). However, Japan/S. Korea will increase 
its consumption by 3.04% under the U.S. Exports Scenario and 3.48% under the 
Competitive. It is interesting that S.E. Asia/China consumes more than 600 Bcm/y in 
2035, from a previous 120 Bcm/y in 2010. In comparison, India’s consumption reaches 
about 300 Bcm/y in 2035, from a previous approximate 70 Bcm/y in 2010. 
Table  2-15 Comparison of  consumption  for 2035 in Bcm/y  and percent 



















China 616.27 621.05 +0.78% 624.02 +1.26% 
India/Pak
istan  301.55 302.71 +0.38% 303.53 +0.66% 
Japan/S.






Overall, the impact of U.S. LNG exports on Asia and the presence of U.S. LNG exports 
leads to higher consumption and lower prices in comparison to the Reference Scenario 
(for both non-reference scenarios). Since there is an increase of supply flows to the 
markets, as the supply curve shifts to the right and the new equilibrium price being 
lower, the consumption will be higher, all things being equal. Also, the U.S. LNG 
significantly displaces market shares from other prominent exporters.    
2.6. Conclusions and future work 
 
This chapter discusses the effect of U.S. LNG exports on the domestic and global 
markets under various scenarios. The Base Case is specified to simulate the magnitude 
of the global markets. In addition to two increased export volume scenarios, a global 
20/20/20 policy and new European pipeline projects are added to gauge the influence 
on the global markets. In addition, a decrease in U.S. production is also analyzed as a 
sensitivity test. Based on the simulation results, the main conclusions can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Increased U.S. LNG exports lead to higher prices, lower consumption, and 
increasing production in the U.S. domestic market. Prices will be lowered 
recovered in the long term after supplies are adjusted to meet demands. 
However, a dramatic effect on price will occur in the event of reduced U.S. 
production. A 10% shortfall in production with 99.7 Bcm of U.S. LNG exports 
results in a price increase of approximately $2/MMBtu relative to the Base Case 
in North America market. It is risky for natural gas exporters to commit to long-





can decline quickly. However, N. American producers can dominate other 
producers in terms of profit. Moreover, increased LNG export can create a small 
increase in the social welfare of the U.S. economy. 
• By contrast, increased U.S. exports reduce prices significantly in importing 
markets. For example, prices in Spain decrease by $2.7/MMBtu in 2020 under 
the High Exports compared with the Base Case. Increased LNG exportation 
results in positive effects on Asia and Europe. 
• High CO2 prices under the Renewable policy scenario lead to reductions in 
production in rapidly developing and developed regions in which the policy is 
applied. This production would be shifted to the least developed regions and 
lead to an increase in production and exports to rapidly developing and 
developing regions. LNG trading plays a key role in the Renewable Policy 
scenario. Europe and Asia will require 30% more LNG imports than in the Base 
Case in 2040.      
• The influence of new European pipelines does not affect Russian production 
levels, but the flow patterns change significantly. The flow from Russia to 
transit countries will be reduced by approximately 50% when the Nord Stream 
and South Stream pipelines are available. More interestingly, Nord Stream is a 
preferable target for expansion, and the total capacity could reach 109 Bcm in 
2040. The presence of the new pipelines reduces transit fees by approximately 
10% each year for Russia. In term of competition between U.S. LNG exports 





suppliers including Russia in European LNG markets, so Russia increases 
volume of exports to Europe by new two pipelines. 
• Without contract restrictions, the optimal U.S. LNG exports are approximately 
50 Bcm/y to Japan/S.Korea in 2035.  The U.S.  LNG displaces market shares 
from other suppliers of the Asian Markets. 
Future work on U.S. LNG exports should include the improved presentation of long-
term contracts and further details regarding LNG transportation. Long-term contracts 
should be determined endogenously by the model as in (Abada et al, 2012). A natural 
question arises with regard to the optimal export volume under different given 
conditions. In addition, more details regarding LNG, including actual cargo routes and 







Chapter 3:  The Influence of Panama Canal Tariffs on LNG 
Markets 
 
An increasing growth of unconventional gas production in the U.S. has gradually 
turned it into a potential gas exporter. In near future, increasing LNG exports from the 
U.S. coupled with the capacity of the Panama Canal will change the LNG market. The 
Panama Canal expansion is the key to the change because the route via this canal 
reduces the voyage by 7,000 nautical miles to Japan from the Gulf of Mexico. Applying 
the World Gas Model from the University of Maryland, this chapter16 investigates the 
potential effects of varying Panama Canal toll selection on the LNG markets via six 
scenarios of possible Panama Canal tariffs.  Results are compared and examined with 
the focus on prices, LNG flows, and supply displacement. 
3.1 Introduction  
The global natural gas market has undergone a number of changes recently due to new 
unconventional resources such as shale gas. This has been at roughly the same time as 
the rise in consumption in liquefied natural gas (LNG) especially in Asian markets. 
LNG is an attractive alternative to gas transported by pipelines and helps consuming 
countries to diversify their supply portfolio (Wood, 2012). LNG is also a key option to 
compensate for domestic resources that are depleting for example in Europe.  Over the 
last decade, LNG market has been dominated by a few exporters.  For example, 83% 
                                                 
16 The analysis and results of this study have been published in S. Moryadee, S.A. Gabriel, F. Rehulka “The 
influence of the Panama Canal on global gas trade”, Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 01/2014; 





of the global LNG trade in 2012 was supplied by eight countries. Qatar was the largest 
exporter followed by Malaysia and Indonesia (GIIGNL, 2013). However, in near future 
the global LNG market will undergo rapid changes as it welcomes the entry of new 
exporters from the U.S. and increased supplies from Australia (Leather et al., 2012). In 
the past, LNG trade has been divided into two basins, the Pacific and Atlantic Basins, 
and most LNG trade is confined within one basin (GIIGNL, 2013).  LNG trade between 
basins is unprofitable due to high shipping costs and a small price gap between these 
two basins. Recently, the price difference between the basins has increased since mid-
2010 due to strong demand in Asia. Therefore, trading LNG between basins became 
profitable depending on the shipping costs. Thus, while LNG markets previously were 
separate due to financial disadvantage, the rise of LNG in Asia and elsewhere, coupled 
with an expanded Panama Canal, are increasing the competitiveness of global LNG 
markets. For instance, U.S.  LNG exports can compete with Australian and Middle 
Eastern LNG exports in the Japanese and South Korean markets or for other high 
demand areas in Asia.   
The expansion of the Panama Canal is scheduled to be completed in June, 2015. The 
route via the Panama Canal will shorten voyages by more than 7,500 nautical miles 
(8,500 miles) from the East Coast of North America to Asia. With shorter distances, 
the cost of U.S. LNG from the East Coast going to Asia will be very competitive 
compared to the cost of LNG from the Gulf countries. For example, taking a Henry 
Hub reference price of $3 /MMbtu, a liquefaction and storage cost of $3 /MMbtu, the 
MMbtu cost aboard an LNG carrier out of the Gulf of Mexico, Texas or Louisiana, will 





estimated at between $2.5 /MMbtu and $3/MMbtu. This gives a LNG delivered price 
of about $9 /MMbtu ($3+$3+$3) to East Asia; a very competitive price for the Asian 
buyers when compared to the spot price which oscillates around the $15-17 /MMbtu 
mark (BP, 2013). Although using the Panama Canal can save time (approximately 14 
days to Asia from the U.S. East Coast) and transportation costs, the canal fee is still 
uncertain, and it may be costly. LNG experts expect the canal tariff will around 30 cents 
per MMBtu based on a $1 million round-trip fee for a medium-sized LNG tanker 
(Reuters, 2013). After the completion of the Panama Canal, several possible outcomes 
are possible. First, how will the Panama Canal tariffs affect the decision of LNG 
exporters and LNG shippers? Second, will more U.S. gas go to Asia given a shorter 
distance or go to Europe? Therefore, the aim of this study is to address these questions 
using the University of Maryland’s World Gas Model (WGM) (Gabriel at el., 2012); 
see Section 3.2 for more details.  We assume the Panama Canal route is available for 
LNG shipping with tariffs differing by scenarios. However, we assume that the Panama 
Canal has unlimited capacity and is never congested which is a best-case scenario but 
useful in providing guidance. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides details for the 
University of Maryland’s World Gas Model. Section 3.3 proposes scenarios involving 
the Base Case and the Panama Canal toll. Section 3.4 presents the results and the 
analysis, and Section 3.5 provides conclusions. 






The WGM (2012 version) is a large-scale, market equilibrium model based on a mixed 
complementarity problem (MCP) system (Gabriel et al., 2013).  This MCP comprises 
profit-maximizing optimization problems for the various market agents such as: 
producers, traders (who controls LNG), an integrated pipeline operator and a storage 
operator as well as demand functions for describing three consumption sectors 
(residential/commercial, industrial, and electric power).  The WGM then takes the 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of these various players along with 
market-clearing conditions to form the overall MCP (Gabriel et al., 2013).  In the 
modeling framework, the traders are modeled as having market power (depending the 
country) in order to withhold gas supplies to increase overall prices.  For some 
countries, such as the U.S., such market power is not consistent with market realities 
and thus traders in the U.S. are modeled via perfect competition.  For other countries 
such as the Former Soviet Union, the traders see a weighted combination of both the 
perfect competition prices as well as ones derived from inverse demand functions.  
Such an approach allows for partial market power and has been used successfully for a 
number of private and public sector projects (e.g., Gabriel et al., 2012).  The WGM 
goes beyond a number of previous and current gas models (Rice, 2005, Holz et al., 
2008; Lochner, 2009; Aune et al., 2009; Rosendahl and Sagen, 2009; Abada et al., 
2012; Huntington et al., 2010; Huntington et al., 2013) by allowing for nearly global 
coverage combined with market power, multiple seasons, as well as coverage of 







3.3 Description of Scenarios  
This section describes the scenarios examined as well as hypotheses about how the 
various case assumptions could impact the model outcomes. First, we define the Base 
Case as a benchmark for the other scenarios. The Base Case was calibrated to match 
recent global natural gas market trends and incorporates natural gas market projections 
from multiple sources. Table 3-1 provides details of the references for the WGM 
calibration. The Base Case assumed that there was no Panama Canal route. Thus, the 
Base Case assumes the longer distances from LNG export nodes to regasification.  
In terms of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exports from North America, the Base 
Case assumes the North America LNG exports begin in 2020 and these LNG export 
capacities are exogenously realized by the model in 2020. Further, five potential 
aggregated export terminals across North America are assumed. Three of them are 
located in the U.S. (West Coast, Gulf of Mexico, and East coast), and the other two are 
in Canada (East and West Coast). More details about the capacities and long-term 
contracts and destinations for these LNG contracts are provided in Table 3-2 where 
both an upper and lower bound on the LNG flows are presented.  The upper bound is 
based on exogenous data from the references and the lower bound is from long-term 
contracts (LTCs) also referenced.  The WGM will pick actual LNG amounts between 
and possibly equal to these two bounds.  
 
Table 3-1 Base Case References 
  Regions References 
Consumption 
North America (EIA, 2013) 













Lower bound LTC                     
with destination 
(BCM) destination (BCM) 
U.S. West 8.25 N/A   
U.S. East 8 6.32 USA-Japan/S.Korea (3.16)                                  
USA-India (3.16) 
U.S. Gulf 72 13.22 USA-Japan/S.Korea (13.22)  
Canada 




East  0.96 N/A   
 
Second, we construct six different Panama Canal toll scenarios as shown in Table 3-3. 
The main difference between the Base Case and Panama Canal scenarios is the port-
                                                 
17 The China node includes more than one country i.e., Thailand, China, and Taiwan. More details for 
regional definitions can be found in Appendix 1. 
China17 
(EDF, 2013), (OIES, 2011), (OIES, 
2012) 
The rest of the 
world  (EDF, 2013) 
Production 
North America (EIA, 2013) 
Europe (DECC, 2013) (AIE, 2012 )( AIE,2013) 
China (WEO, 2013) and (OIES, 2012) 
The rest of the 
world  (WEO, 2013) 
Price Reference 
USA (EIA, 2013) 
the rest of the world  (IGU, 2013) 
Norway (AIE, 2013) 
Contract Data 
Base 
The rest of the 




Liquefaction cost  all regions (WEO 2013), (AIE, 2013) 
Regasification 
cost  all regions (WEO, 2013) 
LNG shipping 
cost  
 all regions 





to-port distance for LNG exports. The Base Case assumes the distance between the 
U.S. Gulf of Mexico to Japan is 15,600 nautical miles (NM) while the Inf_toll scenario 
assumes 9,500 NM with a significantly large tariff (e.g., numerical infinity). In reality, 
three other routes are available: the one via the Cape of Good Hope (15,600 NM), the 
one via the Suez Canal (14,969 NM), and the one via the Cape Horn (17,000 NM).  
Although besides the Panama Canal route, the route via the Suez Canal is the shortest 
route, and the Canal fees are applied in order to pass this waterway. Therefore, this 
study assumes the shortest distance routes with no extra fees applied compared to the 
route via the Panama Canal.  Figure 3-1 shows the difference between the current 
Panama Canal scenarios and the Base Case in shipping gas from the U.S. Gulf of 










Base Case: assumes no Panama Canal route 
(distance from Gulf of Mexico to Japan = 
15,600 NM). 
Panama Canal scenarios assume the 
Panama Canal route is available with 
different canal tariffs depending on 
scenarios. 
Suez Canal route (14,969 NM) 
Good Hope route (15,600 
NM) (((15,749 NM) 










Table 3-3 Panama Canal toll scenarios 
 
Scenarios Abbreviation Description  
Scenario 1 Zero_toll “Zero toll" : tariff = $0 /MMBtu 
Scenario 2 Regular_toll “Regular toll" : tariff = $0.35 /MMBtu 
Scenario 3 Double_toll "Double toll" : tariff is  regular toll times 2=$0.70/MMBtu 
Scenario 4 Threefold_toll "Threefold toll" : tariff is  regular toll times 3=$1.05/MMBtu 
Scenario 5 Fivefold_toll "Fivefold toll" : tariff is  regular toll  times 5=$1.75/MMBtu 
Scenario 6 Inf_toll "Infinite toll” : tariff is  regular toll  is high $9,999/MMBtu 
 
3.4 Numerical Results 
 
3.4.1 Base Case:  Results 
 
In terms of production, the WGM has 59 aggregated producers covering worldwide 
production: 39 are conventional gas producers, nine are strictly for shale gas, and 11 
are unconventional non-shale producers.  It is important to note that the WGM 
production output differs from the references AEO 2013 and WEO 2013. The Annual 
Energy Output (AEO, 2013) and The World Energy Outlook (2013) report gross 
production while the World Gas Model gives net production.  The main difference 
between net and gross production is due to processing losses such as lease and plant 
fuel. Also, pipeline fuel must be subtracted to account for losses in pipeline 
transportation. The WGM explicitly accounts for losses in liquefaction, LNG shipment, 
re-gasification, pipeline and storage losses, but these two references (AEO, 2013) and 
(WEO, 2013) report aggregate losses only. There are also usage categories, such as 





the World Gas Model. The production capacities and volumes in the World Gas Model 
are net production volumes, i.e., the volumes delivered to a number of consumption 
sectors. Figure 3-2 indicates that on the whole, the percentage differences between 
WGM production values and those from the outside references (AEO, 2013 and WEO, 
2013) are fairly small though.  
   
Figure 3-2 World Gas Model Base Case, world production comparison in Bcm and 
percentage price differences. 
 
Under the Base Case, the gap between what North America consumes and produces 
narrows over time.  In the year 2015, this region needs to import small amounts of gas 
to meet its consumption. Eventually, after 2020 North America becomes a net exporter 
as shown in Table 3-4. From this table, we see that there is an average growth rate in 
North American demand of about 4.37% over the time horizon.  
 
Table 3-4 World Gas Model Base Case, North America Natural Gas Production and 
Consumption, Bcm. 
  2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Production 875.1 959.9 1,060.7 1,126.2 1,154.6 1,194.4 














2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
World Production Comparison in BCM






As shown in Figure 3-3, the Base Case indicates that regionally, wholesale prices will 
generally rise in the years 2010-2035 throughout the world.  This reflects an increase 
in willingness to pay for natural gas by the consumer.  This willingness is captured in 
WGM by the cost and price inflation factors.  From Figure 3-3 it is interesting to note 
that the natural gas prices in China increase significantly from 2015 to 2020 due to a 
spike in demand for natural gas rising 114.9 Bcm from 154.8 Bcm to 269.7 Bcm.  
  
 
Figure 3-3 World Gas Model Base Case, average wholesale prices by regions, 
$/MMBtu 
 
Table 3-5 shows that North American 18 wholesale prices only change slightly over the 
time horizon due to abundant shale gas resources (e.g., $6.89/MMBtu in 2035). China 
sees the highest 2045 prices of $17.46 because of high demands. It is interesting to note 
that the Japanese node 19 has the highest country-level prices but this nation is 
subsumed in the Asia Pacific region. The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Middle 
                                                 
18 North America includes Canada, Mexico, and the United States in the World Gas Model. 
19 In the World Gas Model, the Japanese node includes both Japan and South Korea, see Appendix 1 
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East have the least increasing prices due presumably to their vast supplies. For 
comparison purposes, we compare the WGM prices to the EIA price forecasts in the 
New Policy Scenario (WEO, 2013) and find that the WGM North American prices are 
close to the United State prices in the New Policy Scenario ($6.89/MMBtu in WGM 
vs $6.50/MMBtu in WEO (2013)), but the WGM European prices are slightly higher 
$14.68/MMBtu vs $12.7/MMBtu, respectively.  
Table 3-5. World Gas Model Base Case, Average Wholesale Prices by Regions, 
$/MMBtu. 
  NRTH_AM  EUROPE   FRSVTUN  AFRICA   MIDEAST  ASPACIF  CHINA    STH_AM   
2010 $5.66 $9.46 $2.88 $3.23 $2.69 $7.95 $2.92 $5.57 
2015 $6.24 $9.82 $4.29 $3.37 $3.17 $10.28 $4.89 $7.29 
2020 $6.50 $10.87 $5.91 $3.89 $4.04 $11.34 $12.29 $9.49 
2025 $6.80 $12.26 $7.06 $4.04 $4.44 $11.36 $13.16 $9.73 
2030 $6.88 $13.42 $7.49 $4.48 $5.20 $12.38 $14.20 $9.99 
2035 $6.89 $14.68 $7.95 $4.77 $5.54 $14.53 $16.40 $10.18 
 
In terms of world trade flows of natural gas, from Figure 3-4 the trend is clear. Europe 
is the largest importer of gas (pipeline and LNG) followed by the Asia Pacific region 
in general and then the Chinese node.  Also, in all these three regions, the natural gas 
import trend is steadily increasing. By contrast, North America has a steady amount of 
exports from 2020-2035. Moreover, the Former Soviet Union is seen to have increasing 










Figure 3-4 World Gas Model Base Case, Pipeline and LNG imports (+) and Exports 
(-) by Regions in Bcm. 
 
 
Figure 3-5 displays LNG exports by country node with “L” meaning liquefier, see 
details for LNG import/export countries in Appendix 2. Qatar (L_QAT) dominates the 
LNG markets as indicated by its increasing amount of LNG exports over time.  Algeria 
(L_ALG), Yemen (L_YMN), Trinidad & Tobago (L_TRI) also have an upward trend 
in LNG exports. On the other hand, Indonesia and Nigeria have declining exports.  
Moreover, Indonesian production decreases over time.  
The Gulf of Mexico terminal (L_US7L) has the highest U.S. LNG exports of the three 
U.S. nodes with the other two being US west coast terminal (L_US9) and US east coast 
terminal (L_US5W). In 2035, the amounts exported from the Gulf of Mexico to global 
markets are approximately 59 Bcm, (Table 3-6).  12.39 Bcm of this figure comes from 
contracts (to Japan/S. Korea) with the remaining 46.82 Bcm supplied to Europe in the 
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Coast terminal in 2035, or which 5.92 Bcm is under contract (2.92 Bcm to 
Japan/S.Korea and 3 Bcm to India), and 0.69 BCM is exported to France without 
contract. Lastly 6.65 Bcm is delivered to Japan/S.Korea from the U.S. west coast 
terminal without contract in the same year. 
 
Figure 3-5 World Gas Model Base Case, LNG exports in Bcm by country nodes. 
 
Table 3-6 World Gas Model Base Case, LNG exports from Gulf Coast terminal in 
Bcm for 2020 and 2035. 
 From Year To regasification terminals Tota





2020 7.1 7.9 1.8 8 12.3 5.12 3.14 0 45.6 
2035 0 15.2 8.0 12.
1 
12.3 2.17 3.05 5.87 59.0 
 
Finally, in order to measure the errors of the WGM after calibration, we compare its 
output versus consumption references (EIA, 2013) (EDF, 2013) (AIE, 2013). For those 
purposes, we consider the regional consumption between 2010 and 2035 and compare 
them with the references.  It is important to note that the percentage difference is 










LNG Exports in Bcm by country nodes





Overall, there is an average model estimation error of 1.66% for consumption with a 
maximum error of 6.13% which indicates an excellent fit.  
3.4.2 Panama Canal toll scenario: results   
 
In this section, the hypothesis that the Panama Canal toll could affect the global gas 
markets is examined. Each of the tolls considered is compared against each other to 
gauge the magnitude of potential Panama Canal toll-induced effects. We pay attention 
to the results up to the year 2035 based on reliable data sources through that year.   
However, the WGM was run through 2050 with two additional time periods (2055 and 
2060) thrown away to avoid the end-of-horizon bias.   
First, regional prices are examined under the different scenarios. We look at the average 
wholesale prices of natural gas around the world by region for the year 2035.  The first 
thing to realize is that most of the  world is largely unaffected by the different Panama 
Canal toll levels as shown by the similar prices across all regions except Europe, 
Japan/S. Korea, and South America (Figure 3-6). The presence of LNG exports from 
the Atlantic basin (the U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago20), leads to lower prices in Japan/S. 
Korea as the Panama Canal toll decreases.  (The zero and regular toll cases though 
provide identical Japanese node prices). The differences in Japan are about $1/MMBtu 
in considering the two extreme scenarios: Inf_Toll and Zero_Toll. However, the prices 
go in the opposite direction for Europe as a function of the counterfactual Panama 
Canal toll. As the Panama Canal toll increases, the gas prices in Europe decrease due 
                                                 






to the shift of U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago LNG flows from Japan to Europe. In 
general, the U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago become the swing suppliers that can decide 




Figure 3-6 WGM prices for 2035 in $/MMBtu.  
 
The production, however, is mostly constant across scenarios. The explanation is that 
the Panama Canal toll considered as part of the transportation cost only alters the flows 
among regions. Next, Figure 3-7 depicts regional consumption in Bcm for 2035. 
Regionally, consumption is barely changed for all scenarios. However, the 
consumption in the Asia Pacific and European regions (from a regional perspective) 
changes slightly depending on the Panama Canal toll level. In particular, when the toll 
increases, more supplies from the Atlantic basin (U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago) flow to 
Europe. Nonetheless, the flow reroutes to Japan when an inexpensive toll is present 
(not directly observable in Figure 3-7). The consumption in the Middle East is also 


















when the Panama Canal toll is small, so more inexpensive gas is available for domestic 
consumption.  
 
Figure 3-7 Consumption in 2035, in Bcm. 
 
In 2035 for net worldwide imports and exports, the World Gas Model shows a 
significant reduction in exports, approximately 90 Bcm, from the Former Soviet Union 
under the Inf_Toll and Five_Toll scenarios (Figure 3-8). Particularly, the flows from 
Russia-West to Ukraine are reduced significantly when the toll increases. This reflects 
the side effects of the rerouted U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago gas to Europe in these two 
scenarios.  LNG exports from the U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago are only sent to the 
following European country nodes: France, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Germany and 




















Figure 3-8 Imports (+) and Exports (-) in Bcm for 2035. 
3.4.3 Analyses for LNG Markets: Liquefaction  
 
For global LNG markets, Table 3-7 shows values under contract as well as export flows 
in the different scenarios relative to the total LNG liquefaction capacity arranged by 
liquefaction node. Additionally, Table 3-7 provides the details of liquefaction capacity 
utilization. As can be observed from Table 3-7, the worldwide LNG capacity under 
contract amounts to only about 40% (202.5 Bcm out of about 500 Bcm) in 2035 based 
on known contracts by the end of 2020, so there is a lot of capacity available for the 
spot market.   Although Australia has the second largest LNG export capacity, the 
capacity used is only 16%-20% for all scenarios due to high relative liquefaction costs 
as compared to other LNG exporters (presumably due to cost overruns of construction) 
(Kelly, 2013). It is important to note that the major LNG exporting countries Qatar and 
Algeria have only a small share (approximately one third) of contracted exports and are 
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On a global scale, there is a lot of spare liquefaction capacity in the system 
(approximately 60 % of total capacity).21  
 
Table 3-7 LNG export capacity utilization, 2035. 
 
 Capacity  Contracts inf_toll five_toll triple_toll double_toll regular_toll zero_toll 
Algeria 148.9 27 61.4% 60.0% 57.2% 56.5% 56.1% 55.9% 
Australia 194.2 17.2 22.3% 21.0% 19.0% 18.2% 16.8% 16.5% 
E. Canada 0.9 0 85.4% 85.4% 85.4% 85.4% 85.4% 85.4% 
W. Canada 7 1.9 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 
Indonesia 163.9 20.5 16.1% 15.0% 13.4% 13.0% 11.9% 11.7% 
Nigeria 157 9.6 21.5% 21.5% 21.5% 20.6% 19.7% 19.6% 
Norway 31 4 14.8% 14.8% 14.8% 14.8% 14.8% 14.8% 
Qatar 381.8 65.7 39.5% 38.4% 37.1% 36.5% 35.3% 35.1% 
S. Russia 46 15.5 34.0% 33.9% 33.3% 33.0% 31.9% 31.7% 
W. Russia 20.1 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Trinidad  125.6 10.3 15.1% 19.0% 23.1% 24.7% 30.6% 32.2% 
Alaska 0 0 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
E.U.S. 8.2 7.5 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 
U.S. Gulf  72 15.6 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 84.5% 
W. U.S. 7.9 0 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 9.4% 
Yemen 54 7.7 73.3% 70.4% 67.0% 67.0% 67.0% 67.0% 
Total 1482.5 202.5 34.1% 33.6% 32.8% 32.4% 32.1% 32.1% 
 
 
3.4.4 Analyses for LNG Markets: Regasification 
 
The first thing to realize is that there is a lot of spare capacity (about 50% of total 
regasification capacity) for all scenarios in 2035 (Table 3-8). Interestingly, Table 3-8 
suggests that the total usage of regasification goes up slightly when the Panama Canal 
toll increases due to many factors besides the Panama Canal and varying by country. 
                                                 






Also, Inf_Toll and Fivefold_Toll show the highest capacity usages. One explanation is 
that the high toll forces the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago to send more LNG to Europe 
while Middle East exporters can also supply more to Asia with less competition from 
the Atlantic Basin exporters. This hypothesis is supported by the increase of the 
utilization rate of LNG import terminals in Europe when the toll is expensive (Table 3-
8). The Japan /South Korea node has the highest utilization rate among all countries 
(nodes) (over 60%). This reflects this region’s reliance on LNG to satisfy its demand. 
Table 3-8 LNG regasification capacity utilization in percent for 2035.  
 











China  92.9 74.7% 74.0% 74.5% 74.8% 75.7% 75.8% 
France  62.1 57.8% 57.8% 55.7% 48.5% 38.6% 37.5% 
Germany   9.3 93.4% 74.2% 29.5% 19.2% 8.6% 5.9% 
India   59.8 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 
Italy  51.8 45.1% 41.1% 31.8% 26.5% 24.0% 23.6% 
Japan  415.3 63.6% 64.0% 64.9% 65.4% 66.2% 66.3% 
Mexico  26.1 45.6% 45.6% 45.6% 45.6% 45.6% 45.6% 
Netherlands   30.6 22.8% 15.8% 6.2% 11.7% 19.1% 19.6% 
Poland  7.4 51.9% 31.4% 1.8% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Spain  99.4 21.8% 20.5% 18.6% 17.6% 16.9% 17.0% 
Turkey  23.1 25.1% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 
United 
Kingdom  63.7 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 27.9% 
East USA  47.5 25.6% 25.6% 25.6% 25.6% 25.6% 25.6% 
Total 988.9 50.0% 49.2% 47.9% 47.3% 47.1% 47.0% 
 
3.4.5 Analyses for LNG Markets: LNG Flows 
A closer look into the details of the LNG flows reveals that the U.S. LNG exports are 
stable for all scenarios. The U.S. exports gas regardless of the toll the only difference 
being the destinations.  A further analysis indicated that the limiting factor is the U.S. 
production capacity.  As for other LNG exporting regions, Figure 3-9 shows that LNG 





Canal toll decreases. These exporters have a significant market share in Asian markets, 
especially in Japan and South Korea.  The displacement of sales from Algeria, 
Australia, Nigeria, Qatar, and Yemen to Japan is caused by the presence of the U.S. 
and Trinidad & Tobago gas at the Japanese node. One would expect Qatar, Indonesia, 
and Australia would shift their sales to China however China consumes gas from 
domestic production and pipeline imports from Russia and Kazakhstan.  
 
 
Figure 3-9 LNG Flows in Bcm for 2035.  
3.4.6 U.S. LNG Exports from the Gulf of Mexico  
Next, we analyze the U.S. LNG flow pattern originating from the Gulf of Mexico. It is 
important to note that we allow the maximum export capacity of 72 Bcm per year for 
U.S. Gulf of Mexico (L_US7L) and the numbers presented in Figures 3-10 and 3-11 
are net flows taking into account loss along the gas supply chain, e.g., liquefaction and 










LNG Flows in Bcm for 2035





Surprisingly, the U.S. LNG exports are the same between the Zero_Toll and 
Regular_Toll scenarios. This observation is supported by similar flows (58.4 Bcm) to 
Japan/S. Korea for the Zero_Toll and Regular_Toll cases for both 2020 and 2035 
(Figures 3-10 and 3-11). However, the amount of U.S. LNG to Japan starts declining 
when the Panama Canal toll is set more than the regular toll. The same situation is more 
pronounced when the triple toll is applied. Lastly, even the toll is set to be a very high 
number, the U.S. still exports approximately 12 Bcm to Japan/S. Korea because of a 
lower bound contract constraint. 
In term of flows to Europe, the U.S. exports from the Gulf of Mexico to Europe are 
13.6 Bcm in 2020 under the Inf_Toll scenario but 46.62 Bcm in 2035 under the same 
scenario. The explanation for increased flows over time is that European prices increase 
up to $16 /MMBtu in 2035 from $11 /MMBtu in 2020. However, the U.S. gas prices 
are approximately $6/MMBtu for both years (Figure 3-6). The wider gap between the 
U.S. and European prices over time means potentially more U.S. profit by sending gas 







Figure 3-10 LNG exports from U.S. Gulf of Mexico (US7) Bcm, 2020  
 
 
Figure 3-11 LNG export from U.S. Gulf of Mexico Bcm, 2035. 
 
3.4.7 LNG Exports from Trinidad and Tobago 
Trinidad & Tobago LNG flows to Japan/S. Korea are more sensitive to the Panama 
Canal toll as compared to the U.S. flow pattern. This hypothesis is supported by 
declining flows to the Japanese node starting from the Regular_Toll scenario as 
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interpretation is that in 2035, Trinidad & Tobago has higher domestic prices ($ 
8.06/MMBtu) as compared to the U.S. domestic prices ($5.66/MMBtu) so that 
increasing Panama Canal tolls will lower the profit mark-up for Trinidad and Tobago 
and result in less LNG flows to Japan/S.Korea. On the other hand, increased Panama 
Canal tolls have less of an effect on the U.S. flows due to larger price differences 
between U.S. and Japan/S.Korea. The flows to Japan/S. Korea drop significantly, 
reaching zero, after the Regular Toll is applied for both 2020 and 2035.  Trinidad 
&Tobago is considered as a marginal supplier for Europe because the flows there are 
based on the spot market; see Table 3-7 for the LNG contracts for Trinidad & Tobago. 
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Figure 3-13 LNG flows from Trinidad and Tobago Bcm, 2035. 
  
3.4.8 Market Share by Supplier for the Japanese/South Korean 
Markets 
For 2035, the Japanese node relies on LNG. Table 3-9 gives the details of the supply 
structure of this node for all Panama Canal scenarios. In the Inf_Toll and Fivefold_Toll 
scenarios, Qatar is the largest exporter, followed by Australia and Yemen. However, 
the U.S. (all three U.S. nodes) becomes the largest supplier under the Double_Toll and 
Regular_Toll scenarios as shown in Table 3-9.  One thing to realize is that the U.S. and 
Qatar supply almost similar quantities to Japan under the Triple_Toll scenario so that 
this toll represents the “break-even point” in the competition between Qatar and the 
U.S. to supplying LNG to this market. In terms of an economic interpretation, given 
the U.S. domestic prices are about $6/MMBtu plus a WGM liquefaction cost of $2.35 
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challenge other suppliers, and eventually will have the largest market share if the toll 
is inexpensive e.g., less than triple toll of $1.05/MMBtu . 
Figure 3-14 compares two scenarios for the Japanese imports by source in 2035. The 
U.S. becomes the major exporter to the Japanese node with increased sixteen 
percentage points (Figure 3-14). The imports by Trinidad and Tobago also go up five 
percentage points. These changes slightly displace other suppliers’ shares a bit, but 
Qatar is the most to suffer due to a six percentage point loss of market share. The results 
indicate that the U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago LNG displace the spot market sales from 
Qatar. In fact, 66% of the total Qatari supplies to Japan/S.Korea are the sales from the 
spot market. The Panama Canal introduces more suppliers to increase the 
competitiveness in the Japan/S.Korea market so that the spot prices are lower and result 
in the displacement of existing supplier’s sales.  
 Lastly, Qatar and Yemen are sensitive to LNG exports from the Atlantic basin.  
 














Algeria 51.04 48.39 43.67 41.04 36.82 36.13 
Australia 38.16 35.65 31.94 30.39 27.59 27.05 
Canada East 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Canada West 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 5.80 
Indonesia 15.60 13.75 11.19 10.51 8.74 8.51 
Nigeria 24.22 24.22 24.22 22.89 21.23 20.79 
Qatar 56.46 53.49 48.70 46.15 41.81 41.09 
Russia  10.41 10.35 10.11 9.96 9.46 9.35 
Trinidad 0.00 7.22 9.33 10.73 21.81 25.09 
US East Coast 3.00 2.93 2.93 2.93 3.00 3.33 
US Gulf of 
Mexico 12.69 18.67 38.35 48.43 58.40 58.40 





Yemen 38.55 37.05 35.27 34.50 32.03 31.66 
Total Supply 263.34 264.94 268.91 270.74 274.11 274.62 
 
 
Figure 3-14 Percent of imports to Japan/South Korea in 2035 (a) the Five_Toll 
scenario (b) Regular Toll scenarios. 
 
3.4.9 Dynamics of Flows across the Regions 
This section analyzes and compares the effect of the tolls on the regional flows. We 
compare three main scenarios, Regular_Toll, Triple_Toll, and Fivefold_Toll. It is 
important to note that the U.S. LNG flows are the total from three locations, the West 
Coast (L_US9), the Gulf Coast, (L_US7) and the East Coast (L_US5).   
There are interesting dynamics in the competition to supply both the Japanese node 
(Japan and South Korea) and Europe.  One group of suppliers is the Atlantic Basic (the 
U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago).  The other group is composed of: the Middle East, 
Africa, and Russia.  What can be observed from Figures 3-15-3-17 is the following.  
 
An increased Panama toll induces LNG exports from U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago to 













































and Africa to Japan to compensate. This hypothesis is seen by flows to Japan from the 
Middle East and Africa. Under the Regular_Toll scenario in 2035, the U.S. and 
Trinidad & Tobago export a total of 68.05 Bcm and 21.8 Bcm to Japan (Japan and 
South Korea), respectively. However, the Middle East and Africa send 73.8 Bcm and 
58.0 Bcm to the same destination (Figure 3-15). Under the Triple_Toll, the Middle East 
and Africa increase their flows up to 83.9 Bcm and 67.8 Bcm to the Japanese node, but 
the U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago drop their flows to 47.9 Bcm and 9.3 Bcm (Figure 3-
16). The situation is even more pronounced under the Fivefold_Toll.  The flows from 
the U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago reroute to Europe as the Panama Canal toll increases, 
displacing some flows from existing suppliers (i.e., the Middle East, Africa, and 
Russia). In 2035 the U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago export, respectively, 0.69 Bcm and 
11.8 Bcm to Europe under the Regular_Toll while Africa, Russia, and the Middle East 
export 37.0 Bcm, 346.4 Bcm, 30.8 Bcm, respectively, see Figure 3-15. Under the 
Threefold_Toll, the U.S. and Trinidad boost their flows up to 20.1 Bcm and 15.2 Bcm 
to Europe but the flows from Russia, Africa, and Russia are slightly displaced. Lastly, 






Figure 3-15 Dynamics of flows: Regular Tariff scenario, flows in Bcm for 2035.  
 
 







Figure 3-17 Dynamics of flows: Fivefold Tariff Scenario, flows in Bcm for 2035. 
 
3.4.10 European Gas Market Analysis  
For 2035, Europe relies to a large extent on imports and only one fourth of the total 
consumption is supplied from domestic production (about 25 % or 150 Bcm out of 620 
Bcm of total supplies). Table 3-10 gives the details of the supply sources for Europe. 
The European production and storage levels are almost constant for all scenarios.  The 
imports by LNG increases as the Panama Canal toll increases. The LNG imports also 
displace the imports by pipeline. For example, in the Five_Toll scenario, the imports 
by pipeline increase from 89.76 Bcm to 106.74 Bcm (as compared to the Triple_Toll 









Table 3-10 European Gas Market in 2035. 
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106.74 89.76 82.47 75.7 74.73 
Storage  -0.85 -0.93 -0.9 -0.88 -0.91 -0.92 
 
Table 3-11 shows that Russia is the largest exporter to Europe, followed by Norway 
and Algeria.  The U.S. trader has a significant share, 46.21 Bcm and 39.78 Bcm under 
the Inf_Toll and Five_Toll scenarios, respectively, and displaces a small portion of 
supplies from Algeria, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Yemen. Norway does not only export 
via the direct route through the North Sea (26 Bcm), but also via the continent (via 
France and the Netherlands; see Table 3-12 for more detail). The detailed model 
structure in WGM allows separation of physical flows from sales flows, with the latter 
possibly going further than to the next neighboring country. Hence, we can observe 
Norwegian sales to the UK that are transported from Norway to the continent (France 
and Netherlands) and then from the continent to the UK.  Table 3-12 suggests that the 
Nord Stream pipeline (N_RUW-N_GER) is utilized at the maximum capacity22 (95.31 
Bcm) whereas the South Stream pipeline (N_RUW-N_ROM) is almost idle. 
Interestingly, the flows from Ukraine to Poland (N_UKR-N_POL) and Russia to 
                                                 
22 Nord Stream starts operating in 2015 with capacity of 55 Bcm/y however this pipeline is expanded 





Poland (N_RUW-N_POL) considerably decrease when the Panama Canal toll 
increases. This is likely because Poland imports more supply from LNG using the new 
terminal (Polski Terminal) so that it has a significant reduction in flows from Ukraine 
and Russia. This implies that Poland can increase security of gas supply as well as 
diversify its suppliers as the Panama Canal toll increases.  Next, at the end of Table 3-
12 we see that the flows from Poland to Germany also decline by about a half when the 
Panama Canal toll increases. This reflects that not only Poland benefits from U.S. gas 
but also other countries and Poland has more alternatives besides Russian gas. 
 
Table 3-11 Supplies by traders to Europe in 2035. 
 
  
         
inf_toll five_toll triple_toll double_toll regular_toll zero_toll 
T_ALG  117.47 119.73 123.69 126.45 129.95 130.26 
T_FRA  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
T_GER  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
T_ITA  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
T_KZK  65.57 66.69 68.80 69.87 71.04 71.21 
T_NED  16.06 16.08 16.09 16.08 16.07 16.06 
T_NIG  12.15 12.42 13.22 13.49 14.27 14.52 
T_NOR  114.21 114.22 114.24 114.24 114.26 114.26 
T_POL  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
T_QAT  90.82 90.81 90.75 90.71 90.78 90.73 
T_ROM  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
T_RUS  154.59 155.63 158.17 160.09 161.31 161.60 
T_SPA  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
T_TRI  14.72 12.02 14.93 15.36 11.61 10.23 
T_TRK  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
T_UKD  15.20 15.20 15.20 15.20 15.11 15.10 
T_USA  46.21 39.78 19.70 9.43 0.68 0.34 
T_YMN   0  0  0 0.76 3.20 3.56 
























N_FRA  16.67 16.53 16.71 17.15 17.38 17.38 
N_GER  42.40 42.40 42.40 42.40 42.40 42.40 
N_NED  12.54 12.88 12.88 12.88 12.88 12.88 
N_POL  9.71 9.88 10.02 9.87 9.57 9.55 
N_UKD  26.95 26.64 26.40 26.14 26.27 26.29 
N_ALG 
N_ITA  61.99 63.83 66.23 66.72 66.97 66.92 
N_SPA  40.74 41.54 43.76 44.52 45.29 45.42 
N_RUW 
N_GER 95.31 95.31 95.31 95.31 95.31 95.31 
N_POL 36.48 36.91 38.83 39.45 41.15 41.45 
N_ROM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N_TRK 25.73 25.82 26.01 26.12 26.05 26.05 
N_KZK  N_TRK 29.33 29.55 29.57 29.58 29.69 29.71 
N_UKR 
N_POL 5.17 6.57 9.47 11.98 12.77 12.95 
N_ROM 24.61 24.65 24.46 24.44 24.47 24.49 
N_GER 
N_FRA 28.16 28.34 28.31 29.87 31.12 31.26 
N_ITA 22.15 22.82 24.56 25.94 26.36 26.47 
N_NED 11.99 12.19 13.16 13.21 13.74 13.89 
N_ROM 6.31 6.31 6.06 5.84 5.70 5.68 
N_POL N_GER 8.97 10.10 14.13 17.14 19.39 19.81 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The World Gas Model (WGM) has been used to evaluate the effect of the Panama 
Canal transit fees on natural gas markets worldwide.  WGM is a game theoretic market 
equilibrium model using forty-two consumption country nodes with multiple market 
players per country.  Multiple sets of scenarios were employed to analyze the resulting 
prices, quantities, flows, and LNG. The results show that the transit fees affect the flow 
pattern especially for LNG exports from the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago. In addition, 
the wholesale gas prices in Japan/South Korea and Europe are significantly affected by 








Chapter 4: Panama Canal Expansion: Will Panama Canal 
be a Game Changer for LNG Exports to Asia? 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the effects of the Panama Canal capacity level 
for LNG shipping and LNG exports from the Gulf of Mexico. The analysis was 
accomplished by my modifying the WGM 2012 model to include additional market 
agents such as liquefiers, regasifiers, LNG transportation operators, and a canal 
operator in addition to gas producers, traders, storage operators, an integrated pipeline 
operator, and marketers. The mathematical formulation is provided as an Appendix to 
chapter 4. The expansion of market participants was important because the new model-
WGM 2014 can capture the limitation of LNG shipping, capacity of Panama and Suez 
canals, and the investment for future capacity of LNG shipping (tankers). 
 4.1 Introduction 
The Panama Canal is a major waterway connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and 
accommodates more than 14,000 transits per year (Canal de Panama, 2012). However, 
the Panama Canal is not a significant feature of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. 
Only 21 of the 370 LNG tankers worldwide currently in operation can pass through the 
Panama Canal, but none of these tankers have done so because LNG tankers have 
special containment systems that require larger and deeper waterways (Alaskan Natural 
Gas Transportation Project, 2012). Nonetheless, the canal expansion, which is expected 
to be completed by 2015, could allow more than 80% of LNG tankers to use the 





between the Atlantic and Pacific basins and thus could change the landscape of the 
global LNG trade. In particular, the Panama Canal will allow for LNG trade between 
the two basins at lower transportation costs due to decreased shipping distances. In light 
of the anticipated upgrades, the impact of the expanded Panama Canal on global LNG 
trade, especially on U.S. LNG exports, has been asked.  
Recently, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling enabled the gas extraction from 
shale formation economically. In fact, shale gas production in the U.S.  increased 
fivefold from 2006 to 2010. Furthermore, shale gas accounted for 23% of the total U.S. 
natural gas production in 2010 (EIA, 2011). The increase in domestic natural gas 
production has depressed domestic natural gas prices and has caused a large disparity 
between gas prices in the U.S. and those elsewhere in the world. In the near future, the 
U.S. will not only be gas self-sufficient but may also be an LNG exporter. As a result, 
several natural gas producers are eager to apply for natural gas export licenses (Ratner, 
2011). 
The U.S. is more attractive and favorable than other LNG suppliers for several reasons. 
First, because of the negative effects of Russian-Ukrainian gas disruptions in the past, 
U.S. LNG would be considered as an alternative for increasing supply security and 
energy independence in Europe due to the close proximity of the U.S. to Europe. 
Likewise, Asian LNG buyers, such as Japan, South Korea, and India, aim to diversify 
their suppliers. U.S. LNG will increase the security of supply in Asia. Second, U.S. 
LNG sources are more reliable due to the political stability of the country compared to 
other exporters, such as African producers. For example, supplies have been interrupted 





prominent LNG exporters, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have decreased their output 
over time, prompting LNG consumers to search for new LNG sources, especially 
because many existing long-term contracts will end between 2014 and 2016. Lastly, 
North American LNG pricing is based on hub prices, which recently are lower than 
traditional oil index prices. As a result, U.S. LNG exports could affect global LNG 
prices and could bring more competition to global LNG markets. Moreover, some 
countries might benefit from U.S. LNG exports, while others might be disadvantaged.  
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has granted several NON-FTA licenses 
allowing natural gas companies to export gas globally (DOE, 2013). As of October 
2013, the total U.S. LNG export capacity to NON-FTA countries was 57.8 Bcm/y; of 
that capacity, 55.6 Bcm/y comes from liquefaction plants in the Gulf of Mexico and 
2.2 Bcm/y comes from plants located on the East Coast. Additional export applications 
with a total capacity of 279 Bcm/y are under consideration by the DOE. Due to these 
export capacities and lower gas prices, the U.S. will be more competitive in future LNG 
markets. Moreover, experts believe that the Panama Canal widening will improve the 
competitive position of LNG exports from the U.S. Gulf Coast and provide buyers in 
Asia with more opportunities to source supply. However, questions remain regarding 
how much LNG will flow through the canal, who will use the canal, and who will be 
positively and negatively impacted by the new route option given unknown capacity 
and pricing allocated for LNG shipping. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the effects of the Panama Canal capacity level 
for LNG shipping and LNG exports from the Gulf of Mexico. The mathematical 





participants was important because the new model-WGM 2014 can capture the 
limitation of LNG shipping, capacity of Panama and Suez canals, and the investment 
for future capacity of LNG shipping (tankers). The main issue we analyze here is the 
capacity of canal allocated to gas shipment. The results can give some insights on how 
much gas will pass canal to Asian market. In term of congestion prices, it is just the 
measurement of economic efficiency not a true congestion prices. The Panama Canal 
booking system is very complicated because they also assign priority for type of ships 
as well as goods not necessarily related to natural gas.  
This chapter also analyzes the impact on LNG shipping economics as well as impacts 
on global gas prices. In particular, this chapter identifies how much LNG will flow 
through the Panama Canal given different capacities, who will use the Panama Canal, 
and what will be the advantages and disadvantages of the expanded capacity of the 
Panama Canal.  Using a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) market equilibrium 
approach, the 2014 World Gas Model (WGM) provides insightful results for natural 
gas production levels, consumption, prices, and future expansions of natural gas 
infrastructure capacity given different market conditions. The results offer policy 
planning officials and decision makers a better understanding of future LNG markets. 
Recently, several equilibrium models have been developed to describe the structure of 
international gas trade. Some of these models cover specific regional trades (e.g., 
Europe and North America), including GAMMES (Abada et al., 2011), GASTALE 
(Lise and Hobbs, 2009), GASMOD (Holz et al., 2008; Holz, 2009), (Gabriel et al., 
2005a), (Gabriel et al., 2005b), and (Gabriel et al., 2003). In addition, the FRISBEE 





Model (RWGTM) (Rice University, 2004, 2005), the World Gas Model (Gabriel et al., 
2012) depict the global gas trade. Some of these models, such as GASTALE, 
GASMOD WGM-2010, and WGM-2012, include LNG markets, but none account for 
the limitations of maritime shipment. In fact, transportation is a major component of 
LNG trade. The COLUMBUS model (Hecking and Panke, 2012) considers the 
transportation limitations of LNG shipping; however, it assumes only one route 
between each liquefaction and regasification site pair, and the shipping cost is 
determined exogenously.  
In addition, there is a previous study related to the influence of Panama Canal 
expansion on the global gas market.  The work by (Moryadee et al., 2014) used the 
WGM-2012 (Gabriel et al., 2012) to investigate the impact of Panama Canal tolls on 
the global LNG market. However, Moryadee et al. (2014) assumed only one route was 
available (least distance) for each liquefaction and regasification node. Furthermore, 
that study distinguished each scenario only by changing distances and shipping costs. 
Lastly, that study assumed unlimited shipping capacity for LNG tankers as well as 
unlimited capacity for the Panama Canal. However, in reality LNG tankers need to 
compete with other ships for the use of the Panama Canal. Moreover, the new lock of 
the Panama Canal, which is available for large size ships, can accommodate only 15 
passages per day. This might be a constraint for LNG shipment between two basins. 
To address the limitations of the previous studies, we present WGM-2014, an extension 
of WGM-2012 (Gabriel et al., 2012). WGM-2014 incorporates more realistic elements 
to LNG markets. The WGM-2014 takes into account the limitation of canals and 





operator as separate market agents. In addition, WGM-2014 endogenously computes 
the tolls for both the Panama and Suez Canals as opposed to exogenously fixing them 
in WGM-2012(Gabriel et al., 2012).  Also, WGM-2014 includes three types of LNG 
tankers; small (≤140,000 cm3), large (≤170,000 cm3), and extra-large (≥170,000 cm3) 
while WGM-2012 has no tankers modeled. Lastly, WGM-2014 endogenously 
determines shipping costs, but WGM-2012 has exogenous shipping costs. 
These modeling improvements resulted in more realistic LNG trade flows. For 
example, the total LNG trade was only about 1.2% off from historical values for 2010; 
WGM 2012 (Gabriel et al., 2012) is approximately 30% off. More details of WGM 
2014 are discussed in Section 4.1 and the mathematical formulation is presented in 
Appendix 4-A. WGM-2014 was originally based on the works (Gabriel et al., 2005a), 
(Gabriel et al., 2005b), and  (Gabriel et al., 2012).  All these versions were developed 
in mixed complementarity formats, where the Karush-Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions 
of individual gas market players are both necessary and sufficient.  
The remaining portion of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides a 
literature review of issues related to the global LNG trade, LNG shipping, and the 
Panama Canal expansion. Section 4.3 describes the study method and the input data. 
Section 4.4 proposes scenarios involving U.S. LNG exports and the Panama Canal. 
Section 4.5 presents the results and the analysis, and Section 4.6 provides conclusions 





4.2 Global LNG trade, LNG shipping cost, and the Panama Canal 
expansion 
4.2.1 Global LNG trade 
Unlike oil and coal, due to the gaseous nature of natural gas, before the development 
of LNG technology, transportation of natural gas was limited by pipeline and was 
costly due to the low energy density property. Moreover, there was substantial 
infrastructure investment needed to transport natural gas from supply to demand points. 
The evolution of LNG has considerably changed all that and enabled the use of 
maritime transportation so that gas can be shipped and traded internationally.  
However, LNG has historically been a regional fuel with most LNG trade made within 
the same basin where it is produced (GIIGNL, 2013). For example, LNG Trade Data 
for the period 1995-2012 indicates that suppliers in both the Atlantic Basin and 
Asia/Pacific regions dedicated over 99% of their supply to markets in the same basin. 
Before the 2010 nuclear disaster in Japan, the difference in the price of gas between 
Asia and Europe was small, approximately $0.50 (BP, 2013) and this price difference 
could not cover high shipping costs so that LNG trade between basins was 
uneconomical. Nonetheless, the price divergence between the basins has increased 
since mid-2010 due to strong demand in Asia, especially Japan. In 2012, according to 
BP Statistical Reviews (2013) natural gas price prices were $16.75/MMbtu in Japan23  
but only $9.70/MMBtu in Europe (Heren NBP index) and $2.75/MMBtu in the U.S. 
                                                 





(Henry Hub). Therefore, exporting LNG between basins became cost effective 
depending on the shipping costs.  
4.2.2 LNG shipping cost 
LNG shipping costs involve three main elements: the LNG carrier’s capital, the 
operating cost, and the voyage cost, i.e., marine fuel cost. The capital cost is considered 
a fixed cost, while the operating and voyage costs are variable. The operating cost 
includes manning, maintenance, and insurance. LNG projects require large 
investments. A new standard-size LNG tanker (170,000 m3) costs more than $200 
million USD to build because it requires costly materials and sophisticated cargo-
handling equipment (Petroleum Economist, 2011). Because LNG tankers are 
sophisticated ships, they require specialized crews. As a result, the manning costs are 
high, accounting for 35% of the operating cost (Petroleum Economist, 2011). The 
majority of the voyage cost is associated with fuel and port costs. The fuel cost is based 
on the speed and engine performance, whereas the port costs depend on the destination 
port; they can be complex and variable depending on the size and volume of the tanker. 
In addition, the voyage cost also includes transit fees, such as canal tolls. Because the 
capital cost is fixed, the main variable cost is the voyage cost, which depends on the 
distance of the trip. Table 4-2 shows the shipping costs in $/MMBtu from various 
locations to Tokyo, Japan based on data from IHS CERA (Reuters, 2013). The shipping 
cost from the Atlantic Basin to Japan is three to four times higher than that for the 
Pacific Basin. However, the Panama Canal route will significantly reduce the time and 
shipping cost of transportation between the two basins.  





Route Shipping cost 
Indonesia-Tokyo less than $1/MMBtu 
Australia-Tokyo $1.22 
Trinidad Tobago-Tokyo $4.16 
Norway-Tokyo $4.13 
North Africa-Tokyo $3.26 
USA (Gulf of Mexico)-Tokyo $4.40 
 
Because a significant portion of the voyage costs depend on the fuel, which is a function 
of the distance, the presence of the Panama Canal will reduce the voyage costs from 
the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. IHS CERA (Reuter, 2013) estimated that the 
route via the Panama Canal will reduce the shipping cost from the Gulf of Mexico to 
Japan by approximately $1.50/MMBtu. However, at the time of this research, the 
Panama Canal Authority has not determined what toll it will charge LNG tankers to 
pass through the canal, so the final toll could differ. IHS CERA assumed a toll of 
$0.30/MMBtu based on a $1 million round-trip fee for a medium-sized LNG tanker, 
which leaves a significant savings of $1.20/MMBtu. Regardless of the toll, the larger 
canal will improve the economics of LNG shipping between the two basins and will 
create incentives to exploit pricing differences between the Pacific and Atlantic 
markets. The price difference between the basins might be narrowed and may benefit 
Asian consumers. 





The Panama Canal is currently restricted to vessels with beams24 of less than 32 
meters,294-meters long, with draft25 of no more than 12 meters (see, Table 4-2) 
(Panama Canal Authority, 2010). The expansion of the Panama Canal will allow for 
the first time, large tankers with beams up to a maximum of 49 meters to pass.  When 
the expansion is finished, at least 80 % of the LNG tankers, up to large LNG 
conventional ones (up to 180,000 m3), operating in 2013 will be able to use the 
waterway except for Q‐Flex (209,000‐216,200 m³) and Q‐Max (260,000‐266,000 m³) 
size tankers. Consequently, the distance to transport U.S. LNG from the Gulf of Mexico 
will decrease from 16,000 miles to approximately 9,700 miles, reducing the travel time 
from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Tokyo, Japan from 41 to 25 days. Also, the route can reduce 
time going from east to west e.g., Peru –Brazil.  The comparison of distances in 
different routes is shown in Table 4-3.  
 
Table 4-2 Maximum allowed containership dimension before and after expansion 
in meters (m) and dimensions for large conventional LNG carriers. 
  
Maximum   
dimension Before 
expansion  
Maximum   
dimension After 
expansion 
Dimensions for large 
conventional LNG carriers 
(150,000-180,000 m3) 
Length overall  294.30 m 366.00 m 285.00-295.00 m 
Draft 32.31 m 49.00 m 43.00-46.00 m 
Beam 12.04 m 15.24 m Up to 12.00 m 
(Man Diesel and Turbo, 2011) 
 
Table 4-3 Comparison of distances (nautical miles26) between ports 
 
                                                 
24 Beam - the greatest width of a nautical vessel. 
25 Draft- the distance between the vessel's waterline and the lowest point of the vessel 

















Gulf of Mexico 
Western Mexico 3,733 21,637 9,783 19,713 
Chile 4,449 19,723 13,476 20,266 
Japan 9,756 14,449 17,060 15,697 
Singapore  12,147 11,910 16,900 13,157 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Western Mexico 3,331 20,272 7,643 17,573 
Chile 4,048 18,358 11,336 18,126 
Japan 9,355 13,054 14,920 13,557 
Singapore  11,746 10,545 14,761 11,027 
Norway 
Western Mexico 7,471 19,474 10,801 19,601 
Chile 8,188 17,559 14,493 20,155 
Japan 13,494 12,285 18,078 15,585 
Singapore  15,886 9,746 17,918 13,046 
Source: (Popils, 2011) 
 
Currently, the Panama Canal authority operates with two lanes of locks that can handle 
ships at near its capacity or about 35 ships per day.  The expansion of the Panama Canal 
includes two new sets of locks—one on the Atlantic and one on the Pacific side. Each 
new lock will have three chambers, and the canal itself will be deepened and widened. 
Recently, congestion is growing and affecting the total passage time. In the peak 
demand period, some container ships need to wait one day or longer to enter the canal.  
After expansion, the new third set of locks will help eliminate some of those backlogs, 
by adding perhaps 15 passages to the daily total.  However, the capacity for LNG transit 





including ship characteristics, load type, and daylight restriction.  Moreover, LNG 
tankers need to compete with other ships to use the canal. 
4.3 Study methods and input data 
This section presents the framework used to determine the impact of the Panama Canal 
capacity level on LNG exports from Gulf of Mexico in particular and global gas 
markets in general. The structure of the LNG and shipping markets are identified. 
Because LNG transportation, including the shipping cost and capacity, is a major 
component of the market, its impact on the patterns of exports from Gulf of Mexico is 
analyzed. 
4.3.1 The World Gas Model  
In the previous version of WGM, WGM-2012 (Gabriel et al., 2012), the market agents 
include natural gas producers, traders, storage operators, an integrated pipeline and 
system operator, and marketers. The traders are modeled as strategic players and 
coordinate both pipeline and LNG flows from the same country. Unlike WGM-2012, 
WGM-2014 includes additional details on the LNG markets and accounts for the 
limitations of maritime transportation on these markets (e.g., LNG carrier capacity, 
LNG shipping routes, and congestion in shipping routes). In this framework, we 
integrated the shipping markets as part of the LNG markets with endogenously 
determined prices by tanker category. Therefore, the model includes additional market 
participants, namely liquefiers, regasifiers, LNG transportation operators, and canal 
operator. All these new players are modeled by separate optimization problems to 





decisions see Appendix 4-A for more details. WGM 2014 has 5-year time periods 
starting in 2005 and continuing through 2060; each “year” has high and low demand 
seasons.  In terms of LNG contracts, we incorporate an LNG contract data base from 
GIIGNL (2014) and assume that the contracts will be renewed with the same value 
after they expire. In WGM-2014, LNG transportation operators have the ability to 
propose LNG flows for three routes: via the Suez Canal, via the Panama Canal, and via 
a normal route without canals from the liquefaction node to the regasification node. 
The actual flows are determined by the equilibrium condition for all players. LNG can 
be shipped over shorter distances through these canals with an extra charge (toll) or 
over the normal route with longer distances but no toll. The LNG tankers in this model 
are considered in terms of their aggregate capacity rather than individually for 
computational reasons. For simplicity, it is assumed that there are three LNG 
transportation operators own tankers of different sizes, small (≤140,000 cm3), large 
(≤170,000 cm3), and extra-large (>170,000 cm3) e.g., Q-Max and Q-Flex, with 
different aggregate capacities, future investment costs, and operating speeds. The size 
the LNG tankers is important because each type of tanker has different operating costs, 
and extra-large tankers cannot use Panama Canal due to size limitations. In this study, 
it is assumed that the LNG buyers are responsible for the LNG shipping charges, which 
come from market-clearing conditions between the regasifiers and the LNG 
transportation operators for each origin–destination pair. This shipping service charge 
was exogenous in WGM-2012 but in WGM-2014 is endogenously determined for 
greater realism. Since the Panama Canal already has other users, the capacity available 





Another adjustment that is relevant to LNG markets is that the canal operator is 
modeled. We assume that the canal operator owns two main canals, the Panama and 
Suez Canals, for LNG shipping. The canal operator collects transit fees for providing 
shorter routes, and congestion fees at the canal are imposed when the waterway is busy 
with traffic. Lastly, all of the market participants except for the canal operator have 
endogenous future investments. Appendix 4-A provides the complete mathematical 
formulations and assumptions for each market player, and Appendix 4-B describes the 
associated KKT and market-clearing conditions. Details of the input data for WGM-
2014 are shown in Table 4-4 and Figure 4-1 shows a representation of the LNG market 
in WGM-2014. 
 
Table 4-4 Market agents and input data in WGM 2014. 
Market agents Input data and references 
Producers 
Production cost function (Golombeck 
et al., 1995, 1998)                                   
Production reference (EIA,2013; 
IEA,2011) 
Storage operator 
Storage capacity (EIA, 2007;GSE, 
2008)                 
Storage expansion Oil and Gas Journal 
 
An integrated pipeline and system operator  
Pipeline capacity (GTE, 2005, 2008)                                 
Pipeline transportation cost    
(Oostvoorn , 2003)                
Pipeline expansion Oil and Gas Journal 
LNG transportation operators 
Shipping capacity (GIIGNL, 2013) 
Average speed (MAN Diesel & 
Turbo, 2011) 
Shipping cost (Petroleum Economist, 
2011) 
LNG shipping distance 
(PortWorld.com) 
Canal operator 







Liquefaction capacities (GIIGNL, 
2013) 
Regasifiers 
Regasification capacities (GIIGNL, 
2013) 




Consumption reference (EIA,2013; 
IEA, 2011) 




Figure 4-1 Representation of the LNG market in WGM-2014.  
 
 
It is important to note that for many existing LNG users, particularly in Asia, gas and 
oil compete for a considerable portion of the market, unlike the U.S. where gas and oil 
markets are weakly linked. This implies that with greater amounts of inexpensive gas 
available to those markets, the demand for natural gas could significantly increase, 
thereby reducing the demand for oil. Since contract prices for LNG to Asia are often 
linked to the world oil price, more U.S. natural gas exports could also reduce the LNG 





gas interactions, this aspect of the energy market is currently not modeled but may be 
a topic for future enhancement. 
The current version of the model is composed of 42 nodes that represent individual or 
aggregated countries and covers 98% of the worldwide consumption and production 
for 2010. On the supply side, the WGM also characterizes three types of producers in 
each region of the U.S.: conventional gas, shale gas, and non-shale unconventional gas. 
The model operates in five-year periods from 2005-2050 as well as in high and low 
demand seasons. The year 2010 is used as a calibration year. On the LNG side, WGM-
2014 consists of 15 aggregated liquefaction nodes and 23 regasification nodes and 
covers more than 85% of the actual long-term contracts that were in place in 2010. In 
addition, LNG spot markets are used to investigate the state of the global gas market. 
The model solves for decision variables, including the operating levels (e.g., 
production, storage injection) and capacity investments (e.g., for pipelines and 
liquefaction). A total of 103,000 variables make up the WGM complementarity system, 
which can be solved on a standard personal computer (e.g., 4 GB of RAM and 1.2 GHz 
clockspeed) in approximately 240 minutes.  
4.4 Scenarios 
This section describes the scenarios defined in this study.  First, we define the Base 
Case as the baseline for the comparisons with the other scenarios. The Base Case 
assumes no Panama Canal route and no U.S. LNG exports. Secondly in term of US 





the Gulf of Mexico with a capacity of 57.88 Bcm27/y, 8.25 Bcm/y from the West Coast, 
and from the East Coast at 10.33 Bcm/y. Only 4.5 Bcm/y from the Gulf of Mexico is 
under long-term contract with specific destinations (from the U.S. to India), so the rest 
of the capacity is endogenously determined by the model and thus corresponds to the 
LNG spot market.   
We assume the U.S. starts exporting LNG with a capacity of 57.88 Bcm/y in 2015.28 
In addition, the U.S. has the ability to expand its export capacity by 50 Bcm29 during 
each five-year time period. Lastly, there is an assumption the Panama Canal capacity 
regarding the competition for canal capacity. The new lock of the Panama Canal will 
add approximately 15 passages to the daily total (Fountian, 2011).  Since no LNG 
tankers can make it through the Panama Canal due to insufficient lock depth, this means 
the Panama Canal capacity will vary from 0 to 15 passages for LNG given the other 
users of the Canal.  Since WGM-2014 provides a market equilibrium for global natural 
gas markets, it only considers LNG tankers for the use of the Panama Canal. Other 
competition for the Canal, e.g., crude oil, metal ores, agricultural products, and other 
materials are not directly represented. Therefore, this study estimates the capacity for 
LNG shipping using the number of LNG vessels transiting through the Panama Canal  
via four choices of Canal capacity (zero, low-100 ships per year, medium-200 ships per 
                                                 
27 1 Bcm =35.3 Bcf. 
28The U.S. is expected to start LNG exports from Cheniere Energy terminal in 2017, but we assume the 
U.S. starts earlier in 2015 due to the five-year time steps in the model. 
29 The capacity investment cannot be realized instantaneously by the model. WGM has five-year time 
steps which are enough for the time lag for construction. In this case, the U.S. can increase its export 





year, high-250 ships per year), assuming the largest sizes of tankers (170,000 m3 ) 
passes through the Canal.30  The scenarios descriptions are as follows: 
1. The Base Case is run without the Panama Canal route and with no U.S. LNG 
exports. The Base Case consumption outcome uses the data sources presented 
in Table 4 and is calibrated to multiple sources. Details of this calibration are 
provided in the next section. 
2. The second scenario considers U.S. exports with a capacity of 57.88 Bcm/y as 
previously discussed without the Panama Canal route and is denoted as 
“USLNG_Panama0” 
3. The third scenario, which is abbreviated “USLNG_Panama100”, uses the same 
assumptions for the U.S. Exports, but the route via the Panama Canal is 
available starting in 2015 with  endogenously  determined transit tolls from  
market-clearing conditions. We estimate the maximum capacity of the Panama 
Canal by assuming that up to estimated 100 LNG vessels of 70,000 m3 capacity 
ships transiting through the Panama Canal each year once the expansion is 
completed. 
4. The fourth scenario, which is abbreviated “USLNG_Panama200”, uses the 
same assumptions as USLNG_Panama100 on the U.S. LNG exports and the 
availability of the Panama Canal, but assumes that the Canal can accommodate 
up to  200 LNG tankers of 170,000 m3  each year. 
                                                 
30 Although there are 393 LNG vessels in operation (GIIGNL, 2013), only 90% can pass through the 
Panama Canal. Of these 393 ships more than 80% are already committed under long-term for specific 
routes that do not use the Panama Canal. We also allow the LNG shipping operator to expand the 





5. The last scenario which is abbreviated “USLNG_Panama250”, uses the same 
assumptions as USLNG_Panama100 but assumes that the Canal can 
accommodate up to 250 LNG tankers of 170,000 m3 each year. 
The five scenarios were first simulated up to 2035 and allowed for an analysis of the 
flows of U.S. gas exports in the global market. The global results, including production 
and consumption, are presented in the next section. 
4-5 Results 
4.5.1 Model validation and the calibration results 
 
The consumption output of the base case was calibrated to match the global natural gas 
markets in 2010 provided by the 2013 BP Statistical Review as well as projections from 
multiple sources. The model outcome for the U.S. considers the rapid growth of shale 
gas development in the next decades. The U.S.’s natural gas consumption and 
production are specifically calibrated according to the forecast from the Annual Energy 
Outlook (EIA, 2013). The production and consumption for the rest of the world is based 
on the World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2011): New Policy Scenario as a reference, which 
takes into account rapid growth rates for demands in Asia and the Middle East. For 
LNG markets, GIIGNL (2011) is a valuable source for natural gas liquefaction and 
regasification capacities and long-term contracts.  
 
The Base Case is used as the baseline for comparison against other scenarios. To 
examine the error of the model, we compare its output to historical references. As 





from the reference (BP, 2013). The percentage differences in Table 4-5 are the BP 2013 
values minus the WGM values divided by the BP 2013 values. The difference between 
the WGM consumption and the BP values (2013) is less than 5%. We separate Japan/S. 
Korea from the Asia Pacific region because this study primarily focuses on the LNG 
market, of which Japan has the highest consumption in the world. Japan and S. Korea 
have more than 50% of the total LNG consumption in 2012. Among the remaining 
regions, North America has the highest consumption while Asia Pacific, Europe, and 
the Former Soviet Union have intermediate levels of consumption.  
 
Table 4-5 Comparison of natural gas consumption in 2010 from the WGM output 
and BP (2013) (Bcm).  
 
 WGM BP (2013) % difference 
AFRICA   102.9 107.8 4.55% 
ASPACIF  371.7 387.1 3.98% 
EUROPE   537.1 544.6 1.38% 
FRSVTUN  580.2 585 0.82% 
JAPAN/ S.Korea    144.3 137.5 -4.95% 
MIDDLE EAST  339 329 -3.04% 
NRTH_AM  774 767 -0.91% 
STH_AM   134.5 132.9 -1.20% 
 
Table 4-6 indicates that the total LNG trade in 2010 calculated by WGM-2014 is 272.1 
Bcm/y, while the actual trade from GIIGNL was 275.54 Bcm/y. The percentage 
differences between the GIIGNL (2011) and WGM figures of LNG global trade for 
2010 are fairly small. Asia was the dominant LNG importer in 2010, whereas the 









Table 4-6 LNG imports by region and source of imports in 2010. 
















Europe 84.9 81.63 4.0% 
 Atlantic 
Basin  74.7 79.44 5.97% 
Americ
as 25.6 26.3 2.7% 
 Middle 
East  89.8 93.47 3.93% 
Asia 161.6 164.87 2.0% 
 Pacific 
Basin  107.6 102.63 4.84% 
Middle 
East31 - 2.75 - 
 
Total 272.1 275.54 1.25% 
Total 272.1 275.54 1.2%      
 
In terms of the projected regional consumption, the results of WGM-2014 display the 
same trend as the Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2013) for the U.S. and the World 
Energy Outlook (IEA, 2011) for the rest of the world, as shown in Figure 4-2. The Asia 
Pacific region has the highest growth rate from 2010-2035. The consumption of the 
rest of the world gradually increases after 2015. By the end of 2025, the world’s natural 
gas consumption will reach approximately 4,000 Bcm/y, of which approximately half 
will come from the Asia Pacific region, the Former Soviet Union, and North America. 
The results are predicated on the IEA and EIA results for gas demands.  However, those 
gas demands could change substantially depending on the related world oil price 
assumptions.   
                                                 





Figure 4-2 projected natural gas consumption for the base case. 
4.5.2 Impact of LNG shipping economics 
 
The overall impact of the canal expansion on LNG trade is fairly obvious: shorter 
distances and voyages lower the shipping costs.  What is not so obvious and what was 
in part the motivation for this study, was the effect on particular shipping patterns (who 
gets more LNG), resulting regional prices, and other specific results. 
In general, shorter distances reduce fuel consumption and LNG boil-off.  Shorter 
voyages reduce the charter period32 for voyages and increase vessel utilization since 
the route via the Panama Canal reduces the turnaround times per trip, more shipping 
capacity turns into availability, and this should improve the total LNG trade. We found 
that these hypotheses are true if there is enough capacity of the waterway for LNG 
shipping. The first thing to realize is that the total LNG trade over time under the Base 
                                                 










































Case is less than the rest of scenarios due to the restriction on U.S. LNG exports, see 
Figure 4-3.  
Next, the difference between USLNG_Panama0 and USLNG_Panama100 scenarios is 
that there are additional routes via Panama Canal with capacity of 100 ships per year 
for USLNG_Panama100, but other assumptions for U.S. LNG exports are the same. 
Figure 4-3 shows that there is almost no difference in total LNG trade between these 
two scenarios even though the canal route is available. The explanation is that the U.S. 
LNG exports to Asia are restricted by the capacity of the Panama Canal, see 4.5.3 for 
more details for U.S. LNG export pattern. The conclusion is that the canal capacity is 
not enough to improve the total LNG trade. However, under USLNG_Panama200 with 
a capacity of 200 ships per year,  the total LNG trade increases 1-3% from 2015-2030  
and becomes more pronounced in 2035 as compared to USLNG_Panama100 scenario; 
the total LNG trade increases by 5% in 2035.  Nonetheless, the total worldwide trade 
is similar for two scenarios, USLNG_Panama200 and USLNG_Panama250, from 2010 
to 2030. The total trade increase a little in 2035 (423.4 Bcm v.s. 417.1 Bcm). This 
indicates that increasing the Panama Canal capacity from 200 ships per year to 250 







Figure 4-3 WGM-2014 Total LNG trade in Bcm from 2010-203533 
 
 The model results in terms of the Panama Canal utilization show that LNG trade 
becomes more global; the Panama Canal allows the trade from the Atlantic basin to the 
Pacific basin,   and Asian markets rely more on Gulf of Mexico supply. In the past, 
LNG was usually traded within the same basin because the shipping cost was too high 
to ship from one basin to another basin. Figure 4-4 shows the comparison of the Panama 
Canal utilization for 2015 and 2035. All of the trade flows from the Atlantic basin to 
Japan/S. Korea; none flows from the Pacific basin going to the Atlantic. For example, 
Trinidad and Tobago and the U.S. are the major users of the Panama Canal; they 
transport 20.8 Bcm and 35.9 Bcm in 2015 via the Panama Canal to Japan under 
USLNG_Panama100 and USLNG_Panama200, respectively. This phenomenon occurs 
                                                 
33 The reason the total LNG trade drops slightly in 2015 from 342 to 341 Bcm between 
USLNG_Panama100 and USLNG_Panama200 is presumably due to shifting of supplier market share 
and non-cooperative, game-theoretic behavior.  
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Base 295.2 316.5 337.5 349.1 370.1 377
USLNG_Panama0 295.2 335.8 364.4 370.8 390.6 401.2
USLNG_Panama100 295.2 342 367.6 370.8 390.1 404.4
USLNG_Panama200 295.2 341 371.6 380.1 400 417.1






















because Japan/S .Korea has the highest endogenous wholesale prices in the world while 
the LNG suppliers have profit maximization as an objective. Therefore, exporting gas 
to Japan can generate a significant profit depending on the shipping cost. In addition, 
only the LNG from the Gulf of Mexico will benefit from the Panama Canal although 
there are other Atlantic basin LNG-exporting plants e.g., SnØhvit terminal in Norway 
and Nigeria LNG and Angola LNG in West Africa. The distances from SnØhvit 
terminal, Norway, are closer to Asia via the Suez Canal. Likewise, Japan/S. Korea and 
China are closer to West Africa traveling around the Cape of Good Hope so that no 
LNG flows through the Panama Canal to China.   Moreover, the model results show 
that there is a considerable gap for Panama Canal utilization when we assume 100 ships 
per year (USLNG_Panama100) and 200 ships per year (USLNG_Panama200), see 
Figure 4-4. The utilization difference is less when compared USLNG_Panama200 and 
USLNG_Panama250. The utilization rate increases as the given canal capacity 
increases. However, the results for the Suez Canal utilization stays the same for all 
scenarios, approximately 36 Bcm in 2035. This means increasing Panama Canal 
utilization rate does not affect the Suez Canal utilization rate and, the flows from 
Middle East to Europe through the Suez Canal remain the same.  In addition, we did 
further analysis by sufficiently increasing the capacity for the Panama Canal e.g., 500 
ships per year to see what would be the maximum flows through the Panama Canal. 
We found that the maximum flows reached 68.3 Bcm in 2035 due to the restriction on 







Figure 4-4 WGM-2014 Panama Canal utilization from 2015 and 2035 Bcm. 
         
Figure 4-5 presents the extra-large LNG tanker capacity in 2010 vs. 2035. The model 
invests in extra-large tankers, even though the investment costs are much higher than 
that of other tankers. The reason is that extra-large tankers have the lowest unit 
operating and voyage costs per cm due to the economies of scale of the tankers. It is 
important to note that the total capacity for extra-large tankers in 2035 decreases when 
the capacity of the Panama Canal increases, see Figure 4-5. However, the total LNG 
trade increases, see Figure 4-3.  This indicates that the Panama Canal route increases 
efficiency of LNG shipping; less total shipping capacity generates a higher volume of 
trade. For example, in 2035 when comparing USLNG_Panama100 with US_LNG 
Panama200, the total capacity for extra-large tanker are, respectively 15.3 million m3 
and 11.9 million m3, see Figure 4-5. However the total trade for the same year increases 
from 404.4 Bcm to 417.1 Bcm, respectively, see Figure 4-4. The explanation is as 
follows. Under the USLNG_Panama100 scenario in 2015, the total LNG flow using 





The total LNG flows for the two other sizes of ships (medium and extra-large) stay the 
same (extra-large) or almost the same (15.7 vs. 15.2 Bcm for the medium size).  In sum, 
larger Panama Canal capacity (200 vs. 100 ships/year) induces substantially more LNG 
traded on the smaller ships.    
 
Figure 4-5 WGM-2014 Comparison of capacity for extra-large tanker in millions 
cubic meters, 2010 vs 2035   
 
4.5.3 Impact on LNG exports from Gulf of Mexico  
According to the results of our simulations, LNG from the Gulf of Mexico no longer 
flows to Japan/S. Korea in the absence of the Panama Canal with expanded capacity, 
but rather transited to Europe. As shown in Table 4-7, for the year 2015, the U.S. 
exports scenario without the Panama Canal (USLNG_Panama0), indicates that the U.S. 
and Trinidad & Tobago will respectively, export 18.4 Bcm and 7.3 Bcm to South 
America and Europe. Only 4.6 Bcm is transited from the U.S. to India under long-term 
contract via the Suez Canal. The remainder of the U.S. LNG exports are endogenously 
determined by the model. Under the USLNG Panama0 scenario the U.S. exports more 














Base USLNG_Panama100 USLNG_Panama200 USLNG_Panama250
Comparison of capacity  for extra-large tankers in millions cm of 






to Europe (37.6 Bcm) in 2035, see Table 4-8 as compared to 18.4 Bcm in 2015 in Table 
4-7 (. Although the U.S. export capacity is approximately 60 Bcm, the total exports do 
not reach this maximum. This situation shows that the European gas market has 
limitations in absorbing U.S.-exported LNG.  However, the U.S. will export more when 
the Panama Canal is utilized. In sum, without the expanded Panama Canal capacity, 
the U.S. will likely export to Europe rather than to Asia because the endogenously 
determined shipping cost from the Gulf of Mexico to Asia is much higher than that for 
Europe.  
When compared three Panama Canal scenarios (USLNG_Panama100, 
USLNG_Panama200, and USLNG_Panama250), the level of the Panama Canal 
capacity also play a significant role for the direction of U.S. LNG exports.  
USLNG_Panama100 scenario assumes 100 of LNG ships transited through the Panama 
Canal each year. Under this scenario, the U.S. increases the total exports up  to 29 Bcm 
from 18.4 Bcm (Table 4-7) in the USLNG_Panama0 scenario and sends 15.8 Bcm to 
Japan/S.Korea and 8.6 Bcm to Europe (Netherlands, Poland, and Spain) in 2015. With 
the limited capacity of the Panama Canal in this scenario, the U.S. becomes a swing 
LNG exporter, sending gas to both east and west. However, when more Panama Canal 
capacity is available, the U.S. exports almost all of its LNG to Japan/S.Korea.  The 
U.S. exports 26.4 Bcm to Japan/S.Korea in 2015, see Table 4-7 and 51.8 Bcm to the 
same destination in 2035 (Table 4-8) under this scenario.  U.S. LNG exports switch 
direction from Europe to Asia because Asian prices are a lot higher than European 
prices. For example in 2035 Japanese’s prices are 18$/MMBtu but European prices are 






It is important to note that the total endogenous LNG export volume from the U.S. 
under USLNG_Panama250 is similar to USLNG_Panama200 although the maximum 
capacity of the Canal goes up to 250 passages/year.  It is conventionally thought that 
when more capacity is available, the U.S. will export more to that market. However, 
the reverse occurs for U.S. LNG exports. The U.S. exports only approximately 60 Bcm 
under USLNG_Panama100 and US_LNGPanama250, see Table 4-8.  In the model set-
up, we allow additional 50 Bcm per year for the expansion of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico 
terminal in each time period. The terminal can get expanded if it is profitable.  The 
investment condition is that the terminal will expand if the total future profit is greater 
than the cost of current investments as part of the liquefier KKT conditions, see 
Appendix B, equation B16 for more details. However, there is no investment made by 
the model for capacity expansion for the U.S. Gulf of Mexico terminal 
Table 4-7   LNG Exports from Gulf of Mexico in 2015 (Bcm) 
Origi

















Brazil 0 2.2 0 0 0 
India 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Japan/S. 
Korea 0 0 15.8 26.4 26.4 
France 0 2 1.6 0 0 
Netherlands 0 1.5 0.7 0 0 
Poland 0 2.8 2.8 0.8 0.8 
Spain 0 5 3.5 0 0 
Turkey 0 0.3 0 0 0 






Brazil 2.9 2 0 0 0 
Japan/S. 
Korea 0 0 5 9.5 9.5 











Table 4-8 LNG Exports from Gulf of Mexico in 2035 (Bcm). 
Orig

















India 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Japan/S. 
Korea 0 0 31.5 51.8 51.5 
France 0 11.5 4.1 0 0 
Netherlan
ds 0 7.5 1.1 0 0 
Poland 0 14.1 5.7 0 0 
The UK 0 4.1 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0.4 0 0 0 







Korea 0 0 0 5.4 10 
Spain 3 3 3 3 3 
Grand Total 3 3 3 8.4 13 
 
4.5.4 Impact on regional prices  
In addition to the impacts discussed above, the importance of the Panama Canal 
expansion from an LNG market perspective is its influence on global gas price 
convergence.  Lower shipping costs improve the relative economics of shipping Gulf 
of Mexico gas to Asia.  Over time this reduces inter-regional price spreads. It is 
important to note that $2010 is used in this analysis. Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7 indicate 
regional price spreads for the USLNG_Panama0 and USLNG_Panama200 scenarios 
                                                 
34 The U.S. sales decrease because Trinidad & Tobago increases its sales to Japan. Trinidad & Tobago 







respectively. The price gaps for Japan-Europe and Japan-North America in 2035 are 
smaller; the difference between Japanese-European prices is $7.29 for the 
USLNG_Panama0 scenario (Figure 4-6), and it is narrowed to $6.17 (Figure 4-7) as 
the Panama Canal route with expanded capacity is employed under the 
USLNG_Panama200 scenario. Another interesting result is that over time the North 
American gas prices increase a little under $6 range due to LNG exports.  

























2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Comparion of wholesale prices in $/MMBtu for the 
USLNG_Panama0 scenario
Japan Europe North America
13.1
7.29Price difference Japan –Europe   





Figure 4-7 Comparison for wholesale prices in $/MMBtu for USLNG_Panama200 
scenario. 
In terms of country prices, the U.S. LNG exports caused by the Panama Canal 
expansion are projected to have other impacts, for example on worldwide prices. Table 
4-9 shows that under the Base Case, the wholesale price in Japan/S. Korea increases to 
as high as $18.91/MMbtu in 2035, representing the highest prices among all countries. 
Southeast Asia/China and India/Pakistan see 2035 prices of $15.69/MMbtu and 
$11.03/MMbtu, respectively. Under the USLNG_Panama0, due to inexpensive U.S. 
LNG flowing to Europe, the importing countries experience lower gas prices than in 
the Base Case. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and Spain 
experience reductions of $0.20-$0.35/MMBtu in wholesale prices. Due to the 
availability of the Panama Canal, the wholesale prices in China/Southeast Asia and 
Japan/S. Korea decrease by $0.20-0.30/MMBtu under USLNG_Panama100, 
USLNG_Panama200, and USLNG_Panama250 scenarios as compared to the Base 























2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Comparison of wholesale prices in $/MMBtu for the USLNG_Panama200 
scenario
Japan Europe North America
12.1 
6.17 Price difference Japan –Europe   





LNG transported by Qatar and Australia although the U.S. does not export gas to 
China/Southeast Asia. Lastly, when we compare the USLNG_Panama0 and 
USLNG_Panama100 scenarios, the results show that the European prices in the 
USLNG_Panama0 are higher than in USLNG_Panama100 scenario while Asian prices 
are in the opposite direction.   The explanation is that the expanded Panama Canal 
allows the exports from Gulf of Mexico to Asia. More gas supplies go to Asia and 
simultaneously decrease flow to Europe.  











Netherlands $11.61 $11.41 $11.48 $11.54 $11.56 
Poland $11.97 $11.59 $11.82 $11.83 $11.85 
Spain $11.53 $11.20 $11.27 $11.48 $11.51 
Turkey $11.29 $10.95 $11.05 $11.20 $11.21 
United Kingdom $11.44 $11.09 $11.21 $11.28 $11.31 
China/S.E. Asia $15.69 $15.65 $15.36 $14.99 $14.78 
India/Pakistan  $11.03 $10.93 $10.91 $10.88 $10.88 
Japan/S. Korea $18.91 $18.88 $18.45 $17.90 $17.60 
 
4.5.5 Other Impacts on the global gas market 
Without the Panama Canal expanded capacity, under USLNG_Panama0, the entry of 
U.S. LNG into Europe displaces the market shares of Algeria and Russia in the 
European LNG markets (Table 4-10). In 2035, Russia’s natural gas flows to Europe 
decreases significantly from 12.2 Bcm to 0.8 Bcm, and Algeria’s flows decreases by 
approximately 6.1 Bcm under USLNG_Panama0.  The WGM results indicate that the 
greatest effect of the Panama Canal expansion is reflected in the U.S. LNG export 
pattern, which dynamically changes the market. As shown in Table 4-10, the U.S. 





USLNG_Panama250 scenarios, respectively compared with zero in 
USLNG_Panama0.  The increased LNG supply from the U.S. displaces that from other 
exporters to the Japan/S. Korea node (Table 4-10). Under the  USLNG_Panama100 
scenario as compared to the Base Case, Qatar and Australia experience decreases of 
approximately 46% (from 47 Bcm to 25 Bcm) and 4% (from 95 Bcm to 80 Bcm), 
respectively, in their LNG exports to Japan/S. Korea. In contrast, Qatar increases their 
LNG exports to Chinese markets from 26.9 Bcm to 49.6 Bcm under the 
USLNG_Panama100 scenario and from 26.9 to 61.8 Bcm under USLNG_200 scenario. 
Likewise, Australia exports LNG to China a lot more after its market shares are 
displaced by the Gulf of Mexico LNG from the U.S.  The explanation is that as LNG 
exports are displaced in one market, suppliers will attempt to increase sales in other 
markets to maintain their profit. Overall, U.S. LNG causes a significant reduction in 
the total export volume of Asian LNG exporters to the Japanese/S. Korean market. 
 
Table 4-10. Selected LNG flows from major LNG exporters in 2035 (Bcm). 
Exporters 

















Australia 96.2 95.1 91.4 80 0 0 1.7 10.4 
Qatar 47.8 47 25 13 26.9 27.9 49.6 61.8 
Russia 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 0 0 0 0 
USA 0 0 31.5 51.8 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Trinidad 0 0 0 5.4 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Nigeria 1.8 4 0 0 35.8 35.1 24.6 24.6 
Yemen 3 3 3 3 28.5 28.5 26.5 21.1 



















Figure 4-8 shows the changes in import sources for selected Asian countries. Under the 
USLNG_Panama0 scenario, without the presence of the Panama Canal expanded 
capacity even the model allows exports from Gulf of Mexico, LNG imports to Asia do 
not change. However, when the Panama Canal route is open, the total LNG imports to 
Asia increase for different reasons; Japan/S. Korea receives LNG directly from Gulf of 
Mexico exporters, the United States, and Trinidad &Tobago while China/Southeast 
Asia and India import more LNG from Qatar and Australia. Lastly, imports by pipelines 
for China/Southeast Asia decrease due to the presence of more LNG supplied to the 








Australia 0 0 0 0 
Qatar 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 
Russia 12.2 0.8 10.2 12.6 
USA 0 37.6 10.9 0 
Trinidad 3 3 3 3 
Algeria 68.4 62.3 62 66.4 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria 5 3.9 12 10.7 






Figure 4-8 Selected Asian country imports by sources in 2035 Bcm 
4. 6 Conclusions  
The aim of this study is to identify the influence of Panama Canal capacity level on 
LNG shipping and the LNG exports from the Gulf of Mexico under five different 
scenarios. The main conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
• The model results show that without the Panama Canal expanded capacity, it is 
unprofitable to ship LNG from the Gulf of Mexico to Japan/S. Korea and U.S. 
LNG exports are shown to flow to Europe. However, the availability of the 
expanded Panama Canal allows for trade between the two basins and also 
reroutes approximately half of the total U.S. LNG exports from Europe to Asia, 
depending on the Canal capacity level. The main users of the Panama Canal 
route are the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago.  
• The Panama Canal capacity plays a significant role for the direction of the LNG 
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becomes a swing gas exporter supplying both Asian and European gas markets. 
In addition, although the model allows large capacity for Panama Canal, the 
maximum gas flows through the Canal is only approximately 60 Bcm per year.   
• More Panama Canal capacity (e.g., 100 vs. 200 ships/year) means more LNG 
trade but translates only to a greater number of small tankers.  
• There is no doubt that Asian consumers will benefit from inexpensive gas 
through Panama Canal. LNG exports from the Gulf of Mexico increase 
competitiveness in Asian gas markets.   The regional price disparity is shown 
to decrease over time. Japanese prices are improved about $1/MMBtu in 2035 
when enough capacity of Panama Canal provided. 
• The presence of Gulf of Mexico-based LNG in the Japanese market 
significantly decreases the market shares of the existing exporters e.g., Qatar 
and Australia, who dynamically increase their sales to neighboring countries 
such as China and countries in Southeast Asia to compensate for the losses due 
to U.S. LNG exports. LNG from other Atlantic producers, such as Nigeria and 











APPENDIX 4-A. Mathematical Formulation 
Table A1. Notation used in the model.   
Sets  a A∈    Gas transportation arcs                                                                                                 
d D∈    Demand seasons e.g., { low, high} 
p P∈    Producers 
m M∈   Years                                           
n N∈    Model nodes 
s S∈    Storage facilities 
t T∈    Traders 
( )a n+             Inward arcs 
( )a n−             Outward arcs  ∈    Liquefiers  ∈               Regasifiers  ∈   LNG shipping route, e.g.,{ route without canal, 
Panama, Suez}  ∈               LNG carriers, e.g.,{small, large, extra Large} 
 
Variables A
admSALES   Pipeline capacity assigned to a trader (mcm/d) 
P
pdmSALES   Quantity sold by a producer to traders and liquefiers 
(mcm/d) 
SI
sdmSALES   Storage injection capacity assigned for use by traders                        
(mcm/d)          
SX
sdmSALES   Storage extraction capacity assigned for use by traders 
(mcm/d) 
T
tndmSALES   Quantity sold to end-user markets by traders (mcm/d)  !"#→%       Quantity sold to traders by regasifiers (mcm/d)  "&''(→) Canal capacity assigned for use by LNG transporters 
(mcm/d) 
  ("*         Quantity sold to regasifiers by a liquefier (mcm/d) 






  &!(+")     LNG transported from liquefier l to node r via route j 
by LNG  shipper c (mcm/d) 
T
tndmPURCH   Quantity bought from a producer by a trader (mcm/d) ,-.("*←0      Quantity bought from a producer by a liquefier 
(mcm/d) ,-.1"%←#      Quantity bought from a regasifier by a trader (mcm/d) 
T
tadmFLOW    Arc flow by a trader (mcm/d) 234!(+")      LNG transported from node l to node r via route j 
(mcm/d) 
T
tndmINJ    Quantity injected into storage by a trader (mcm/d) 
T
tndmXTR    Quantity extracted from storage by a trader (mcm/d) 
A
am∆     Arc capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SI
snm∆     Storage injection capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SX
snm∆     Storage extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SW





, 0α β ≥  Dual variables of capacity restrictions 
freeϕ             Dual variables of mass balance constraints 
0ρ ≥   Dual variables of capacity expansion limitations 
freeπ  Dual variables of market-clearing conditions for sold 






freeτ  Dual variables of market-clearing conditions for 
capacity          
                         assignment and usage 78!(+")            Dual variable of LNG transportation cost 
Parameters A
amb   Arc capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
SI
smb   Storage injection capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
SX
smb   Storage extraction capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
SW
smb   Storage working gas capacity expansion costs 
(k$/mcm) 9&)              LNG shipping capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 960              Production capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 9(*              Liquefaction capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 9!#              Regasification capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm) 
(.)Ppmc   Production costs (k$/mcm) 
A
amCAP  Arc capacity (mcm/d) 
SI
smCAP  Storage injection capacity (mcm/d)  
SX
smCAP  Storage extraction capacity (mcm/d)  ,::::::&)              LNG shipping capacity (mcm/d)  ,::::::(*              Liquefaction capacity (mcm/d)  ,::::::(#              Regasification capacity (mcm/d)  ,::::::+;<             Canal capacity (mcm/d)  
C
tnδ   Level of market power exerted by a trader in a market 
                       [ ]0,1Ctnδ ∈   
ddays   Number of days in a season 







ndmINT  Intercept of inverse demand curve (mcm/d) 
aloss   Loss rate of gas in the transport arc, [ )0,1al ∈  
sloss    Loss rate of gas storage injection, [ )0,1sl ∈  
P
pmPR   Initial daily production capacity (mcm/d) 
P
pPH   Total producible reserves in the time horizon (mcm) 
W
ndmSLP  Slope of the inverse demand curve (mcm/d/k$) 
,A reg
admτ   Regulated fee for arc usage (k$/mcm) 
,SI reg
sdmτ   Regulated fee for storage injection (k$/mcm) 
S
smWG   Storage working gas capacity (mcm/d)  
A
am∆   Upper bound of arc capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SI
sm∆   Upper bound of injection capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SX
sm∆   Upper bound of extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d) 
SW
sm∆   Upper bound of working gas capacity expansion (mcm) ∆:&)              Upper bound of LNG shipping capacity expansion  
(mcm) ∆:60              Upper bound of production capacity expansion (mcm) ∆:(*              Upper bound of liquefaction capacity expansion costs 
(mcm) ∆:!#              Upper bound of regasification capacity expansion 
costs(mcm)                 CO2 cost ($/ton of CO2e)  6('=>!          CO2 emissions factor (0.1] ?@!(+             Distance from r to l via route j in units of 1,000 nautical 





E6&CD1                Quadratic cost term in production cost function F6&CD1                 logarithmic production cost function 7G7?@      Distance from start to end of Panama Canal HIJKKL  Maximum speed permitted on Panama Canal route 






A natural gas producer J ∈ , is modeled as profit maximization. The daily profit is 
determined by the difference between the revenue,O6	"0  6"0 , and the total 
costs, which are composed of the production cost  60 P 6"0 Q, the emission 
cost35 61C 6"0  60, and the capacity expansion cost, 966 ∆66  which are new 
features for producers in WGM 2014 The production cost function 60 P 6"0 Q is 
a logarithmic function (see equation A7) of the involved capacity of capacity 
utilization. The annual profit is calculated by the sales rate multiplied by the number of 
day L7" for each season with the discount rate F for that particular year. The 
producer supplies gas to traders and liquefiers. 
RSTNU*VNWXYZ∆66    ∑ F\] ^∑ L7" _
O6	"0  6"0−60 P 6"0 Q−61C 6"0  60a −"\"'=D 96
6 ∆66 b(A1) 
                                                 





The daily sales rates are restricted by the maximum initial capacity ,60 and the 
expansion in the previous years  ∑ ∆66cde . 
 s.t.         6"0 ≤ ,60::::::: + ∑ ∆6g6cde     ∀L, i     B6"0 	            (A2) 
The total sales over the time horizon are limited by the reserves. 
∑ ∑ L7""∈j∈]  6"0 ≤ ,.60::::::     ∀i  E60k	            (A3) 
The production capacity expansion is less than the budgetary constraints. 
 ∆66 ≤ ∆66:::::    ∀i l60 	            (A4) 
The sales rate and the capacity expansion must not be negative.  
 6"0 ≥ 0     ∀L, i                                (A5)   
    ∆66 ≥ 0     ∀i                           (A6) 
The production cost function follows the fossil fuel supply cost proposed by Golombek 
et al. (1995), but we consider the expansion from the previous year. Details of the 
expansion of a logarithmic production cost function can be found in Huppmann (2013). 
60 P 6"0 Q = 
PB6&CD1 + F6&CD1Q 6"0 + E6&CD1 6"o  










Equation (A8) is the objective function for the trader and optimizes gas sales levels 
 1"% ,  purchases of gas ,-.1"%←0  from producers and regasifiers. In addition, 
we assume the trader decides how much to inject wx1"%  and yz1"%  from storage. 
The trader maximizes the discounted profits, which come from the revenue 
{1; |"} . 	 + 1 − {1; 	O"} 	 1"%  and the purchasing 
costs O"0 ,-.1"%←0  and O"# ,-.1"%←# , the cost of using storage, P~D"N,!> +
  ~D"N Qwx1"% +  ~D"N yz1"% , and the emission cost36 11C 1"% .  %%	. 
The traders are modeled as a weighted combination of strategic/competitive players 
depending on the market power parameter {1; ∈ [0,1], where 0 represents competitive 
behavior and 1 indicates oligopolistic behavior with a knowledge of demand in the 
market. In addition, the trader is responsible for the transportation costs,  ~'"U,!> +
~'"U 	2341'"% , for the gas.  
 
 NU*VNXY0#;kXY←Z0#;kXY←*}XY<XY%#XY
















This constraint ensures the mass balance of sales, purchases, flows, and storage.  
,-.1"%←# + ,-.1"% +  1 − H'	 2341'"%'\'¡	 + yz1"% = 
                                                 





 1"% + ∑ 2341'"% + wx1"%      ∀G, L, i ¢1"%'\'£ 	             (A9) 
In each yearly storage cycle, the total extracted volumes must equal the loss-corrected 
injection volumes. 
1 − HD	 ∑ L7""\j wx1"% = ∑ L7""\j yz1"%      ∀G, ¤Px	Q, L, i     P¢1"N Q
                   (A10) 
All of the variables must be nonnegative.  
      1"% ≥ 0   ∀G, L, i                                              (A11)                                             ,-.1"% ≥ 0   ∀G, L, i             (A12) 
   2341'"% ≥ 0   ∀7, L, i               (A13)      wx1"% ≥ 0   ∀G, L, i               (A14) 





Liquefiers buy gas from the producers and sell it to regasifiers globally. The liquefier 
maximizes the discounted profit O(	"*  ("*  minus the purchasing 
costs, O(	"0 ,-.("*←0, liquefaction costs  (*  ("* 	, and capacity investment 
costs 9(* Δ(¦ . 
 
A7NU*VN§XY¨,-.§XY¨←Z©§Yª
∑ F\] ^∑ L7" _ O(	"*  ("*−O(	"0 ,-.("*←0−(*  ("* 	 a − 9(






The sales are restricted by the initial capacity ,(* plus the total expansion ∑ ∆(g*de  from the previous period. 
 ("* ≤ ,(* + ∑ ∆(g*de   ∀L, i B("* 	        (A17) 
The sales rates are also restricted by losses from the liquefaction process. 
1 − H(	,-.("*←0 −  ("* ≥ 0   ∀L, i ¬("* 	        (A18) 
The expansion in each time period is limited by budget restrictions.  
∆(* ≤ ∆:(*    ∀i l(* 	         (A19) 
All of the variables must be nonnegative.  
 ("* ≥ 0        (A20) 
,-.("*←0 ≥ 0          (A21) 
∆(* ≥ 0        (A22) 
LNG shipping operators 
LNG transporters provide maritime transportation capacity to ship gas from a liquefier 
l to a regasifier r. Each transporter  ∈  owns ships of different sizes and operates at 
different shipping costs depending on the distances and tanker types. The capacity of 
each transporter is the aggregated capacity of all of the LNG carriers of a particular size 
that are available in the shipping market. The LNG transporter maximizes the 
discounted profit ∑ 78!(+")  &!(+")!,(,+  minus the shipping cost 





~"N_ 1C(( Suez Canal plus congestion fees ~"0_ &Cand ~"N_ &C for LNG flows on route  ∈{,7G7i7, 8K®}. The endogenous investment for LNG tanker 9&) Δ°c±  is also 
considered if it is profitable in the future time period. 
A7NU*VN²³§´XYµ∆²Yµ ∑ F\] 
∑ L7"





           (A23) 
The sales rates on maritime shipping are constrained by the capacity of the LNG carrier, 
the average ship speed, and the maximum distance traveled in one day. This constraint 
has units of mcm/1,000 nautical miles. The total capacity is the initial capacity plus the 
expansion from the previous time periods ∑ ∆&d)de . We also assume LNG tankers 
take the same route back and forth from origin to destination. 
∑ 2 ∗  &!(+")!,( ∗ ?@!(+	 ≤ i7_L@& ∗ ,&) + ∑ ∆&d)de 	    
  ∀L, i B&") 	      (A24) 
The expansion for each time period is constrained by budget restrictions. 
∆&) ≤ ∆:&)    ∀i l&) 	  (A25) 
The sales of extra-large ships are restricted on the Panama and Suez Canal routes. 
 &∈{V¸('!>}!(+\{N¹§}") = 0   ∀, , L, i  E∈{V¸('!>}Liº 	   (A26) 
 &∈{V¸('!>}!(+\{0¹§}") = 0   ∀, , L, i  E∈{V¸('!>}Liº 	   (A27) 





 &!(") ≥ 0     (A28)   
 ∆&) ≥ 0   (A29) 
Regasifier problem 
 The regasifier maximizes the discounted profit from the sellers to the 
traders  !"#→% minus the costs of purchases,∑ O(	"* 234!(+")!(+  the cost of shipping 
from the LNG transporter∑ {234!(+")!,(,+	 78!(+") 	}, the cost of the regasification 







 O!	¿#  !"#→%− ∑ O(	"* 234!(+")!(+− ∑ {234!(+")!(+ 78!(+") 	}−!# P !"#→%Q 

 − 9!#"\j Δ»c¼


            (A30) 
The sales rates are constrained by the initial capacity plus the expansion from the 
previous time periods. 
 !"#→% ≤ ,!# + ∑ ∆!g#de   ∀L, i B!"# 	           (A31) 
This constraint considers losses incurred in maritime transport and the regasification 
process. 
∑ P1 − H(!+Q ∗ 1 − H!	 ∗ 234!(+")(!+ ≥  !"#→%  ∀L, i ¬!"# 	          (A32) 
The expansion for each time period is constrained by budget restrictions. 





The minimum purchases for long-term LNG contracts are enforced. Future contracts 
are assumed to have the same volume before their term expires.  
∑ 234!(+")+ ≥ HG7!("#  ∀, , L, i  À!("# 	       (A34) 
All of the variables must be non-negative.  
 !"#→] ≥ 0      (A35) 
 !"#→% ≥ 0      (A36) 
234!(+") ≥ 0                                            (A37) 
∆!# ≥ 0                                          (A38) 
 
Canal operator problem  
The canal operator provides shorter distances to the LNG transporter compared to the 
regular route from the liquefier l to the regasifier r for an additional charge. The canal 
operator maximizes his discounted profit from the canal toll ~"0_ 1C((, ~"N_ 1C(( and 
congestion fees ~"0_ &C, ~"N_ &C minus the operating costs "0¹§ "0²§→)	 
and "N¹§ "N²§→)	. 
 
A7NU*VNXYZ_²§→µNU*VNXYÁ_²§→µ ∑ F\] 
∑ L7"












The sales rates for the Panama Canal is restricted by speed allowance and daylight 
hours, see A40. 37 The left-hand side of this constraint shows how much gas flows in 
mcm per day through the Canal multiplied by the distance from the start of the canal to 
the end of Canal (50 nautical miles), so the units of the left-hand side are mcm.nautical 
miles per day. For the  right-hand side, the allowed average speed (8 nautical miles per 
hour) is multiplied by the number of operating hours per day (12 hours from sunrise to 
sunset)  and the capacity in mcm per day, so we get the same units (mcm*nautical miles 
per day) as the left- hand side.   
 
 "0_&''(→)7G7?@ ≤  HIJKKL ∗ ?7ℎ ∗  ,0_&''(          
        ∀L, i PB"0_;''(Q   (A40) 
The sales rates for the Suez canals are limited by its capacity. 38  
   "N_&''(→) ≤   ,N_&''(    ∀L, i PB"N_;''(Q        (A41) 
All of the variables must be non-negative.  
 "0_&''(→) ≥ 0                      (A42)    
 "N_&''(→) ≥ 0            (A43) 
 
Transmission system operators 
The transmission system operator (TSO) provides an economic mechanism to 
efficiently allocate international transport capacity to traders. The TSO maximizes the 
discounted profit that results from selling arc capacity to traders from 
A
admSALES  minus 
                                                 
37 The Panama Canal Authority requires the fleets to maintain a speed of 5 knots. However, the 
average speed is 8 knots.  
38 The Suez Canal can accommodate up to 106 vessels in one north-bound and two south-bound 





the investment costs for capacity expansions 
A
am∆  and CO2 
costs HiHG  7Li  Hz3.  
A7NU*VNXYÃ∆YÃ    ∑ F Ä∑ L7""\j Å
∑ ~'"U'  '"U−1DC1C  '"U .  1DC%NÆ − ∑ 9'U ∆'U' Ç\]  (A44) 
 
The assigned capacity is restricted by the available capacity. The available arc 
capacity at arc a is the sum of the initial arc capacity 
A
amCAP  and the capacity 





∆∑ . The sales are limited by capacity and the 
expansion from the previous year. 
 '"U ≤ ,::::::7i + ∑    ∆'dU           i<i′ ∀7, L, i  B'"U 	         (A45) 
There may be budgetary or other limits on the yearly capacity expansions. 
∆'U ≤ ∆Ê7i       ∀7, i     l7i  	           (A46) 
 
All of the variables must be non-negative. 
  '"U ≥ 0   ∀i, L           (A47) ∆'U ≥ 0     ∀i             (A48) 
 
Storage operator 
The storage operator provides storage capacity to the traders. The revenue term is 
calculated by ~D"N  D"N + ~D"N  D"N  minus the expansion cost 9DN∆DN +
9DN ∆DN + 9DN}∆DN} and the emission costD1C 6"N +  6"N 	 DN. 
i7 NU*VNËXYÁÌNU*VNËXYÁÍ∆ËYÁÌ ,∆ËYÁÍ ,∆ËYÁÎ
    F\]  L7""\j Ï
~D"N  D"N + ~D"N  D"N−9DN∆DN + 9DN ∆DN + 9DN}∆DN}−D1C 6"N +  6"N 	 DN		Ð 





The aggregate injection rate in any season is restricted by the injection capacity (A50). 






∆∑  must be added to the initial capacity 
S
sINJ  to determine the total 
capacity. Equation (A51) provides the limits on the extraction from storage, and 
condition (A52) represents the working gas limitations. 
 D"N ≤ ,::::::iw + ∑    ∆DdN            ,i<i′ ∀i, L  BD"N 	            (A50)  N"N ≤ ,::::::iy + ∑    ∆DdN        ,i<i′ ∀i, L  BD"N 	            (A51) ∑ L7 "\j  D"N ≤ 4Ñ:::::i + ∑    ∆DdN        ,i<i′ ∀i  BDN}	           (A52) 
The limitations on the allowable capacity expansions are modeled as follows: 
∆DN}≤ ∆Êi      4 , ∀i     li4 	            (A53) ∆DN ≤ ∆Êi      w , ∀i     liw 	            (A54) ∆DN ≤ ∆Êi      y , ∀i     liy 	            (A55) 
 
All of the variables must be non-negative.   N"N ≥ 0    , ∀i, L                        (A56)  N"N ≥ 0    , ∀i, L                       (A57) ∆DN}≥ 0     , ∀i               (A58) ∆DN ≥ 0     , ∀i             (A59) ∆DN ≥ 0     , ∀i              (A60) 
 
Market-clearing conditions 
Market clearing conditions tie the producers to traders and liquefiers. The total sales 
from producers equals the purchases from traders and liquefiers.  6"0 = ∑ ,-.("*←0 +(∈*6	 ∑ ,-.16	"    ,%16	 ∀J, L, i   O6	"0 	  
                  (A61) 
The injection capacity offered by a storage operator equals the total of injection from 





The extraction capacity offered by a storage operator equals the total of extraction 
from all traders. The market clearing condition extraction capacity is 
 D"N = ∑ yz1D"%1\%D		       ∀, L, i   ~D"N 	           (A63) 
The pipeline capacity offered by a pipeline operator equals the total of flows from all 
traders. The market clearing condition for arc capacity flow is 
 '"U = ∑ 2341'"%1       ∀7, L, i   ~'"U 	           (A64) 
The total sales from liquefiers equals the total flows from different routes to 
regasifier. The market clearing condition between the liquefiers and the regasifiers is 
∑  ("*ÒÓÔÕÒ		 = ∑ ∑ 234!(+"#←*!∈#+∈<    ∀L, i    PO(	"* Q                (A65) 
The flow on the route j from liquefier l to regasifier j equals the total shipping 
capacity offered by different shipping operators. The market clearing condition 
between the regasifiers and the LNG transporters is 
∑  &!(+")& =234!(+")  ∀, , j, L, i      78!(+") 	        (A66) 
The canal capacity offered by canal operator equals the total flows from all LNG 
shipping operators on the canal routes. The market-clearing conditions between the 
canal operators and the LNG transporters are: 
 "0_&''(→) = ∑  &!(+")&,!,(  ∀ ∈ {,_7GG7}, L, i    ~"0_&''( 1C((	 (A67) 
 "N_&''(→) =  ∑  &!(+")&,!,( ∀ ∈ {_7GG7}, L, i    ~"N_&''( 1C((	  (A68) 
Market-clearing conditions for final demand 





APPENDIX 4-B: KKT conditions 
KKT conditions for the producer problem 
0 ≤ L7" ÅF r−O6	"0 + ×&WYZ ØNU*VNWXYZ Ù×NU*VNWXYZ + 61C 66vÆ + B6"0 + L7"E60 ⊥
 6"0 ≥ 0     ∀L, i             (B1) 
0 ≤ ,60::::::: + ∑ ∆66cde −  6"0 ⊥   B6"0 ≥ 0    ∀L, i              (B2) 
0 ≤ ,.::::60 − ∑ ∑ L7""∈j∈]  6"0 ⊥ E60  ≥ 0                 (B3) 
0 ≤ F966 + ∑ ×&WYdZ .	×∆WYWdÛ − ∑ ∑ B6"0"dÛ + l60 ⊥   ∆66 ≥ 0    ∀i               (B4) 
0 ≤ ∆:60 − ∆60 ⊥   l60 ≥ 0   ∀i                (B5) 
 
KKT conditions for the trader problem 
0 ≤ L7" _F Ü {1
; ,"]  1"%− Ø{1; |"}%	 + 1 − {1; 	O"} Ù+11C.  %%	 Ýa + ¬1"
%  ⊥  1"% ≥
0,     ∀G, L, i                     (B6) 
 
0 ≤ L7"[FO"0 ] − ¬1"% ⊥   ,-.1"%←0 ≥ 0    ∀G¤xPJ	Q, L, i            (B7) 
0 ≤ L7" ÞFOG	di à − ¬1"% ⊥   ,-.1"%←# ≥ 0    ∀G¤xP	Q, L, i          (B8) 
0 ≤ L7"FP~"N,!> + ~"N Q + ¬1"% − 1 − H	L7"¬1N ⊥   wx1"% ≥0  ∀G, i                  (B9) 






0 ≤ L7"FP~D"U,!> + ~D"U Q + ¬1'£"% − 1 − H'	¬1'¡"% ⊥   2341"% ≥ 0     
∀7 = PG'£,G'¡Q, ∀L, i                           (B11) 
0 =

,-.1"% + ,-.1"%←# +  1 − H'	 2341'"%'\'¡	 + yz1"%− 1"% −  2341'"% − wx1"%  '\'£ 
 , ¢1"% , KK, ∀G, L, i 
                  (B12) 
0 = 1 − HD	 ∑ L7""\j wx1D"% − ∑ L7""\j yz1D"%  , ¢1DN , KK  ∀G, ¤Px	Q, L, i   
                              (B13) 
KKT conditions for the liquefier problem 
0 ≤ L7" áF â−O(	"* + ×;§ŸPNU*VN§XY¨ Q×NU*VN§XY¨ ãä + B("* + ¬("* ⊥  ("* ≥0  ∀L, i                  (B14) 
0 ≤ L7"åFPO(	"0 Qæ − 1 − H(	¬("* ⊥ ,-.("*←0 ≥ 0  ∀L, i          (B15) 
0 ≤ F9(* − ∑ ∑ B("*dÛ" + l(* ⊥ ∆(* ≥ 0  ∀i             (B16) 
0 ≤ ,(* + ∑ ∆(d*de  −  ("* ⊥ B("* ≥ 0  ∀L, i           (B17) 0 ≤ 1 − H(	,-.("*←0 −  ("* ⊥ ¬("* ≥ 0     ∀L, i           (B18) 0 ≤ ∆:(* − ∆(* ⊥   l(* ≥ 0   ∀i              (B19) 
 
KKT conditions for the LNG shipper problem 
0 ≤ L7"F ç−78!(+") + ×;²Yµ Ø Liº Ù× Liº + è~Li,H  ∈ {,7G7}~LiH  ∈ {7G7}éê +2 ∗ ?@!(+ ∗
B&") ⊥  Liº ≥ 0  ∀L, i                 (B20) 
0 ≤ F9) − ∑ ∑ A7?@ ∗ B&")dÛ" + l&ë) ⊥ ∆&!# ≥ 0  ∀i             (B21) 





⊥  B&") ≥ 0  ∀L, i                   (B23) 0 ≤ ∆:&) − ∆&) ⊥ l) ≥ 0       ∀i                 (B24) 
KKT conditions for the regasifier problem 
0 ≤ L7"F Ï −O!	"!+ ×;³Y PNU*VN³XY→Q×NU*VN³XY→ Ð + B!"# + ¬!"# ⊥  !"#→% ≥ 0  ∀L, i           (B25) 
0 ≤ L7"FPO(	"* + 78!(+") Q − ØP1 − H(!+Q ∗ 1 − H!	Ù ¬!"# − À!("# ⊥
234!(+") ≥ 0 ∀, , , L, i               (B26) 
0 ≤ F9!# − ∑ ∑ B!"#"\jdÛ + l!# ⊥ ∆!# ≥ 0  ∀i            (B27) 
0 ≤ ,!# + ∑ ∆!d#de − P !"#→%Q ⊥ B!"# ≥ 0 ∀L, i           (B28) 0 ≤ ∆:!# − ∆!# ⊥   l!# ≥ 0   ∀i               (B29) 
0 ≤ ∑ ØP1 − H(!+Q ∗ 1 − H!	 ∗ 234!(+") Ù!,(,+ −  !"#→% ⊥ ¬!"# ≥ 0    ∀L, i
                  (B30) 
0 ≤ ∑ 234!(+")+ − HG7!("# ⊥ À!("# ≥  0      ∀, , L, i          (B31) 
 
KKT conditions for the storage operator problem 
 
0 ≤ −L7"F~Liw + iHG.  	 + BLiw ⊥   Liw ≥ 0    ∀L, i         (B32) 
 
0 ≤ −L7"F~Liy + iHG.  	 + BLiy +L7"BLi4 +⊥   Liy ≥ 0    ∀L, i      
    (B33) 
0 ≤ F9iw − ∑ ∑ BLi′wgÛ"\j + lN ⊥  ∆i′w ≥ 0    ∀i        (B34) 
0 ≤ F9iy − ∑ ∑ BLi′ygÛ"\j + lN ⊥  ∆i′y ≥ 0    ∀i         (B35) 





0 ≤ ,::::::DN + ∑    ∆i′w − Liw ⊥ BLiw ≥ 0     ed ∀i, L        (B37) 
0 ≤ ,::::::DN + ∑    ∆i′y − Liy ⊥ BLiy ≥ 0     ed ∀i, L       (B38) 
0 ≤ 4Ñ:::::DN + ∑    ∆i′4 −L7" Liy ⊥ Bi4 ≥ 0     ed ∀i         (B39) 
0 ≤  ∆Ê i      4 − ∆DN}⊥ li4  ≥ 0  ∀i          (B40) 
0 ≤  ∆Ê i      w − ∆DN ⊥ liw  ≥ 0  ∀i          (B41) 
0 ≤  ∆Ê i      y − ∆DN ⊥ liy  ≥ 0  ∀i          (B42) 
 
KKT conditions for Canal Operator 
 
0 ≤ L7"F r−~Li,_H − ~Li,_HG + ×;´XYZ_²§ØNU*VN´XYZ_²§→µÙ×NU*VN´XYZ_²§→µ v + ?@0&''(B+"0_&''( ⊥
 +"0_&''(→) ≥ 0  ∀L, i, ¤{,_7G7}                (B43) 
0 ≤ L7"F r−~Li_H − ~Li_HG + ×;´XYÁ_²§ØNU*VN´XYÁ_²§→µÙ×NU*VN´XYÁ_²§→µ v + B+"N_&''( ⊥
 +"N_&''(→) ≥ 0  ∀L, i, ¤{_7G7}                               (B43) 
0 ≤  HIJKKL ∗ ?7ℎ ∗  ,,7G7 −  Li,_7G7→º7G7?@ ⊥ B+"0¹§ ≥
0  ∀L, i, ¤{,_7G7}                      (B44) 
0 ≤  +"N²§→) −   ,N²§ ⊥ B+"N¹§ ≥ 0  ∀L, i, ¤{_7G7}             (B45) 
 
KKT conditions for the system operator problem 
0 ≤ FL7"−~'"U + 1DC1C  1DC%N	 + B'"U ⊥  '"U ≥ 0   ∀7, L, i        (B46) 





APPENDIX 4-C A sensitivity Analysis on LNG Shipping Costs  
 
In this Appendix, a sensitivity analysis on LNG shipping costs is documented. The 
following section presents the sensitivity of the model results to changes in LNG 
shipping costs. Three sensitivity scenarios were run to check the robustness of results 
against LNG shipping costs;  
• Base  baseline scenario displays the LNG shipping costs from the references 
• Low   LNG shipping costs are 20% lower than the Base Case 
• High  LNG shipping costs are 20% higher than the Base Case 
The results in term of prices, consumption, and production for the year 2035 
respectively, are shown in Tables C-1, C-2, and C-3.  As can be seen, across three 
sensitivity scenarios the LNG shipping costs only slightly modify the model results. 
For example, the prices in most regions are unchanged, but the wholesale prices in 
Japan change about $0.20/MMBtu because Japan imports a large volume of LNG to 
meet domestic demand.  Changes in LNG shipping costs have a small effect on results 
for consumption and production. Production and consumption remain the same as the 
Base Case, see Tables C-2 and C-3.  In general, the model results are fairly unchanging 
to changes in LNG shipping costs. 
Table C-1 Price in $/MMBtu for 2035 
  
Prices 
Low Base High 
AFRICA   $3.32 $3.27 $3.22 





EUROPE   $11.78 $11.85 $11.86 
FRSVTUN  $4.92 $4.93 $4.93 
JAPAN    $18.78 $18.91 $19.11 
MIDEAST  $5.17 $5.17 $5.17 
NRTH_AM  $5.49 $5.49 $5.49 
STH_AM   $6.68 $6.68 $6.68 
WORLD    $8.31 $8.33 $8.35 
 
Table C-2 Consumption in Bcm/y for 2035 
  
Consumption 
Low Base High 
AFRICA   168.9 169.8 170.9 
ASPACIF  1091.7 1090.3 1086.9 
EUROPE   626.2 624.3 623.9 
FRSVTUN  772.1 771.2 770.6 
JAPAN    174.2 173.9 173.5 
MIDEAST  558.9 558.9 558.8 
NRTH_AM  1004.2 1004.2 1004.2 
STH_AM   246.7 246.8 246.8 
WORLD    4642.8 4639.4 4635.5 
 








Low Base High 
AFRICA   404.5 400.9 395.9 
ASPACIF  942.2 940.4 940.3 
EUROPE   211.3 211.9 212 
FRSVTUN  1180.8 1180.9 1180.8 
JAPAN    0 0 0 
MIDEAST  777.2 777.2 777.3 
NRTH_AM  1004.6 1004.6 1004.6 
STH_AM   250.4 250.4 250.4 















Chapter 5: A New Benders-SOS1 Method to Solve MPECs 
with an Application to Natural Gas Markets 
 
This chapter presents a methodology to solve mathematical programs with equilibrium 
constraints (MPECs). MPECs are very challenging problems to solve as noted in 
Chapter 1 due to the non-convexities associated with putting the solution set of the 
lower-level problem as constraints. The method we develop uses an SOS1 approach 
based on (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012) to replace complementarity in the lower-level 
problem's optimality conditions. Then, Benders algorithm decomposes the MPECs into 
a master and a subproblem (Conejo et. al., 2006) and solves the overall problem 
iteratively. This methodology is then applied to a large-scale natural gas model as well 
as other small, illustrative examples.  One advantage of Benders decomposition is when 
the complicating variables are fixed the problem separates into a number of 
independent optimization problems for which parallel computations can be applied. 
 
While no formal mathematical convergence proof of the resulting Benders-SOS1 
approach is shown, the positive, numerical results indicate that this new method has 
promise for solving MPECs more efficiently than some existing approaches.  The 
connection of this chapter with the previous natural gas-based ones is that one of the 
MPECs considered and solved with this approach is an MPEC version of the World 
Gas Model.  In this MPEC, the Panama Canal operator is a Stackelberg leader with a 









5.1 Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs) 
 
5.1.1 MPEC Formulation  
We are concerned with solving the following two-level mathematical program which 
we refer to as MPEC: min , 	 
                                                            . . , 	 ∈ Ω                  (5.1)                                                                          ∈ 	 
where the continuous variables  ∈ ì ,  ∈ í are respectively,  the vector of upper-
level and lower-level variables and  , 	 is the objective function to the problem.  
Here,  Ω is the joint feasible region between this set of the variables and 	 is the 
solution set of the lower-level problem which can be one or more optimization 
problems and/or mixed complementarity problems (MCP). Problem (5.1) is also called 
a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC).  The term MPCC 
is often used if  	 consists of just complementarity conditions (e.g., from the KKT 
optimality conditions to an optimization problem) (Gabriel et al., 2013). However, 
more generally, (5.1) is called an MPEC. The main focus of our approach is when 	 
corresponds to the solution set of a complementarity problem which includes the KKT 
conditions of nonlinear programs and other constraints. In general, the lower-level 
problem then is to find a vector y such that: 
             ≥ 0 
                                                                  ï, 	 ≥ 0                                 (5.2)  





where g(x, y) is a vector of constraint functions and the function  ï, 	: ì ×
í → í .  If S(x) is the solution set for an MCP39,   (5.1) can be rewritten as:                                                                                               
min , 	 
                                                            . . , 	 ∈ Ω                                   (5.3)      ≥ 0 
                                                            ï, 	 ≥ 0                                                                           %ï, 	 = 0 
 
5.1.2 Solving MPECs  
In general, %ï, 	 = 0 is non-convex function of y (when x is fixed) which 
complicates finding a solution to the overall MPEC. One approach that is often used is 
to transform the problem via disjunctive constraints introduced by Fortuny-Amat and 
McCarl (1981) and used in (Gabriel and Leuthold, 2010). In this case, a large constant 
K is introduced along with a vector of binary variables  ∈ {0,1}í to represent 
complementarity. Consequently, we can rewrite (5.3) as: 
min , 	 
 . . , 	 ∈ Ω                                                                  
 0 ≤  ≤ ò1 − 	                                   (5.4) 
 0 ≤ ï, 	 ≤ ò 
   ∈ {0,1}í , 
where ò ∈ ss is a fixed parameter suitably chosen, the continuous variables  ∈ì ,  ∈ í are the vector of upper-level and lower-level variables, respectively and 
the given function ï: ì × í → í . If the vector constraint function g(x,y) is 
linear, we can solve (5.4) as a mixed-integer linear, (binary) program (MIP) for each 
                                                 
39 Here for ease of presentation and without loss of generality, we assume no equations and associated 





fixed value of K . However, the computation time will increase exponentially with the 
number of binary variables. Additionally, in some applications it is not immediately 
obvious how to find a correct value of K and some sort of numerical procedure is 
needed to find a best value (or values).  Alternatively, the approach by Siddiqui and 
Gabriel (2012) used special ordered sets of type 1 (SOS1) variables to solve (5.3). 
SOS1 variables are used to transform the complementarity conditions from above into 
mixed-integer nonlinear constraints. The key idea is to use a transformation of variables 
to re-express the complementarity of the vector  and ï, 	.  More specifically, for 
each index i, let 
8ó = =ôsô¸,=	o     (5.5) õó = =ôöô¸,=	o    (5.6) 
and note that   %ï, 	 = 0 = =s¸,=	o − =ö¸,=	o  	=s¸,=	o + =ö¸,=	o  	=[8ó − õó][8ó + õó] 
=8óo − õóo                                                    
so 8ó = |õó|  noting that  8ó = =ôsô¸,=	o  is nonnegative.  This allows both 8ó  
and õó  to be rewritten as, respectively, the sum and the difference of two nonnegative 
variables õós, õóö.  More specifically,  8ó = =ôsô¸,=	o = õós + õóö   (5.7) õó = =ôöô¸,=	o = õós − õóö    (5.8) 
 
with the restriction that at most one of the variables õós, õóö  is nonzero, i.e., that these 
are SOS1 variables.  Considering the vector versions 8, õ and other related vector 
versions of the other variables mentioned above, this leads to the following equivalent 
formulation of (5.3). 
    i@G , 	       





      ≥ 0        
     ï, 	 ≥ 0       
     8 − õs + õö	 = 0           (5.9) 
     8 = =s¸,=	o        
    õs − õö	 = =ö¸,=	o      8 ≥ 0               where vs and vö are SOS1 nonnegative	 variables . 
When comparing the disjunctive-constraints technique (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 
1981) and SOS1 transformation technique (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012), the 
disjunctive-constraints technique has two main disadvantages.  First, it is 
computationally expensive for large models and second, it requires good selections for 
a large constant K. The SOS1 technique overcomes those two problems. However as 
discussed in (Siddiqui, 2011), the SOS1 approach initially failed to find a solution for 
a large-scale North America Gas model (based on the World Gas Model) (Gabriel et. 
al, 2012) as it requires a good starting point. In order to obtain good starting points, 
Siddiqui and Gabriel (2012) needed to solve a penalty method version of the SOS 1 
formulation before applying (5.9) and then iterating heuristically between these two 
approaches with the solver failed to maintain the SOS1 property. Sometimes finding a 
right penalty is troublesome since the penalty is not known beforehand. The Benders-
SOS1  method we present in this dissertation has an advantage when compared with 
other these two methods because it does not require either a large constant value or 
solving another problem beforehand, but it just needs to start with a feasible value of 






Besides these two mentioned approaches, MPECs can be solved in a variety of ways 
examples of which include:  NLPEC (a commercial solver), nonlinear programming, 
integer programming, and other methods.    As for the nonlinear programming approach 
for solving MPECs, there are three main directions in the literature. First, the 
regularization and complementarity-penalty approaches (Scholtes, 2001; Hu and 
Ralph, 2004; Ralph and Wright, 2004). In their framework, the MPEC is approximated 
by nonlinear programming (NLPs) and a sequence of NLPs is solved to identify 
stationary points of the MPEC. Second is are Penalty Interior Point Algorithms (Luo et 
al, 1996; Benson et al., 2002; de Miguel et al., 2005; Raghunathan and Biegler, 2005, 
Leyffer et al., 2007). These methods are based on complementarity-penalty version of 
sequential of NLP and solve one linear system of KKT conditions with a log barrier 
penalty function for each iteration. However, a drawback in this method is finding a 
right initial penalty. A third MPEC solution method is Sequential Quadratic 
Programming (SQP) (Kojima and Shindo, 1986; Fletcher et al., 2002; Fletcher and 
Leyffer, 2002, Fletcher and Leyffer, 2004; Anitescu, 2005). The SQP method 
approximates the Lagrangian function via a quadratic function using linearized 
versions of the constraints at each iteration. SQP provides positive results on small and 
medium-scale problems (Anitescu, 2005). However, Chen et al. (2006) found that no 
single NLP solver could solve their large-scale electricity model, but they applied 
SNOPT and FILTER solvers in sequence and eventually find a solution. 
Integer programming approaches have also been widely used for solving MPECs. The 
branch- and-bound algorithm (Bard and J. Falk, 1982; Bard and Moore, 1990; Al-





developed to satisfying linear/nonlinear complementary constraints. This algorithm 
reformulates the KKT conditions of the lower-level problem and applies branch-and-
bound techniques. Convergence to a global optimum can only be guaranteed when 
certain convexity and separability properties hold.  
By contrast, the current work employs a somewhat related idea to the branch-and-
bound algorithm in that the KKT conditions are reformulated, but in different way 
using SOS1 variables.  Instead of using branch-and-bound, our approach employs 
Benders decomposition solving the problem iteratively. Apart from branch-and-bound, 
Wen and Yang (1990) proposed an exact algorithm, but it only worked for relatively 
small problems. Later, Wen and Hung (1996) presented a Simple Tabu Search heuristic 
algorithm to solve mixed-integer, linear bilevel programs. Two strategies need to be 
done for the Tabu Search method.  First, an upper bound-screening approach generates 
neighborhood points, then an advanced start method selects the points to initiate the 
search. The Tabu Search works well with small mixed-integer linear bilevel programs 
where the upper-level problem needs to decide on values for zero-one variables.   
 In addition, other methods, for example, a relaxation scheme (Steffensen and Ulbrich 
2010) and exact penalty functions with nonlinear perturbations (Uderzo 2010) also 
exist but have not been shown to work for large-scale models. However, larger 
problems of MPEC are more difficult to solve (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012) due to non-
convexity of MPECs.  The motivation behind developing an algorithm for MPECs was 
to find an alternative to previous techniques to solve large-scale problems but based on 
a decomposition approach which could potentially alleviate the computational issues 





decomposition method as a prelude to the new Benders-SOS1 method developed later 
in this chapter. 
5.2 Benders Decomposition  
 
Benders (1962) developed partitioning procedures for solving linear programming 
problems. Geoffrion (1972) extended Benders algorithm and proposed a Generalized 
Benders decomposition (GBD) for a broader class of problems using nonlinear convex 
duality theory to drive optimality cut generation. Later, Geoffrion and Graves (1974) 
applied GBD solve a mixed-integer linear program for the design industrial distribution 
systems. The work done by Polito et al. (1980) used GBD to find a solution to the 
spatial equilibrium problem. Beptistella and Geromel (1980) proposed a method to 
solve the unit commitment problem where the master problem is an integer, nonlinear 
program representing the unit commitment and the subproblem is the economic 
dispatch (stochastic nonlinear program). Rouhani et al.  (1985) used GBD to solve an 
MINLP model for reactive power planning in power systems. In addition, the work 
done by Floudas and Ciric (1989) also applied GBD to a MINLP formulation for a heat 
exchanger network. Benders decomposition has also been applied to a wide range of 
energy applications e.g., generation capacity expansion (Kazempour and Conejo, 2012; 
Jae Hyung Roh et. al, 2007), voltage security (Rabiee and Parniani, 2013), and 
hydrothermal scheduling (Sifuentes and Vargus, 2007). 
 There is also a strong connection between Benders method and stochastic 
programming, in particular recourse problems.  When Benders decomposition is 





and specialized results are available. In addition, GBD was also applied to nonconvex 
programming, see (Geoffrion, 1972; Floudas et al., 1989). Besides optimization 
problems, Benders method has been also applied to complementarity problems. The 
work done by Cabero et al., (2010) applied Benders algorithm to linear 
complementarity problems. Gabriel and Fuller (2010) developed a Benders approach 
to solve stochastic variational inequality/MCPs problems.  Egging (2013) implemented 
Benders algorithm to large-scale, stochastic mixed complementarity problems. This 
work applied the variational inequality method developed in Gabriel and Fuller (2010). 
In addition, Gabriel et al. (2010) developed a Benders algorithm combined with a 
heuristic procedure to solve discretely-constrained mathematical programs with 
equilibrium constraints (DC-MPECs) and applied it to a variety of test problems 
including some in electric power.  
5.2.1 Benders decomposition procedure  
 
This section gives a brief introduction to Benders decomposition using a simple 
example taken from (Conejo et. al., 2006). It is important to note that the standard 
Benders algorithm is more for linear programs but we present it here as a way to 
introduce GBD later which has more relevant to MPECs analyzed in this chapter.  
Consider a linear program of the following form: 
i@G¸,=  % + L% 
     . .     + º = 9             (5.10)        ≥ 0,  ∈ y ⊆  
where  ∈ ,  ∈ , and y is a polyhedron, , º are matrices, and 9, , L are vectors 





to solve. When the vector x is fixed, the problem is decomposable or easier to solve. 
First, it is important to note that problem (5.10) can be written in terms only of the 
complicating variables  as follows: 
i@G  z+B	 
        . .       ∈ y,               (5.11) 
where B	 is defined as: 
 B	 = i@G=   L% . .  º = 9 −         (5.12)  ≥ 0 
Based on this reformulation, Benders decomposition defines and a master (MP) and 
subproblem (SP) and solves them iteratively. The master problem (MP) is as follows: 
i@G¸,  % + B . .    B ≥ B"C                 (5.13) L%		 + 
		P − 		Q ≤ B;   = 1,… , @ − 1 
where B is the optimal objective function value of the subproblem for a  given, fixed 
value of the complicating variables x, @ is the iteration counter, and  B"C is a user-
specified parameter.   The values ó1	 and 
ó1	are respectively, a primal and a (part of 
a) dual solution vector from the subproblem with 
ó1	 related to fixing constraints 
specified below.  Note that the last set of constraints in (5.13) are called Benders cuts 
are  used to approximate from below, the optimal value function B	.  For this reason 
Benders method is sometimes called an "outer approximation" as opposed to an inner 
one for example, the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition (Conejo et al., 2006).  Problem 
(5.13) is updated each iteration by new constraints (Benders cuts) added based on the 
information from the subproblem. The MP is a relaxed version of the original problem 





, from the MP is a lower bound on the optimal objective function to the original problem 
and defined as: 
®"Có1	 =   %ó1	 + Bó1	          (5.14) 
 
For a fixed value of the complicating variables x, Benders subproblem (SP) is defined 
as: i@G=  L% . .   º = 9 −            (5.15)  ≥ 0  = ó1	: 
ó1	 
A solution for the subproblem provides ó1	 (primal values) and the dual variable 
vector 
ó1	 associated with the constraints that fix the complicating variables. The 
subproblem solves a more restricted version of the original problem (since the vector x 
has been fixed) so that the objective function value for the subproblem, ®6ó1	, is an upper 
bound of the original problem.  This value is defined as follows:  
®6ó1	 = L%ó1	         (5.16) 
 
Benders method iterates between the MP and the SP until the difference between the 
upper and lower bounds is small enough. Lastly in terms of convergence of the 
algorithm, we cite the theorem 3.2 from Conejo et. al (2006):  
Problem (5.13) and (5.15) are equivalent to the original problem (5.10). However, the 
original problem (5.10) is harder to solve because it requires to get an exact B	. 
Benders decomposition approximates B	  using hyperplanes and improves the 
approximation using additional hyperplanes from the subproblem at each iteration. The 






5.2.2 Benders Algorithm Stpes Conejo et. al., (2006) 
 
Step 0: Initialization. Find feasible values   for the complicating variables  so 
that  ∈ y, set @ = 1, ó¸ó1	 = , ®"Có1	 = −∞. 
Step 1: Subproblem solution. Solve the subproblem 
i@G=  L% . .   º = 9 −        (5.17)  ≥ 0  = ó1	: 
ó1	 
This problem provides L%ó1	, 
ó1	. Update the objective function upper 
bound ®6ó1	 = L%ó1	. 
Step 2: Convergence check. If ®6ó1	 − ®"Có1	 ≤ À , STOP. Otherwise, go to the next 
step. 
Step 3: Master solution. Update the iteration counter, @ ⟵ @ + 1 
i@G¸,  % + B . .    B ≥ B"C             (5.18) L%		 + 
		P − 		Q ≤ B;   = 1,… , @ − 1 
Note: a new constraint (Benders cut) is added L%		 + 
		P − 		Q ≤ B at each 
iteration. The objective function lower bound, ®"Có1	 =   %ó1	 + Bó1	  is updated. 
The algorithm returns to Step 1.  
5.3 Generalized Benders Decomposition 
The Generalized Benders Decomposition (GBD) was proposed by Geoffion (1972), for 
exploiting the structure of broader class of programs beyond linear programs. GBD was 





 i@G   , 	 .   ï, 	 ≤ 0    (5.19)      ∈  ⊆ ,  ∈ y ⊆ , 
where g is a vector of coupling constraint functions. The vector x is represents 
complicating variables in the sense that: 
• For fixed x, the problem separates into a number of independent optimization 
problems in which parallel computation can be applied. 
• For fixed x, the original problem becomes easier to solve. Examples include 
mixed- integer linear/mixed-integer nonlinear programming problems in which 
a fixed x gives rise to linear and nonlinear programming problems, respectively.  
• Lastly, (5.19) can represent nonconvex programs having x and y jointly to be 
determined e.g., a NLP involving bilinear terms of the form xy, but fixing x 
removes the nonlinearity. 
In GBD, the subproblem results from fixing the x variables, which we denote as ó1	 
where @ is the iteration counter. The subproblem (SP) is as follows: i@G=    ó1	, 	 .   ï ó1	, 	 ≤ 0    (5.20)  = ó1	: 
ó1	  ∈  
whose optimal objective value is B	 and the relaxed master problem, i@G,¸   B .   B ≥  P 		, 		Q + 
		P − 		Q, ∀ = 1,… , @ − 1  (5.21) 





whose solution is ó1	 and 
		  is optimal multiplier vector for the subproblem. The 
feasibility of the subproblem in GBD is guaranteed by relaxing constraints to introduce 
slack/surplus variables when necessary to avoid initial feasibilities. 
Next, function B	 (Conejo et. al, 2006) expresses the objective function of the 
original problem as a function solely of the complicating variables. The optimal 
objective function value given x fixed is defined as: 
B	 = i@G@i8i= , 	 
. .  ï, 	 ≤ 0                                              (5.22)  ∈  
The steps of GBD are; 
1. Initialize; @ = 1, find  ∈ y, ®"Có1	 (lower bound)= −∞, ®6ó1	(upper 
bound)= ∞, À = convergence tolerance 
2. Solve SB, obtaining an optimal value ó1	 and optimal vector 
ó1	 . Update 
®"Có1	 = Bó1		 . 
3. Generate a Benders cut (constraint to the master problem ) B ≥
 P 		, 		Q + 
		P − 		Q. 
4. Solve the master problem with optimal value Bó1	. Set ®6ó1	(upper bound)=
Bó1	. 
5.  If (®6ó1	 − ®"Có1	 	/79®"Có1	 	 < À, stop. ó1	, ó1		 is an optimal solution 
to the original problem (5.19). 






Assumptions which guarantee finite convergence of the procedure are: 
1.  and ï are convex on  for each fixed  ∈ y. 
2.  is nonempty and convex. 
3. It must be possible to solve the master problem globally 
4. It must be possible to obtain a closed-form expression for a Benders cut  for 
each fixed   
ó1	 
5.4 Benders-SOS1 Algorithm (Solving MPECs Using a Combination of 
SOS1 Method and Benders Decomposition) 
The main idea to be explored in this chapter is to make use of Generalized Benders 
decomposition but applied to MPECs using an SOS1 transformation (Siddiqui and 
Gabriel, 2012). Recall the function ï, 	 ≥ 0  and the bilinear term %ï, 	 = 0. 
We introduce the SOS1 variables, õ+ and õ− noting that z is a nonnegative vector that 
equals the function g(x,y) for notational simplicity. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
SOS1 variables are nonnegative. Noting that  
8 = õs + õö  = ® + 	2  
õ =  õs − õö = ® − 	2  
we can rewrite the original MPEC in (5.3) using SOS1 variables as: min , 	                                                                  . . , 	 ∈ Ω                                  (5.23)  ® = ï, 	                                                                ® ≥ 0                                                                      2õs +2õö = ® +  2õs - 2õö = ® −  
     ≥ 0 






The vector x is considered as the complicating set of variables (or at least a subset of 
them) and whose values are determined in the master problem. In (5.23), if the vector 
x is fixed, the resulting problem will become a simpler or decomposable one. By 
applying Benders decomposition, we propose the following Benders subproblem (SP) 
as follows where the vector x has been fixed as shown in the last constraint: 
 min , 	                                                                  . . , 	 ∈ Ω                                  (5.24)  ® = ï, 	                                                                ® ≥ 0                                                                      2õs +2õö = ® +  2õs - 2õö = ® −  
     ≥ 0           = ó¸ó1	  λ	 
where   õs and õö  are SOS1 variables 
 
The master problem (MP) becomes:  min,¸ B 
                                                  . . B ≥ B"C               (5.25)                                                                          B ≥ P		, 		Q + 
		 − 			  ∀ = 1, . . , @ − 1                           
 






5.4.1 Benders-SOS1 Algorithm: 
 
Step 0:  Set  @ = 1 . Select a tolerance value ε,  B"C, and ó¸ó1	 being a feasible 
solution for the complicating variable x for the first iteration. 
Step 1: Transform the complementarity conditions in problem (5.3) into SOS1 format. 
We rewrite the problem as: 
min , 	                                                                  . . , 	 ∈ Ω                                  (5.26)  ® = ï, 	                                                                ® ≥ 0                                                                      2õs +2õö = ® +  2õs - 2õö = ® −  
     ≥ 0 
where   õs and õö  are SOS1 variables 
 
Step 2: Subproblem solution. Solve the subproblem   min , 	                                                                  . . , 	 ∈ Ω                                  (5.27)  ® = ï, 	                                                                ® ≥ 0                                                                      2õs +2õö = ® +  2õs - 2õö = ® −  
     ≥ 0           = ó¸ó1	  λ	 
 where   õs and õö  are SOS1 variables 
A solution for this problem gives ó1	, ó1	, ®ó1	, ó1	, ó1	) and 
ó1	, the dual 





 ó1	, ó1	). However in some cases, the subproblem may infeasible. The alternative 
always-feasible subproblem from Conejo et. al., (2006) is as follows: 
min , 	 + Ks + Kö	 
                                               . . , 	 ∈ Ω                                   (5.28)                                      
              ® = ï, 	 +Ks − Kö 
                                              ® ≥ 0    
          2õs +2õö = ® +  
               2õs - 2õö = ® −  
         Ks, Kö,  ≥ 0 
           = ó¸ ∶  
ó1		 
where   õs and õö  are SOS1 variables - and L∈ s is the penalty for violating 
constraints.  
Step 3: Check for convergence. Compute upper and lower bounds of the optimal 
value of the objective function of the original problem: 
®6ó1	 =  ó1	, ó1	).         (5.29) ®"Có1	 = Bó1	              (5.30) 
  If ®6ó1	 − ®"Có1	 ≤ À, then a solution to the original MPEC is ∗ = ó1	, ∗ = ó1	. 
STOP. 
 
Step 4: Master problem solution. Update the iteration counter,@ ← @ + 1 and solve 
the master problem: 
 min,¸ B 
                                                              . . 
         B ≥ B"C     (5.31) 
                ≥ 0                                                                        B ≥ P		, 		Q + 





Note:  a new constraint is added at every iteration. A solution for the master problem 
provides ó1	, Bó1	 . Update the objective function lower bound, ®"Có1	 = Bó1	 . The 
algorithm continues to Step 2.   
5.4.2 Numerical Example (Example 1) to Show Methodology Step-
by-Step 
A simple numerical example is presented to show how Benders algorithm is used to 
obtain solutions to the MPEC. First, a simple linear program with complementarity 
constraints (LPCC) is presented to show the proposed methodology step-by-step. A 
linear program with complementarity constraints is expressed as: 
i@G % + L= 
                                                        . .      + º ≥                                       (5.32)               0 ≤  ⊥  + x + A ≥ 0 
 
The following LPCC from (Hu and Pang, 2008) is considered. 
 i@G 3 − 5 
                                                          . .   0 ≤  ≤ 1         (5.33) 2 + 3 ≥ 6 
                                  0 ≤  ⊥ 2 + 3 − 6 ≥ 0 
 
A solution for this problem is x=1.5, y=1 (Hu and Pang, 2008) with an objective 
function value of -0.5. Next we proceed to the Benders-SOS1 method for MPECs. 
Step 0:  Pick the tolerance value  À = 10ö to control the convergence and B"C =
−25, ®"Có1	 = −∞ and ó¸ó1	 = 1. B"C is the bound that can be determined from 
economic or physical consideration (Conejo, 2006). Set the iteration counter @ = 1. 
Step 1: Transform the complementarity condition in problem (5.33) into the SOS1 





i@G 3 − 5 
                      . .       0 ≤  ≤ 1    (5.34) 
             −6 + 2 + 3 = ® 
 ® ≥ 0 
   2õs +2õö = ® +  
  2õs - 2õö = ® −  
where   õs and õö  are SOS1 variables 
 
Step 2: Subproblem Solution. Solve the subproblem with a fixed value ó¸	 = 1  
for the complicating variables .We arbitrarily pick x =1 as a starting point however, 
the subproblem is infeasible. We introduce the nonnegative variable Ks, Kö to prevent 
infeasibility with a penalty of 10 in the subproblem and penalize the violating 
constraint as shown in (5.28) 40: i@G  3 − 5 + 10Ks + Kö	 
                                             . .   0 ≤  ≤ 1     (5.35) −6 + 2 + 3 + Ks − Kö = ® 
        2õs +2õö = ® +  
        2õs - 2õö = ® −              Ks, Kö, ® ≥ 0 
           = 1 
where   õs and õö  are SOS1 variables 
 
This gives:  	 = 1,  = 1 , ®	 = 0, Ks	 = 1, Kö	 = 0 . Its optimal objective 
function value is 8. An optimal dual variable associated with the fixing constraint is 
given as:  
	 = −17. 
 
                                                 
40 The penalty needs to be a positive value. It is important to note that not all positive values will work. 
The appropriate value of the penalty should make Ks, Kö become zero in the last iteration of Benders 





Step 3: Check for convergence. Calculate the upper and lower bounds for this 
problem: 
®6	 =  	, 	) =  3 ∗ 1	  − 5 ∗ 1	  + 10 ∗ 1	  = 8 ®"C	 = −∞ 
 
Check for convergence with ®6	 − ®"C	 = 8 − −∞	 = ∞ ≥ À. This value is not 
small enough when compared with the tolerance, so a Benders cut is added. Go to Step 
4. 
Step 4: Master problem solution. The iteration counter is updated, @ = 1 + 1 =
2 . Based on the solution of the subproblem,   	, 		 = 8 and 
	 = −17 in Step 
3, the algorithm constructs a new Benders cut: B ≥  	, 		  + 
	 − 		 and 
adds B ≥ 8 + −17	 − 1	 to the master problem and solves the master problem 
(MP) with the Benders cut added: 
min  B 
                                                               . .  B ≥ −25 
          B ≥ 25 − 17     (5.36) 
 
Solving this problem gives Bo	 = −25, o	 = 2.941. Go to Step 2. 
 
Step 2 Subproblem solution. Set ó¸o	 = o	 = 2.941 and then solve the 
following subproblem: 
 i@G  3 − 5 + 10Ks + Kö	 
                                             . .   0 ≤  ≤ 1     (5.37) −6 + 2 + 3 + Ks − Kö = ® 
        2õs +2õö = ® +  





            Ks, Kö, ® ≥ 0 
           = 2.94 
    where   õs and õö  are SOS1 variables 
          
Solving this problem gives o	 = 0.039, ®o	 = 0, Kso	, Köo	 = 0. with an optimal 
objective function value of 8.627. An optimal dual variable associated with the 
constraint  = 2.941 is 
o	 = 6.333. 
 
Step 3: Check for convergence.  
 
®6o	 =  o	, o	) =  3 ∗ 2.941	  − 5 ∗ 0.039	  + 10 ∗ 0	  = 8.627 
®"Co	 = Bo	 = −25 
Check for convergence with ®6o	 − ®"Co	 = 8.627 − −25	 ≥ À. This value is not 
small enough when compared with the tolerance, so a Benders cut is added: Go to 
Step 4. 
Step 4: Master problem solution. The iteration counter is updated, @ = 2 + 1 =
3. Based on the solution of the subproblem, o	, o		 = 8.627 and 
o	 = 6.33, 
the algorithm constructs a new Benders cut: B ≥ Po	, o	Q + 
o	 − o		  and 
adds B ≥ 8.627 + 6.33	 − 2.941	 to the master problem and solves the master 
problem (MP) with the Benders cut added: 
     min  B 
                                                           . .  B ≥ −25 
       B ≥ 25 − 17     (5.38)  B ≥ −9.989 + 6.33 





Step 2 Subproblem solution. Set ó¸#	 =  #	 = 1.5 and then solve the following 
subproblem: i@G  3 − 5 + 10Ks + Kö	 
                                             . .   0 ≤  ≤ 1     (5.39) −6 + 2 + 3 + Ks − Kö = ® 
       2õs +2õö = ® +  
        2õs - 2õö = ® −              Ks, Kö, ® ≥ 0 
           = 1.5 
where   õs and õö  are SOS1 variables    
Solving this problem gives #	 = 1, Ks#	 = 0, Kö#	 = 0 , ®#	 = 0 with an optimal 
objective function value of -0.5. 
Step 3: Check for convergence. Check for convergence with ®6#	 − ®"C#	 =−0.5 − −0.5	 = 0 ≤ À and the algorithm is terminated. A summary of the iterations 
is provided below. 
Table 5-1 Iterative Values for Benders Decomposition Approach for Sample MPEC: 
  
Iteration (@) ó1 ó1 ®"Có1  ®6ó1  
1 1 1 -25 8 
2 2.95 1 -25 8.627 
3 1.5 1 -0.5 -0.5 
         
 
5.4.3 Validating a solution from Benders SOS1 approach 
 
The question whether Benders can find a global optimum of example 1 from any 
starting point is considered in Table 5-2 below where the results of the application of 
the algorithm are shown for four different starting points.  Starting with x=0, x=1, x=2, 
and x=2.8 leads to the same global optimum x=1.5. It is important to note that the 





value in the objective function. It is important to note that this form of this penalty is 
exact. Hence, if the problem is feasible, there is a positive threshold value for the 
penalty such that any value above that threshold yields optimal solutions with all slack 
variables equal to zero and the remaining variables optimal for the original problem 
(5.33). 
Table 5-2 Solutions from different starting points41 for Benders Decomposition 
Approach for the Example 1: 









Dual of fixing 
variable con 
Objective 
function $%	 &$%	 's$% 'ö$%	 (s$%	 )$%	 *+,-Õ$%	  *./$%	 
1 0.00 1.00 0 0.50 3.00 -27.32304 -25.00 25.00 
2 1.83 0.78 0 0.39 0.00 6.33333 -25.00 1.62 
3 1.04 1.00 0 0.50 0.92 -17.00000 -3.41 7.32 
4 1.50 1.00 0 0.50 0.00 -16.79178 -0.50 -0.50 
         










Dual of fixing 
variable con 
Objective 
function $%	 &$%	 's$% 'ö$%	 (s$%	 )$%	 *+,-Õ$%	  *./$%	 
1 1.00 1.00 0 0.50 1.00 -17.00 -25.00 8.00 
2 2.95 0.03 0 0.02 0.00 6.33333 -25.00 8.71 
3 1.50 1.00 0 0.50 0.00 -17.00 -0.50 -0.5 
         










Dual of fixing 
variable con 
Objective 
function $%	 &$%	 's$% 'ö$%	 (s$%	 )$%	 *+,-Õ$%	  *./$%	 
1 2.00 0.67 0 0.33 0.00 6.33333 -25.00 2.67 
2 0.00 1.00 0 0.50 3.00 -28.92319 -10.00 25.00 
3 0.99 1.00 0 0.50 1.01 -17.00000 -3.71 8.12 
                                                 
41 Note that we use a nonnegative starting point becasue nonnegativity of x is implied from the 





4 1.50 1.00 0 0.50 0.00 -16.84348 -0.50 -0.50 
         










Dual of fixing 
variable con 
Objective 
function $%	 &$%	 's$% 'ö$%	 (s$%	 )$%	 *+,-Õ$%	  *./$%	 
1 2.80 0.13 0 0.07 0.00 6.33333 -25.00 7.73 
2 0.00 1.00 0 0.50 3.00 -17.31788 -10.00 25.00 
3 1.48 1.00 0 0.50 0.04 -17.00000 -0.63 -0.16 
4 1.50 1.00 0 0.50 0.00 -16.52307 -0.50 -0.50 
       
In order to understand why a global optimum is found or why the algorithm works, we 
look at the optimal value function B	 for the lower-level problem at given fixed 
values of the complicating variable x from the master problem.  Function B	 
expresses the objective function of the original problem as a function solely of the 
complicating variables. For this problem B	 is defined as: 
B	 = i@G@i8i=  3 − 5 + 10Ks + Kö	 
                               . .    
      0 ≤  ≤ 1                          (5.40)                               −6 + 2 + 3 + Ks − Kö = ® 
      2õs +2õö = ® +  
      2õs - 2õö = ® −            Ks, Kö, ® ≥ 0 
 
In general, the function B	 is not known in closed form. The requirement for the 
standard Benders approach (for linear programs) is that the optimal objective value 
function B	 needs to be convex for the method to converge, see Theorem 3.2 in 





integer program due to the SOS1 property, 42 which is not directly applicable for the 
above-mentioned convergence theorem.  For illustration of this point, Figure 5-1 
presents the B-function for different x. It is clear  for this example that the  B-
function is piecewise linear, but not convex. We see that α has one line with a negative 
slope (furthest left), then a positively sloped line, and finally another positively sloped 
line (furthest right). Since the SOS1 property only allows at most one variable in the 
set to be nonzero, there are three possible cases: case 1 (õs > 0, õö = 0	, case 2 (õs =
0, õö = 0	,  and case 3 (õs = 0, õö > 0	.  The correspondence with these cases and 
the three slopes are indicated in the figure below.  Lastly, the reason that each part is a 
straight line (more generally convex function) is because the problem is a linear 





Figure 5-1 The optimal value function for example 1 
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It is important to note that each portion of the B-function is determined by the SOS1 
variables which define the slopes for the B-function. The first downward slope x= [0, 
1.4]   is due to infeasibility of the subproblem having Ks > 0 . The second portion has 
two upward slopes due to the SOS1 variables.  The first slope of B-function starts in 
the range x = [1.5, 2.9] where õs is nonezero while õö is zero, the second slope has õö 
is nonzero and õs = 0 from x=3.1 to x=5, and the last slope is just a point at (3, B3	) 
where õö = 0 and õs = 0. Table 5-3 also shows the values for all related variables. In 
addition, Figure 5-1 also shows that   B-function is a piecewise linear function of x and 
therefore is convex for specific ranges of x. As stated in (Conejo et al, 2006 page 257), 
the convergence of Benders decomposition for MINLP problems is guaranteed as long 
as the envelope of  B-function is convex.  
 
Table 5-3 Solutions from different starting point for Benders Decomposition 
Approach for B-function  
 
Iteration        Objective function & (s  's 'ö 
1 0.0 25.0 1.0 3.0  0.0 0.5 
2 0.1 23.3 1.0 2.8  0.0 0.5 
3 0.2 21.6 1.0 2.6  0.0 0.5 
4 0.3 19.9 1.0 2.4  0.0 0.5 
5 0.4 18.2 1.0 2.2  0.0 0.5 
6 0.5 16.5 1.0 2.0  0.0 0.5 
7 0.6 14.8 1.0 1.8  0.0 0.5 
8 0.7 13.1 1.0 1.6  0.0 0.5 
9 0.8 11.4 1.0 1.4  0.0 0.5 
10 0.9 9.7 1.0 1.2  0.0 0.5 
11 1.0 8.0 1.0 1.0  0.0 0.5 
12 1.1 6.3 1.0 0.8  0.0 0.5 
13 1.2 4.6 1.0 0.6  0.0 0.5 
14 1.3 2.9 1.0 0.4  0.0 0.5 
15 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.2  0.0 0.5 





17 1.6 0.1 0.9 0.0  0.0 0.5 
18 1.7 0.8 0.9 0.0  0.0 0.4 
19 1.8 1.4 0.8 0.0  0.0 0.4 
20 1.9 2.0 0.7 0.0  0.0 0.4 
21 2.0 2.7 0.7 0.0  0.0 0.3 
22 2.1 3.3 0.6 0.0  0.0 0.3 
23 2.2 3.9 0.5 0.0  0.0 0.3 
24 2.3 4.6 0.5 0.0  0.0 0.2 
25 2.4 5.2 0.4 0.0  0.0 0.2 
26 2.5 5.8 0.3 0.0  0.0 0.2 
27 2.6 6.5 0.3 0.0  0.0 0.1 
28 2.7 7.1 0.2 0.0  0.0 0.1 
29 2.8 7.7 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.1 
30 2.9 8.4 0.1 0.0  0.0 0.0 
31 3.0 9.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 
32 3.1 9.3 0.0 0.0  0.1 0.0 
33 3.2 9.6 0.0 0.0  0.2 0.0 
34 3.3 9.9 0.0 0.0  0.3 0.0 
35 3.4 10.2 0.0 0.0  0.4 0.0 
36 3.5 10.5 0.0 0.0  0.5 0.0 
37 3.6 10.8 0.0 0.0  0.6 0.0 
38 3.7 11.1 0.0 0.0  0.7 0.0 
39 3.8 11.4 0.0 0.0  0.8 0.0 
40 3.9 11.7 0.0 0.0  0.9 0.0 
41 4.0 12.0 0.0 0.0  1.0 0.0 
42 4.1 12.3 0.0 0.0  1.1 0.0 
43 4.2 12.6 0.0 0.0  1.2 0.0 
44 4.3 12.9 0.0 0.0  1.3 0.0 
45 4.4 13.2 0.0 0.0  1.4 0.0 
46 4.5 13.5 0.0 0.0  1.5 0.0 
47 4.6 13.8 0.0 0.0  1.6 0.0 
48 4.7 14.1 0.0 0.0  1.7 0.0 
49 4.8 14.4 0.0 0.0  1.8 0.0 
50 4.9 14.7 0.0 0.0  1.9 0.0 









5.5 Numerical Examples 
 
The following numerical examples serve to demonstrate applicability of the proposed 
algorithm.  In particular, the proposed algorithm is compared to other known 
procedures to solve MPECs to show the different types of problems that can be solved 
and the superiority of the new method (at least numerically on these examples). 
Example 2 from (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012) is solved by Benders-SOS1 and 
compared with the disjunctive-constraints and SOS1 methods. Examples 3 and 4 
applied Benders decomposition to stochastic MPEC problems. Example 5 presents a 
nonlinear program constrained by a nonlinear complementarity problem (Dirkse and 
Ferris, 1998) solved by the Benders-SOS1 approach. Lastly, we apply this algorithm to 
an MPEC derived from the World Gas Model MPEC version which serves as the 
natural gas link to the other chapters in this dissertation.  
 
Example 2: Shale Gas MPEC-Linear Complementarity-Constrained Nonlinear 
Program   
This MPEC is a Stackelberg game as reported in (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012). This 
small example has three shale natural gas producers where one producer is the leader 
in the market and the other two are the followers. The leader makes its decisions first, 
and then the two followers decide their own production with the leader's production 
fixed. The objective function for the leader is to maximize profit taking into account 
the anticipated sales from other two producers. The formulation is shown as follows 
  i@G ,o,2	 ≔ −{7 − 9 + o + 2		2 − 2} 





                               0 ≤ −7 + o + 9 + 29o + 92 ⊥ o ≥ 0         0 ≤ 2 
where a is the intercept and b  is the slope of the inverse demand curve, and C,c1,c2  
are the marginal production costs for the leader and the two followers, respectively. 
The value for these parameters are presented in Table 5-4 with three datasets considered 
as in (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012). Also, Q, q1, q2 are the production levels for the 
leader and the two followers, respectively. We applied Benders-SOS1 to this problem 
by considering Q as a complicating variable. In this problem we define the master 
problem as: i@G,4 B 
                                                             . .  B ≥ B"C            (5.42) 
            0 ≤ 2                                              B ≥ Ø2		, ó		Ù + 
		P2 − 2		Q;∀ = 1, . . , @ − 1 
The subproblem is as follows: i@G 56,57D6¡,D6£,D7¡,D7£,86,87 −{7 − 9 + o + 2		2 − 2} ® = −7 +  + 29 + 9o + 92                (5.43) 
                        ®o = −7 + o + 9 + 29o + 92   2s + 2ö = ® +  2s − 2ö = ® −  2os + 2oö = ®o + o 2os − 2oö = ®o − o 
2 = 2		: 
		      
2, , o, ®, ®o ≥ 0 s, ö, os, oöare SOS1 variables 
As defined in (5.22), the B-function is defined as: B2	 = i@G@i8i56,57D6¡,D6£,D7¡,D7£,86,87 −{7 − 9 + o + 2		2 − 2} 





2os + 2oö = ®o + o 2os − 2oö = ®o − o 0 ≤ ®, ®o, , o s, ö, os, oöare SOS1 variables 
Figure 5-2 shows the optimal lower-level objective value function (B) for fixed Q from 
the master problem for test 1 data.  The  B-function is convex, but the first part 2 =
[0,12] is not linear due to nonlinearity (quadratic term) in the objective function of the 




Figure 5-2 Lower-level optimal objective value function for example 2 
 
The computational objective was to compare the results for the methods of disjunctive 
constraints, SOS1 variables (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012), and Benders-SOS1 
algorithm. Later, the number of followers is increased to compare the efficacy of the 
algorithm. The solutions for three data sets from the literature are shown in Table 5-4.  


















Q from the leader
















Test 1                      
dataset1 (a=13 
b=1 C,c1,c2=1) 
12 Q=6, q1=q2=2 2.37   s 
SOS1 12 Q=6, q1=q2=2 0.459 s 
Disjunctive 
constraints 
12 Q=6, q1=q2=2 0.209 s 
Benders-
SOS1 































These results indicate that the computational time is longer for the Benders-SOS1 
method but the same solution is obtained compared with the other two approaches.  
Next, the test problem was changed so that instead of just two players at the lower level, 
there were N followers with similar costs and parameters. The decision variable ó 
represents the quantity supplied by producer i. The number of players was increased to 
test the computational time taken for the disjunctive-constraints, SOS1, and Benders-
SOS1 approaches.    The results are shown in the Table 5-5 and Figure 5-3. All methods 







Table 5-5 Comparison of the solution with increased number of followers for the 
three approaches 








5 Q=6 q1,..,q5=1 0.349 s  0.339 s 3.877 s 
10 Q=6 q1,..,q10=0.545 0.482 s  0.264 s 4.54 s 
50 Q=6 q1,..,q50=0.118 1.663 s 0.329  s 6.706 s 
100 Q=6 q1,..,q100=0.059 3.518 s 0.414 s 6.977 s 
300 Q=6 
q1,…,q300=0.020 
57.8   s 1.534 s 9.635 s 
500 Q=6 
q1,…,q500=0.012 
376.8  s 4.232 s 15.48 s 
750 Q=6 q1,…,q750= 
0.008 
1,281.6 s 14.084 
s 
32.11  s 
1500 Q=6 q1,…,q1500= 
0.004 
3,209.4 s 81.0 s 62.3 s 
















Figure 5-3 Comparison of Computational Time for the Three MPEC Methods 
 
                                                 






















Comparison of Computational Times for Three MPEC 
Methods





Clearly, the disjunctive-constraints method becomes extremely computationally 
expensive when the number of players is increased. When comparing the SOS1 and 
Benders-SOS1 approaches, Benders-SOS1 is slower for N< 1500, but faster when for 
N greater than or equal to 1500.   So on this example, it seems that the computational 
advantage of the new Benders-SOS1 method shows up for larger problems. This is an 
indication that the overhead associated with the Benders approach is worth the 
computational effort for large enough problems. Lastly, we increase the number of 
followers up to 5,000, but the problem becomes infeasible and is terminated by GAMS 
for all three approaches. 
Example 3: Two-Stage Stochastic Shale Gas MPEC  
This problem is a modified example from the literature (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012) 
resulting in a two-stage, stochastic MPEC. In this example, the producers face uncertain 
demand.  This problem has one leader and two followers @ = 1,2	. The uncertainty is 
represented by equal probabilities Pr(s)=0.5 for two scenarios ¤{1,2} representing 
low and high demand cases. The values  7D = {15,30} are the intercepts of the demand 
curves for scenarios s=1,2 and 9D9,o = {1,1}  are the slopes of the demand curves.  The 
values , óD  are the production costs for the leader and followers, respectively, and 
2, óD are the production level decision variables for the leader and followers, 
respectively, see Figure 5-4. The leader has an initial capacity of 3 units at time period 
0 and needs to make an investment decision wGõ with an investment cost @Gõ_	of $2 






Figure 5-4 Scenario tree for small two-stage MPEC problem. 
The complete formulation for the problem is as follows: 
A@G ç ,D{7D − 9D  óDó + 2D		2DD − 2D}ê − @Gõ_ ∗ wGõ 
              . .  0 ≤ −7D + ó + 29DóD + 9D ∑ +D+:ó + 9D2D ⊥ óD ≥ 0 ∀, @         (5.45) 
 2D ≤ 3 + @Gõ ∀ 
2D, @Gõ, óD  ≥ 0 
Note that the complementarity constraints 0 ≤ −7D + ó + 29DóD + 9D ∑ +D+:ó +
9D2D ⊥ óD ≥ 0 represent the KKT conditions from the followers’ problems. In this 
problem we consider the leader variables for each scenario,   2D, as complicating 
variables, and the master problem is as follows: 
i@G,4Ë B 
  . .  B ≥ B"C              (5.46) B ≥ Ø@Gõ		,2D		, óD		Ù + 
		Ø2D − 2D		Ù;∀ = 1, . . , @ − 1 






A@G5ôË,Í;,ËôË¡ ,,ËôË£ ,<ôË,  çPrD{7D − 9D  óDó + 2D		2DD − CQD}ê − @Gõ_ ∗ wGõ 
 . .  2D ≤ 3 + @Gõ ®óD = −7 + ó + 29óD + 9+:ó,D + 92D                 (5.47) 2óDs + 2óDö = ®óD + óD 2óDs − 2óDö = ®óD − óD   2D = 2D		: 
		 
ó, ®ó , @Gõ ≥ 0 ós, óöare SOS1 variables 
 
In addition, as discussed in (5.22), the B-function in this problem is defined as: 
 
A@G@i8i5ôË,Í;,ËôË¡ ,,ËôË£ ,<ôË,   çPrD{7D − 9D  óDó + 2D		2DD − CQD}ê − @Gõ_ ∗ wGõ 
 . .  2D ≤ 3 + @Gõ ®óD = −7 + ó + 29óD + 9+:ó,D + 92D                 (5.47) 2óDs + 2óDö = ®óD + óD 2óDs − 2óDö = ®óD − óD   2D = 2D		: 
		 
ó, ®ó , @Gõ ≥ 0 ós, óöare SOS1 variables 
 
Figure 5-5 shows the lower-level optimal objective value function (α function) in three 
dimensions. Table 5-6 reports and compares the results for the disjunctive-constraints 
method and the Benders-SOS1 algorithm. We have three starting points with the same 
parameter values as follows; B"C = −30, À = 10ö@. Table 5-7 shows the 





points lead to the same optimal objective function value, but each uses a different 
number of iterations.  
 
Figure 5-5 α function (α (2D,2D	 ) for example 3 
 
Table 5-6 Comparison of the solution for Benders Decomposition and disjunctive-
constraints approaches. 
  
Results Disjunctive-constraints method Benders-SOS1 method 
Inv 5.5 5.5 
S=1: q11=q21 2.33 2.33 
S=1: Q1 7 7 
S=1:Price 3.33 3.33 
S=2: q12=q22 6.83 6.83 
S=2: Q2 8.5 8.5 
Price 7.83 7.83 
 
 
Table 5-7 Convergence for small stochastic MPEC problem for three starting points. 
 
Starting Point: 2D	 = 0 
Iterations @	 Primal Variables Objective function  2D9ó1	  2D9oó1	  @Gõ ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 





2 12.86 0 9.86 -30 17.26531 
3 0 6.21 3.21 -30 -17.16528 
4 0 23 20 -30 16.99123 
5 2.75 14.6 11.6 -30 -16.9915 
6 5.87 10.3 7.3 -30 -25.41 
7 5.93 3.96 2.93 -29.27605 -18.65371 
8 14.44 10.81 11.44 -28.72596 -6.75323 
9 11.98 9.57 8.98 -28.43799 -17.08443 
10 8.13 7.65 5.13 -27.98784 -24.90819 
11 5.87 6.51 3.51 -27.72095 -25.32879 
12 7.87 8.46 5.46 -27.39181 -26.08311 
13 5.97 8.41 5.41 -26.63095 -26.02845 
14 6.89 9.47 6.47 -26.37924 -26.04963 
15 6.91 8.52 5.52 -26.35879 -26.20704 
16 7.33 7.39 4.39 -26.22475 -25.98365 
17 7.36 8.04 5.04 -26.22249 -26.15097 
18 7.39 8.52 5.52 -26.22085 -26.18277 
19 7.15 8.29 5.29 -26.21512 -26.19717 
20 7.15 8.53 5.53 -26.21387 -26.20431 
21 7.04 8.41 5.41 -26.21124 -26.20673 
22 7.03 8.53 5.53 -26.21040 -26.20801 
23 6.98 8.47 5.47 -26.20921 -26.20808 
24 6.97 8.53 5.53 -26.20869 -26.20809 
25 7 8.5 5.5 -26.20861 -26.20833 
26 6.97 8.5 5.5 -26.20837 -26.20822 
27 6.99 8.51 5.51 -26.20835 -26.20828 
28 6.99 8.5 5.5 -26.20835 -26.20831 
29 7 8.51 5.51 -26.20834 -26.20833 
30 7 8.5 5.5 -26.2083356 -26.20833 
31 7 8.5 5.5 -26.2083354 -26.20833 




Starting Point: 2D	 = 5 
Iterations @	 Primal Variables Objective function 2D9ó1	  2D9oó1	  inv ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 5 5 2 -30.00000 -23.50000 
2 23.5 0 20.5 -30.00000 152.62500 





4 4.89 10.63 7.63 -30.00000 -24.70922 
5 9.68 7.9 6.68 -30.00000 -21.38216 
6 7.25 7.86 4.86 -28.33738 -26.12985 
7 13.46 15.53 12.53 -27.24756 -11.00248 
8 9.64 12.28 9.28 -26.87270 -22.66860 
9 7.58 10.53 7.53 -26.67160 -25.46176 
10 6.19 9.35 6.35 -26.53526 -25.97910 
11 7.53 9.18 6.18 -26.38780 -26.08299 
12 6.79 8.65 5.65 -26.33701 -26.19689 
13 7.45 8.51 5.51 -26.25131 -26.17452 
14 7.05 8.28 5.28 -26.23487 -26.19957 
15 7.12 8.61 5.61 -26.22307 -26.20372 
16 6.94 8.48 5.48 -26.21646 -26.20757 
17 7.1 8.44 5.44 -26.21082 -26.20595 
18 7.04 8.53 5.53 -26.21015 -26.20791 
19 7.02 8.45 5.45 -26.20910 -26.20788 
20 6.99 8.5 5.5 -26.20888 -26.20831 
21 7.03 8.49 5.49 -26.20847 -26.20816 
22 7.01 8.52 5.52 -26.20840 -26.20826 
23 7.01 8.49 5.49 -26.20839 -26.20831 
24 7 8.51 5.51 -26.20836 -26.20832 
25 7 8.5 5.5 -26.20835 -26.20833 
26 7 8.5 5.5 -26.2083430 -26.20833 
27 7 8.5 5.5 -26.2083413 -26.20833 
28 7 8.5 5.5 -26.20833 -26.20833 
 
Starting Point: 2D	 = 10 
Iterations @	 Primal Variables Objective function  2D9ó1	  2D9oó1	  inv ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 10 10 7 -30 -24.33333 
2 0 0 0 -30 0 
3 2.43 5.03 2.03 -30 -20.72517 
4 3.52 11.62 8.62 -30 -22.57294 
5 6.01 7.82 4.82 -29.40744 -25.96997 
6 6.83 11.07 8.07 -26.971 -25.10218 
7 7.92 9.07 6.07 -26.87787 -26.01292 
8 6.29 9.48 6.48 -26.43491 -25.96467 
9 6.92 8.52 5.52 -26.42473 -26.20709 
10 10.82 2.57 7.82 -26.36138 -1.43512 





12 7.91 7.91 4.91 -26.23926 -26.01238 
13 7.87 7.97 4.97 -26.23776 -26.03547 
14 7.56 8.54 5.54 -26.22481 -26.15563 
15 7.25 8 5 -26.22038 -26.15608 
16 7.24 8.36 5.36 -26.21735 -26.19536 
17 7.23 8.75 5.87 -26.21408 -26.18833 
18 7.14 8.56 5.56 -26.2129 -26.20471 
19 7.05 8.38 5.38 -26.21187 -26.20564 
20 7.03 8.5 5.5 -26.21048 -26.20816 
21 6.96 8.43 5.43 -26.20896 -26.2072 
22 6.97 8.49 5.49 -26.20883 -26.20817 
23 6.99 8.58 5.58 -26.20864 -26.20724 
24 7 8.53 5.53 -26.20856 -26.20816 
25 7 8.5 5.5 -26.2085 -26.20833 
26 7 8.45 5.45 -26.20834 -26.20796 
27 6.99 8.48 5.48 -26.20834 -26.20823 
28 6.99 8.49 5.49 -26.20834 -26.20829 
29 7 8.49 5.49 -26.208340 -26.208310 
30 6.99 8.49 5.49 -26.208340 -26.208320 
31 6.99 8.51 5.51 -26.208340 -26.208280 
32 6.99 8.5 5.5 -26.208333 -26.208320 
33 7 8.5 5.5 -26.208332 -26.208330 
34 7 8.5 5.5 -26.208331 -26.208330 
35 7 8.5 5.5 -26.208330 -26.208330 
 
 
Example 4: Two-Stage Stochastic Shale Gas MPEC with binary variables in the 
first-stage, upper level problem 
This is a modification of Example 3 so that the problem becomes a two-stage stochastic 
MPEC with binary variables in the first stage. In particular, this problem is an instance 
of a planning problem including build/don’t build decisions. The decision variable ‘inv’ 
for capacity expansion for the leader’s problem in the first stage becomes a binary 





a fixed investment cost of $10 is needed for the capacity expansion. The production 
capacity constraint for the leader becomes 2D ≤ 3 + 6 ∗ @Gõ. 
The complete formulation for this problem is as follows: 
A@G5ôË,4Ë,óA  ç PrD{7D − 9D  óDó + 2D		2DD − CQD}ê − 10 ∗ wGõ 
          . .  0 ≤ −7D + ó + 29DóD + 9D ∑ +D+:ó + 9D2D ⊥ óD ≥ 0   (5.49)      
 2D ≤ 3 + 6 ∗ @Gõ  2D, @Gõ, óD  ≥ 0 
 wGõ ∈ {0,1} 
In this problem, we consider the binary variable wGõ as a complicating variable because 
if it is fixed, the subproblem becomes a nonlinear program instead of a mixed-integer 
nonlinear program. Therefore  2D  is not in the master problem unlike the previous 
problem. For this problem, the master problem is as follows: 
 
 i@G,óA B 
                                                            . .  B ≥ B"C    (5.50) 
           0 ≤ @Gõ ≤ 1                                               B ≥ Ø@Gõ		,2D		, óD		Ù + 
		P@Gõ − @Gõ		Q;∀ = 1, . . , @ − 1 
The subproblem is as follows:  
A@G4Ë,5ôË,DôË¡ ,DôË£ ,8ôË  çPrD{7D − 9D  óDó + 2D		2DD − CQD}ê − 10 ∗ wGõ 
        . .        ®óD = −7 + ó + 29óD + 9+:ó,D + 92D              (5.51)         2óDs + 2óDö = ®óD + óD 
       2óDs − 2óDö = ®óD − óD 





       2D, @Gõ, óD, ®óD  ≥ 0 wGõ = @Gõ		: 
		 ós, óöare SOS1 variables 
We initialize the parameters to be: B"C = −30, À = 10ö@ .  The binary investment 
variable is relaxed in the master problem to be in the range between zero to one. Four 
different starting points wGõ = 0,0.4,0.8,1 lead to the same optimal solution. Three 
starting points wGõ = 0,0.4,0.8 converge within three iterations. When  wGõ = 1  is used 
as a starting point, the algorithm converges to an optimal solution within two iterations 
as shown in Table 5-8.    Table 5-9 compares the results to the disjunctive-constraints 
approach for Example 4. Benders-SOS1 has quicker a computational time (0.588 vs 
1.045 seconds) and achieves the same optimal solution as the disjunctive-constraints 
approach.   
 
Table 5-8 Comparison of three starting points for Example 4 
Benders-SOS1  
Starting Points: wGõ = 0 
Iterations @	 Primal Variables44 Objective function  2D9ó1	  2D9oó1	  wGõ ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 3 3 0 -30 -18.5 
2 7 9 1 2 -30 
3 7 9 1 -28.1667 -28.1667 
      
Starting Points: wGõ = 0.4 
Iterations @	 Primal Variables Objective function  2D9ó1	  2D9oó1	  wGõ ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 5.4 5.4 0.4 -30 -24.98 
2 7 9 1 -30 -28.1667 
                                                 






3 7 9 1 -28.1667 -28.1667 
      
Starting Points: wGõ = 0.8 
Iterations @	 Primal Variables Objective function  2D9ó1	  2D9oó1	  wGõ ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 7 7.8 0.8 -30 -27.7267 
2 7 9 1 -28.4067 -28.1667 
3 7 9 1 -28.1667 -28.1667 
      
Starting Points: wGõ = 1 
Iterations @	 Primal Variables Objective function  2D9ó1	  2D9oó1	  wGõ ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 7 9 7 -30 -28.1667 
2 7 9 7 -28.1667 -28.1667 
 
Table 5-9 A comparison of solutions for the two-Stage Stochastic Shale Gas MPEC  
  
Results Disjunctive-constraints method Benders-SOS1  method 
Inv 1 1 
S=1: q11=q21 2.33 2.33 
S=1: Q1 7 7 
S=1:Price 3.33 3.33 
S=2: q12=q22 6.67 6.67 
S=2: Q2 9 9 
Price 7.67 7.67 
Computational time 1.045 seconds 0.588 seconds 
 
Example 5: Nonlinear Complementarity-Constrained Nonlinear Program   
This two-variable example is from (Dirkse and Ferris, 1998) and is a nonlinear 
complementarity problem (NCP)-constrained mathematical program45 with the 
variables being x and y. An optimal solution for this problem is  = 1,  = 0	 (Dirkse 
and Ferris, 1998). The problem is as follows: 
                                                 
45 This problem has nonlinear complementarity constraints while other problems showed earlier have 






 i@G , 	 ≔  − 1 − 	o . .          o ≤ 2 −1 ≤  ≤ 2      (5.52)  − 1	o +  − 1	o ≤ 3 0 ≤  − o + 1 ⊥  ≥ 0     
In this problem, x is defined as the complicating variable.  Thus, the master problem 
is as follows: i@G,¸ B 
   . .  B ≥ B"C    (5.53)  o ≤ 2 −1 ≤  ≤ 2 B ≥ P		, 		Q + 
		P − 		Q;∀ = 1, . . , @ − 1 
The subproblem is:  A@G = − 1 − 	o 
                                . .       − 1	o +  − 1	o ≤ 3 
 ® =  − o + 1        (5.54) 2s + 2ö = ® +  2s − 2ö = ® −  ®,  ≥ 0  = 		: 
		 s, öare SOS1 variables 
This example is solved with a lower bound B ≥ −25 and À = 10ö@. The Benders-
SOS1 algorithm was tried with three starting points considering x as the complicating 
variable. The question whether Benders-SOS1 can find an optimal solution from any 





initial values P	 = 0,0.5,0.9Q. The algorithm provides a solution which is close to an 
optimal solution from these three starting points, see Table 5-10.  In addition, as 
discussed in (5.22), the optimal objective function value given fixed  in this problem 
is defined as: 
B	 = A@G@i8i = − 1 − 	o 
 . .    − 1	o +  − 1	o ≤ 3 
 ® =  − o + 1                 (5.55) 2s + 2ö = ® +  2s − 2ö = ® −  ®,  ≥ 0 s, öare SOS1 variables 
We notice that the α-function (the optimal value of the objective function of 
subproblem given x is fixed) in this problem is convex, see Figure 5-6. The Benders-
SOS1 converges to a point that is very close to an optimal solution. 
 
Table 5-10 Convergence for Example 5 Using the Benders-SOS1 Approach  
 	 = 0 
 Iteration @	 ó1	 ó1	 
ó1	 ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 0 0 -2 -20 1 
2 1.41421 1.6224 1000 -3 5.393055011 
3 1.40701 0.97967 2.07763 -1.814 0.32794037 
4 0.88171 0 -0.23657 -0.76342512 0.013991919 
5 1.21765 0.48266 0.76075 -0.06548138 0.070232982 
6 1.08157 0.16979 0.20522 -0.03328857 0.007782751 
7 0.9886 0 -0.02279 -0.01129561 0.000129898 
8 1.03871 0.07892 0.08664 -0.00101229 0.001616794 
9 1.01469 0.02959 0.03068 -0.00046469 0.000222106 
10 1.00184 0.00369 0.00371 -0.000171940 0.000003419 
11 0.99523 0 -0.00954 -0.000021120 0.000022777 





13 1.0002 0.0004 0.00039 -0.000002690 0.000000042 
14 0.99937 0 -0.00126 -0.000000280 0.000000402 
15 0.99979 0.00001 -0.00043 -0.000000120 0.000000048 
16 1 0 0 -0.000000030 0.000000000 
      	 = 0.5 
Iteration @	 ó1	 ó1	 
ó1	 ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 0.5 0 -1 -20.000000000 0.250000000 
2 1.41421 0.87274 1000 -1.250000000 15.570800000 
3 1.39799 0.95439 1.99856 -0.647994770 0.309574959 
4 1.07865 0.16349 0.19637 -0.328651340 0.007197380 
5 0.79793 0 -0.40415 -0.047927060 0.040833474 
6 0.94574 0 -0.10853 -0.018902660 0.002944647 
7 1.01739 0.03508 0.03662 -0.004832050 0.000313050 
8 0.98194 0 -0.03611 -0.000984950 0.000326051 
9 0.99997 0 -0.00005 -0.000324910 0.000000001 
10 1.00883 0.01774 0.01813 -0.000000410 0.000079358 
11 1.00444 0.0089 0.009 -0.000000200 0.000019914 
12 1.00222 0.00444 0.00447 -0.000000100 0.000004945 
13 1.0011 0.0022 0.00221 -0.000000050 0.000001213 
14 1.00053 0.00107 0.00107 -0.000000020 0.000000291 
15 1.00025 0.0005 0.0005 -0.000000010 0.000000063 
16 1.00007 0.00014 0.00011 0.0000000000 0.0000000050 
17 1.00001 0.00003 0.00003 0.0000000000 0.0000000002 
18 0.99983 0.00001 -0.00034 0.0000000100 0.0000000340 
19 0.99999 0 0 0.0000000005 0.0000000001 
20 0.99999 0 0.00002 0.0000000002 0.0000000000 
      	 = 0.9 
Iteration @	 ó1	 ó1	 
ó1	 ®"Có1	  ®6ó1	 
1 0.9 0 -0.2 -20 0.01 
2 1.41421 0.37358 1000 -0.21 32.0372 
3 1.38209 0.91017 1.86327 -0.08641799 0.278871308 
4 1.20505 0.45214 0.69684 -0.05100914 0.061053196 
5 1.08009 0.1666 0.20073 -0.02601858 0.007483598 
6 0.99649 0 -0.00702 -0.00929802 0.000012319 
7 1.04131 0.08432 0.09313 -0.00030227 0.001849961 





9 1.0084 0.01687 0.01722 -0.00007128 0.000071734 
10 1.0025 0.00501 0.00504 -0.00002986 0.000006279 
11 0.9995 0.00001 -0.001 -0.00000882 0.000000258 
12 1.00101 0.00201 0.00202 -0.00000125 0.00000101 
13 1.00026 0.00052 0.00051 -0.00000050 0.00000007 
14 0.99988 0 -0.00023 -0.00000012 0.00000001 
15 1.00007 0.00014 0.00011 -0.00000003 0.00000001 
16 0.99997 0 -0.00004 0.00000000 0.00000000 
17 1.00003 0.00006 0.00006 0.00000001 0.00000000 
18 0.99998 0 -0.00002 0.000000003 0.000000000 





Figure 5-6 optimal objective function value for example 5 
 
   
5.6 A large-scale MPEC version of the World Gas Model 
 
In order to test the efficiency of the algorithm on larger problems than those already 
described, this section introduces a Stackelberg version (Gibbons 1996) of the World 
Gas Model (Gabriel et al., 2012) in which the Panama Canal operator is the leader and 
the rest of the gas market are the followers. The canal operator anticipates the reactions 

































tariffs. The leader’s objective function is profit maximization and includes the 
constraints from the WGM in addition to the KKT conditions of the followers (i.e., 
other market players). The lower level of this problem includes natural gas producers, 
traders, pipeline operator, and marketers represented by the inverse demand curve. The 
lower level is the reduced version of the WGM model because we take out the storage 
operator to reduce the size of the problem. Also, only six time periods (2005-2030) are 
considered here.  Section 5.6.1 presents the mathematical notation used.  
 
 
Figure 5-7 WGM MPEC version  
 
5.6.1 Mathematical Notation  
Indices:  
   Gas transportation arcs                                                                                                  
   Seasons, i.e., {low, high} 
   Producers 
  Years                                           
   Model nodes 











             Inward arcs at node n 
             Outward arcs at node n 
Variables: 
~"0_ 1C((   Canal transit fee in $ per kcm (thousand cubic meters) 
 "0²§   Capacity of the canal in terms of kcm offered to traders 
 '"U   Pipeline capacity assigned to a trader (mcm/d) 
 0"0   Quantity sold by a producer to traders and liquefiers (mcm/d)  1"%   Quantity sold to end-user markets by traders (mcm/d) 
,-.1"%   Quantity bought from a producer by a trader (mcm/d) 2341'"%   Arc flow by a trader (mcm/d) B ≥ 0   Dual variables of capacity restrictions 
¢, KK             Dual variables of mass balance constraints 
l ≥ 0   Dual variables of capacity expansion limitations 
O, KK  Dual variables of market-clearing conditions for sold and bought 
quantities             
~ KK  Dual variables of market-clearing conditions for capacity assignment 
and usage 
 
Parameters: 60 . 	  Production costs (k$/mcm) 
,::::::'U   Arc capacity (mcm/d) 
{1;  Cournot coefficient; Level of market power exerted by a trader in a market  







L7"  Number of days in a season F  Discount rate for a year, F ∈ 0,1]  wxz"}  Intercept of inverse demand curve (mcm/d) H'  Loss rate of gas in the transport arc, H' ∈ [0,1	  ,"}  Slope of the inverse demand curve (mcm/d/k$) 
                 CO2 cost ($/ton of CO2e) 
  6('=>!         CO2 emissions factor 46 with values in (0.1] 
 
M Conjectural variation slope, M<0, see more explanation on this 
parameter in the next section 
 
 
5.6.2 Canal operator problem (Upper Level Problem) 
 
The main assumption of this model is that the Panama Canal is a local leader since 
traders that use the Suez Canal would not be directly affected. The first term 
~"0_ 1C((	 "0²§is the revenue gained from collecting transit fees. The second 
term "0¹§ "0²§	is the operating cost for using the canal. The canal operator 
can decide the canal toll ~"0_ 1C((  on the total flows from traders through the canal route. 
However, this model assumes that the canal operator faces a decreasing demand curve 
47 for its transit service because without this assumption, the transit fees ~"0_ 1C(( could 
be unbounded which would complicate things computationally. Therefore, a transit 
demand curve approach is implemented.  It is important to note that this represents a 
bilinear term in the sales and tariff variables, but this computational challenge is 
                                                 
46 The gas industry assumes that 27% of the carbon dioxide is emitted from the production 
process,12% in the processing process, 28% in transmission, 24% from the distributing process, and 
9% from storage. In this model, we assume 1 mcm of natural gas produced emits 2.76 metric tons of 
CO2 and CO2 emission is allocated to each market player as follows; producers 0.105 MT/MCM, 
traders 1.194 MT/MCM, storage operator 0.017 MT/MCM,TSO 0.294 MT/MCM, marketers 1.194 
MT/MCM. 
47 This also gives an implicit bound on the canal transit fees otherwise the transit fees will go to 





overcome by the Benders-SOS1 algorithm. The variable  "0²§  is considered as 
complicating variables for Benders-SOS1. The master problem has the variable 
 "0²§   and B. The subproblem is solved with fixed  "0²§  from the master 
problem. Fixing  "0²§    removes the nonlinearity in the subproblem. There is 
no  ~"0_ 1C(( in the master problem.  
A7NU*VNXYZ_²§
BXYZ_ C§§
∑ F\] Ä∑ L7" Å ~"0_ 1C((	 "0²§−"0¹§ "0²§	Æ"\j Ç      (5.56) 
s.t. 
The sales rates for the Panama canals are limited by its capacity.   "0²§ ≤   ,0_&''(    ∀L, i                 (5.57) 
 
The total flows from traders in the lower level problem through the canal route equal 
the capacity of the Canal offered by the upper-level player: 
∑ 2341'"%  1,'\0&''( =  "0²§     ∀L, i         (5.58) 
The canal transit demand is represented by a conjectured transit demand curve 
approach. 
 "0²§ + A~"0_ 1C((	 ≤ 0    ∀L, i           (5.59) 
All of the variables must be nonnegative.   "0²§ ≥ 0       (5.60)    ~"0_ 1C(( ≥ 0          (5.61) 
In this model, canal transit interaction is represented by a transit demand curve 
approach, which assumes that the Panama Canal operator will face a decreasing 
demand for increased transit fees. To be clear, this does not necessarily mean that the 





demand curve is not in the objective function of the canal operator unlike for the trader 
optimization problem (5.66) which has market demand taken into account along with 
the decisions of other traders. The canal operator has no ability to withhold transit 
capacity to obtain higher transit fees.  The transit demand curve condition just 
represents the interaction between these two sets of players and shows a canal 
operator’s belief about the reaction (or variation) of traders to potential adjustments in 
the canal operator’s actions.   The same approach is used in the work by Chyong and 
Hobbs (2014) that considers transit market power between Ukraine and Russian gas 
exports. The conjectural variations approach is also widely used in the electricity 
market modelling literature, for example in the form of the conjectured supply function 
and the conjectured transmission price function (Day et al., 2002; Hobbs and Rijkers, 
2004; Hobbs et al., 2004). In our context, this approach suggests that the transit quantity 
 "0²§  will diverge from the equilibrium point  "0²§∗ in proportion to the 
change of transit fee (~"0_ 1C((∗) with assumed exogenous slope. Therefore, in our case 
the conjectured transit demand equation is  
P "0²§ −  "0²§∗Q − A ∗ P~"0_ 1C(( − ~"0_ 1C((∗Q = 0, A < 0 ∀L, i  (5.62) 
 
where P "0²§ −  "0²§∗Q is the difference in demand for canal transit that 
cause by the change of transit fee P~"0_ 1C(( − ~"0_ 1C((∗Q, and slope is a conjectured slope 
for canal transit demand curve, which is measured in mcm per day.  WGM assumes a 
maximum of 200 mcm per day for capacity of Panama Canal transit daily. 48 Figure 5-
8 shows the demand curve for Panama Canal under three slopes. Also, Figure 5-8 
                                                 





shows that for a large slope, M= -200, a small change in transit fees cause significant 
changes in flows through the Panama Canal. This makes sense in the way that if the 





Figure 5-8 Panama Canal’s transit demand curve. 
 
5.6.3 Lower-Level Problems 
5.6.3.1 Producer problem 
A natural gas producer J ∈ , is modeled as a profit maximizer. The daily profit for the 
producer is determined by the difference between the revenue, O6	"0  6"0 , and 
the total costs, which are the production cost  60 P 6"0 Q and the emissions cost49 
61C 6"0  60. The   production cost function 60 P 6"0 Q is linear50. The 
                                                 
49 In this study the emissions cost is zero. 
50 The production cost function differs from the previuos WGM because we would like to simplify the 
























annual profit is calculated by the sales rate multiplied by the number of days L7" for 
each season with a discount rate F for year m. The producer supplies gas to traders. 
RSTNU*VNWXYZ    ∑ F\] ^∑ L7" _ O6	"
0  6"0−60 P 6"0 Q−61C 6"0  60a"\"'=D b       (5.63) 
The daily sales rates are restricted by the maximum capacity ,60:::::::.  
 s.t.         6"0 ≤ ,60:::::::    ∀L, i     B6"0 	       (5.64) 
The sales rate and the capacity expansion must be nonnegative.   6"0 ≥ 0     ∀L, i                             (5.65)  
 
5.6.3.2 Trader Problem 
The trader maximizes discounted profits, which come from the revenues 
{1; |"} . 	 + 1 − {1; 	O"} 	 1"%  and the purchasing 
costs O"0 ,-.1"%←0 and the emissions cost 11C 1"%  %%	. The 
expression {1; |"} . 	 + 1 − {1; 	O"} 	 can be viewed as a weighted average of 
market prices resulting from the inverse demand function |"} . 	  and a perfectly 
competitive market-clearing wholesale price O"} . In addition, the trader is responsible 
for the transportation costs,  ~'"U,!> + ~'"U 	2341'"% , for the gas. Also, the term  
P∑ P~'"U,!> + ~"0_ 1C((Q2341'"%'\0&''( Q  corresponds to if the traders flow gas 
through the Panama Canal. The traders are modeled as a weighted combination of 
strategic/competitive players depending on the market power parameter {1; ∈ [0,1], 
where 0 represents competitive behavior and 1 indicates oligopolistic behavior with a 
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The next constraint ensures the mass balance of sales, purchases, and flows.  
 ,-.1"% + ∑ 1 − H'	 2341'"%'\'¡	 =  1"% +∑ 2341'"%      ∀G, L, i ¢1"%'\'£ 	     (5.67) 
 
Some traders have contractual obligations, that can be modeled as follows:  
( ), ,T T Ttadm tadm tadmFLOW CON a d m ε≥ ∀        (5.68) 
All of the variables must be nonnegative.  
     1"% ≥ 0   ∀G, L, i                                         (5.69)                                           ,-.1"% ≥ 0   ∀G, L, i        (5.70) 
   2341'"% ≥ 0   ∀7, L, i         (5.71) 
                   5.6.3.3 Transmission system operator 
The transmission system operator (TSO) provides an economic mechanism to 
efficiently allocate international transport capacity to traders. It is assumed that there is 
one central TSO for the model.   The TSO maximizes discounted profits that result 
from selling arc capacity to traders via the '"U  variables.  
A7NU*VNXYÃ    ∑ F Ä∑ L7""\j Å∑ ~'"U'∉0&''(  '"U−1DC1C  '"U  1DC%N ÆÇ\]          (5.72) 
 
The assigned capacity is restricted by the available capacity 
 '"U ≤ ,::::::7i   ∀7 ∉ ,7G7, L, i  B'"U 	       (5.73) 
All of the variables must be nonnegative. 
         '"U ≥ 0   ∀7 ∉ ,7G7, L, i       (5.74) 
 





Market-clearing conditions tie the producers to traders. The total sales from producers equals 
the purchases from traders. 
 6"0 = ∑ ,-.16	"    ,%16	 ∀J, L, i   O6	"0 	     (5.75) 
The pipeline capacity offered by a pipeline operator equals the total of flows from all traders. 
The market-clearing conditions for arc capacity flow are: 
 '"U = ∑ 2341'"%1       ∀7, L, i   ~'"U 	    (5.76) 
Market-clearing conditions for final demand represented by inverse demand curve are: 
O"} = wxz"} − ,"} P∑  1"%1 Q    ∀G, L, i   O"} 	   (5.77) 
In order to write the problem in the way we can apply the decomposition method, we first 
write out the KKT conditions for the lower-level problems. 
5.6.4 The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions of the lower-
level problems  
 
5.6.4.1 KKT conditions for the producer problem 
0 ≤ L7" ÅF r−O6	"0 + ×&WYZ ØNU*VNWXYZ Ù×NU*VNWXYZ + 61C 66vÆ + B6"0 ⊥ 6"0 ≥ 0     ∀L, i   (5.78) 
0 ≤ ,60::::::: −  6"0 ⊥   B6"0 ≥ 0    ∀L, i    (5.79) 
 
5.6.4.2 KKT conditions for the trader problem 
 
0 ≤ L7" _F Ü {1
; ,"]  1"%− Ø{1; |"}%	 + 1 − {1; 	O"} Ù+11C %%	 Ýa + ¬1"
%  ⊥  1"% ≥
0,     ∀G, L, i          (5.80) 





 0 ≤ L7"FP~'"U,!> + ~'"U Q + ¬1'£"% − 1 − H'	¬1'¡"% ⊥   2341'"% ≥ 0     ∀7 ∉ ,7G7 = PG'£,G'¡Q , L, i       (5.82) 0 ≤ L7"FP~'"U,!> + ~Li,_ HQ + ¬1'£"% − 1 − H'	¬1'¡"% ⊥   2341'"% ≥ 0     ∀7 ∈ ,7G7 = PG'£,G'¡Q , L, i       (5.83) 
 
0 = Å,-.1"% + ∑ 1 − H'	 2341'"%'\'¡	− 1"% − ∑ 2341'"%  '\'£ Æ , ¢1"% , KK, ∀G, L, i  (5.84) 
 
5.6.4.3 KKT conditions for the system operator problem 
 0 ≤ FL7"−~'"U + 1DC1C  1DC%N	 + B'"U ⊥  '"U ≥ 0   ∀7, L, i (5.85) 
 0 ≤ ,::::::'U −  '"U ⊥ B7Li ≥ 0   ∀7, L, i     (5.86) 
 
Then the complementarity conditions in the lower level are replaced by SOS1 variables. 
The purpose of this form is to have mixed-integer linear constraint at hand. We get the 
following mixed-integer problem for the WGM MPEC as follows: 
A7NU*VNXYZ_²§
BXYZ_ C§§
∑ F\] Ä∑ L7" Å ~"0_ 1C((	 "0²§−"0¹§ "0²§	Æ"\j Ç   (5.87A1) 





L7" áF â−O6	"0 + ×&WYZ PNU*VNWXYZ Q×NU*VNWXYZ + 61C 66ãä + B6"0 = ®J6"      ∀J, L, i 
          (5.87A8) 0 ≤ ®J6"      ∀L, i                  (5.87A9) 2J16"s  +2J16"ö = ®JJLi1 +  JLi,  ∀J, L, i               (5.87A10) 2J16"s  -2J16"ö = ®JJLi1 −  JLi,  ∀J, L, i               (5.87A11) ,60::::::: −  6"0   = ®JJLi2     ∀J, L, i                (5.87A12)  0 ≤ ®JJLi2     ∀J, L, i                   (5.87A13) 2J26"s  +2J26"ö = ®JJLi2 + B6"0  ∀J, L, i               (5.87A14) 2J26"s  -2J26"ö = ®JJLi2 − B6"0  ∀J, L, i               (5.87A15) 
 
L7" _F Ü {1
; ,"]  1"%− Ø{1; |"}%	 + 1 − {1; 	O"} Ù+11C %%	 Ýa + ¬1"
% = ®1"      ∀, G, L, i    
       (5.87A16) 
 0 ≤ ®1"     ∀, G, L, i         (5.87A17) 
 211"s  +211"ö = ®GLi1 +  GLiz ∀, G, L, i    (5.87A18) 
 211"s  -211"ö = ®GLi1 −  GLiz ∀, G, L, i    (5.87A19) 
 L7"[FO"0 ] − ¬1"% =   ®GLi2  ∀, G¤xPJ	Q, L, i    (5.87A20) 
   0 ≤   ®GLi2  ∀, G¤xPJ	Q, L, i          (5.87A21) 
 221"s  +221"ö = ®GLi2 +  ,-.1"%←0  ∀, G¤xPJ	Q, L, i   (5.87A22) 






L7"FP~'"U,!> + ~'"U Q + ¬1'£"% − 1 − H'	¬1'¡"% =   ®1'"# ∀, 7 ∉,7G7 , L, i          (5.87A24) 
 0 ≤   ®1'"# ∀, 7 ∉ ,7G7 , L, i        (5.87A25) 
 231"s  +231"ö = ®GLi3 +  234GLiz  ∀, 7 ∉ ,7G7 , L, i   (5.87A26) 
 231'"s  -231'"ö = ®7Li3 − 2347Liz  ∀, 7 ∉ ,7G7 , L, i   (5.87A27) 
 L7"FP~'"U,!> + ~"61C((Q + ¬1'£"% − 1 − H'	¬1'¡"% =   ®1'"E   
 ∀, 7 ∈ ,7G7 , L, i        (5.87A28) 
 0 ≤   ®1'"E ∀7 ∈ ,7G7 , L, i         (5.87A29) 
 241'"s  +241'"ö = ®7Li4 +  2347Liz  ∀, 7 ∈ ,7G7 , L, i   (5.87A30) 
 241'"s  -241'"ö = ®7Li4 − 2347Liz  ∀, 7 ∈ ,7G7 , L, i    (5.87A31) 
 
0 = Å,-.1"% + ∑ 1 − H'	 2341'"%'\'¡	− 1"% − ∑ 2341'"%  '\'£ Æ , ¢1"% , KK, ∀, G, L, i                                                                   
          (5.87A32) 
 FL7"−~'"U + 1DC1C  1DC%N	 + B'"U = ®@'" ∀7, L, i   (5.87A31) 
  0 ≤ ®@'" ∀7, L, i        (5.87A32) 
 2@1'"s  +2@1'"ö = ®@7Li1 +  7Li  ∀7, L, i     (5.87A33) 






0 ≤ ,::::::'U −  '"U = ®@7Li2  ∀7, L, i       (5.87A35) 
    0 ≤ ®@'"o ∀7, L, i        (5.87A36) 
 2@2'"s  +2@2'"ö = ®@7Li2 + B7Li  ∀7, L, i      (5.87A37) 
 2@2'"s  -2@2'"ö = ®@7Li2 − B7Li  ∀7, L, i      (5.87A38) 
 J16"s , J16",ö J26"s , J26"ö , 11"s , 11"dö 21"s , 21",ö 31'"s  , 31'"ö 41'"s , 41'"ö @1'"s , @1'"gö @2'"s , @2ó"ö  are SOS1 variables  
 
Now when the KKT conditions are transformed into an SOS1 formulation, the problem 
(5.87A) is decomposed using the Benders-SOS1 approach. The variables  "0²§  
are considered as the complicating variables for Benders-SOS1. It is important to note 
that the bilinear term ~"0_ 1C((	 ∑  "0²§  1,'\0&''( is in the subproblem so that the 
master problem has the variable B ,  the complicating variable   "0²§ , and the 
capacity constraint. Benders cuts are obtained at each iteration based on information of 
the dual variables 
"	   from the subproblem. Benders decomposition approximates B  
using hyperplanes and improves the approximation using additional hyperplanes from 
the subproblem at each iteration which yield the following master and subproblem.  
 i@GNU*VNXYZ²§ ,   B 
           . . B"C − B ≤ 0                                  (5.8787B) P "6&''(,	Q + 
"	 P "0²§ −  "0²§,	Q −  B ≤ 0 ;    ∀, . . , @ − 1     
                        "0²§ ≤   ,0²§   , ∀L, i 





The Benders-SOS1algorithm proceeds by solving the master problem then provides the 
vector of fixed master variables  "0²§  to the subproblem. The subproblem with 
fixed  "0²§  is as follows: 
A7NU*VNXYZ_²§
BXYZ_ C§§
∑ F\] Ä∑ L7" Å ~"0_ 1C((	 "0²§−"0¹§ "0²§	Æ"\j Ç      (5.87C1) 
s.t.  "0²§ =  "0²§ó1	, 
" KK ∀L, i     (5.87C2)  "0²§ ≤   ,0_&''(    ∀L, i               (5.87C3) ∑ 2341'"%  1,'\0&''( =  "0²§     ∀L, i                (5.87C4)  "0²§ + A~"0_ 1C((	 ≤ 0    ∀L, i                 (5.87C5)  6"0 − ∑ ,-.16	"    %16	 = 0  ∀J, L, i                   (5.87C6)  '"U − ∑ 2341'"%1 = 0      ∀7 ∉ ,7G7, L, i                 (5.87C7) O"} = wxz"} − ,"} P∑  1"%1 Q    ∀G, L, i                (5.87C8) 
L7" áF â−O6	"0 + ×&WYZ PNU*VNWXYZ Q×NU*VNWXYZ + 61C 66ãä + B6"0 = ®J6"      ∀J, L, i   
          (5.87C9) 0 ≤ ®J6"       ∀J, L, i                  (5.87C10) 2J16"s  +2J16"ö = ®JJLi1 +  JLi,  ∀J, L, i               (5.87C11) 2J16"s  -2J16"ö = ®JJLi1 −  JLi,  ∀J, L, i               (5.87C12) ,60::::::: −  6"0   = ®JJLi2     ∀J, L, i                (5.87C13)  0 ≤ ®JJLi2    ∀J, L, i                   (5.87C14) 2J26"s  +2J26"ö = ®JJLi2 + B6" 0  ∀J, L, i               (5.87C15)  2J26"s  -2J26"ö = ®JJLi2 − B6" 0  ∀J, L, i               (5.87C16)  
L7" _F Ü {1
; ,"]  1"%− Ø{1; |"}%	 + 1 − {1; 	O"} Ù+11C %%	 Ýa + ¬1"
% = ®1"      ∀, G, L, i    





 211"s  +211"ö = ®GLi1 +  GLiz ∀, G, L, i     (5.87C19) 
 211"s  -211"ö = ®GLi1 −  GLiz ∀, G, L, i     (5.87C20) 
 L7"[FO"0 ] − ¬1"% =   ®GLi2  ∀, G¤xPJ	Q, L, i    (5.87C21) 
   0 ≤   ®GLi2  ∀, G¤xPJ	Q, L, i          (5.87C22) 
 221"s  +221"ö = ®GLi2 +  ,-.1"%←0  ∀, G¤xPJ	Q, L, i  (5.87C23) 
 221"s  -221"ö = ®GLi2 − ,-.1"%←0  ∀, G¤xPJ	Q, L, i  (5.87C24) 
 L7"FP~'"U,!> + ~'"U Q + ¬1'£"% − 1 − H'	¬1'¡"% =   ®1'"# ∀, 7 ∉,7G7 , L, i          (5.87C25) 
 0 ≤   ®1'"# ∀7 ∉ ,7G7 , L, i        (5.87C26) 
 231'"s  +231'"ö = ®7Li3 +  2347Liz  ∀, 7 ∉ ,7G7 , L, i   (5.87C27) 
 231'"s  -231'"ö = ®7Li3 − 2347Liz  ∀, 7 ∉ ,7G7 , L, i   (5.87C28) 
 L7"FP~'"U,!> + ~"61C((Q + ¬1'£"% − 1 − H'	¬1'¡"% =   ®1'"E   
 ∀, 7 ∈ ,7G7 , L, i        (5.87C29) 
 0 ≤   ®1'"E ∀, 7 ∈ ,7G7 , L, i         (5.87C30) 






241'"s  -241'"ö = ®7Li4 − 2347Liz  ∀, 7 ∈ ,7G7 , L, i    (5.87C32) 
 
0 = Å,-.1"% + ∑ 1 − H'	 2341'"%'\'¡	− 1"% − ∑ 2341'"%  '\'£ Æ , ¢1"% , KK, ∀, G, L, i   
          (5.87C33) 
 FL7"−~'"U + 1DC1C  1DC%N	 + B'"U = ®@'" ∀7, L, i   (5.87C34) 
  0 ≤ ®@'" ∀7, L, i        (5.87C35) 
 2@1'"s  +2@1'"ö = ®@7Li1 +  7Li  ∀7, L, i     (5.87C36) 
 2@1'"s  -2@1'"ö = ®@7Li1 −  7Li  ∀7, L, i     (5.87C37) 
 0 ≤ ,::::::'U −  '"U = ®@7Li2  ∀7, L, i       (5.87C38) 
    0 ≤ ®@'"o ∀7, L, i        (5.87C39) 
 2@2'"s  +2@2'"ö = ®@7Li2 + B7Li  ∀7, L, i      (5.87C40) 
 2@2'"s  -2@2'"ö = ®@7Li2 − B7Li  ∀7, L, i      (5.87C41) 
 J16"s , J16"ö J26"s , J26"ö , 11"s , 11"ö , 21"s , 21"ö , 31'"s , 31'"ö , 41'"s , 41'"ö @1'"s , @1'"ö , @2'"s , @2'"ö  are SOS1 variables  
      
  5.7 Model Validation  
In order to validate the results from Benders Algorithm, a check of the solution from the model 
has been performed as follows: 
• We solve the model with many different starting points. Eight different 





where the results for the upper-level problem are shown for different initial 
points. We apply Benders-SOS1 with  "0²§  as the complicating 
variables. A tolerance of 10ö@  and a value of B"C of −10öF are selected.  
Overall, the model has 13,303 variables: 3,640 are discrete (SOS1 variables 
to replace the complementarity condition in the lower problem) and the 
remaining 10,663 are continuous.  Although we use different starting points, 
Benders-SOS1 obtains the same solution for each of the starting points. 
However, the computational time and number of Benders iterations were 
different depending on the starting points. The number of iterations vary 
from 6-8.  
• We compare the results for the Benders-SOS1 with SOS1 approaches, both 
give the same solution, see Table 5-12.  
• Lastly, we validate a solution for this problem by fixing and varying the 
upper-level variables  "0²§and solving the problem. Then a solution 
from each fixed   "0²§  is compared. Each fixed  "0²§  results 
in different values for ~"0_ 1C(( and the corresponding objective function 
values are displayed in Figure 5-9. The comparison in Figure 5-9 shows that 
the transit fees ~"0_ 1C(( decrease as the variables  "0²§  increase. In 
addition, the comparison in Figure 5-9 shows that an objective function 







  Table 5-11 Comparison of the solution of different starting points  "0²§  for one time 
period (2005).  
Starting Point: SALES«JK,o@LMNONP , SALESQRSQ,o@LMNONP = 0 
Iterations it	 Average sales (mcm/d)51 
Average 
transit fee 
($/MMBtu)52 z¿JKURV	  zWXRV	 
1 0 0.66 -100,000,000.0 0.0 
2 200 0.64 -1,679,270.0 3,191,960,800.0 
3 0 0.64 -340,416.1 402,846,580.0 
4 40.32 0.64 -338,528.6 -335,702.3 
5 80.64 0.64 -336,390.1 402,850,610.0 
6 40.32 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,702.8 
     
Starting Point:SALES«JK,o@LMNONP , SALESQRSQ,o@LMNONP = 1 
Iterations it	 Average sales (mcm/d) 
Average 
transit fee 
($/MMBtu) z¿JKURV	  zWXRV	 
1 1.0 0.72 -100,000,000.0 -9,323.1 
2 200.0 0.64 -1,864,629.0 3,191,960,800.0 
3 80.6 0.64 -376,908.0 402,810,090.0 
4 40.3 0.64 -375,878.2 -335,690.6 
5 40.3 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,703.1 
     
Starting Point: SALES«JK,o@LMNONP , SALESQRSQ,o@LMNONP = 5 
Iterations it	 Average sales (mcm/d) 
Average 
transit fee 
($/MMBtu) z¿JKURV	  zWXRV	 
                                                 
51 Average sales are the total sales of canal capacity in the year 2005 for high and low demand seasons 
devided by 2.  
52 Average transit fees are the sum of high and low demand season transit fees in the year 2005 devided 






1 5.0  0.64 -100,000,000.0 -46,615.7 
2 200.0 0.64 -1,864,629.0 3,191,960,800.0 
3 80.6 0.64 -376,908.0 402,810,090.0 
4 40.3 0.64 -375,878.2 -335,690.6 
5 40.3 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,703.1 
     
Starting Point SALES«JK,o@LMNONP , SALESQRSQ,o@LMNONP = 10 
Iterations it	 Average sales (mcm/d) 
Average 
transit fee 
($/MMBtu) z¿JKURV	  zWXRV	 
1 10.0 0.72 -100,000,000.0 -93,231.4 
2 200.0 0.64 -1,864,629.0 3,191,960,800.0 
3 80.6 0.64 -376,908.0 402,810,090.0 
4 40.3 0.64 -375,878.2 -335,690.6 
5 40.3 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,703.1 
     
Starting Point: SALES«JK,o@LMNONP , SALESQRSQ,o@LMNONP = 20 
Iterations it	 Average sales (mcm/d) 
Average 
transit fee 
($/MMBtu) z¿JKURV	  zWXRV	 
1 20.0 0.72 -100,000,000.0 -186,462.9 
2 200.0 0.64 -1,864,629.0 3,191,960,800.0 
3 80.6 0.64 -376,908.0 402,810,090.0 
4 40.3 0.64 -375,878.2 -335,690.6 
5 40.3 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,703.1 
     
Starting Point SALES«JK,o@LMNONP , SALESQRSQ,o@LMNONP = 50 
Iterations it	 Average sales (mcm/d) 
Average 
transit fee 





1 50.0 0.64 -100,000,000.0 193,209,690.0 
2 20.7 0.68 -100,000,000.0 96,508,811.0 
3 40.3 0.68 -100,000,000.0 -302,176.5 
4 40.3 0.64 -338,286.9 -318,138.0 
5 40.3 0.64 -338,285.9 -335,702.3 
6 45.3 0.64 -335,788.1 49,513,830.0 
7 40.3 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,056.9 
8 40.3 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,703.1 
     
Starting Point: SALES«JK,o@LMNONP , SALESQRSQ,o@LMNONP = 150 
Iterations it	 Average sales (mcm/d) 
Average 
transit fee 
($/MMBtu) z¿JKURV	  zWXRV	 
1 150.0 0.64 -100,000,000.0 2,192,377,100.0 
2 0.0 0.64 -100,000,000.0 303,187,000.0 
3 0.0 0.68 -100,000,000.0 -133,803.1 
4 80.6 0.68 -360,532.6 402,826,470.0 
5 40.3 0.64 -338,296.1 -327,827.8 
6 40.3 0.64 -338,294.6 -335,701.5 
7 40.3 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,703.1 
     
Starting Point: SALES«JK,o@LMNONP , SALESQRSQ,o@LMNONP = 200 
Iterations it	 Average sales (mcm/d) 
Average 
transit fee 
($/MMBtu) z¿JKURV	  zWXRV	 
1 200.0 0.64 -100,000,000.0 3,191,960,800.0 
2 70.7 0.64 -100,000,000.0 303,187,000.0 
3 30.3 0.64 -100,000,000.0 -134,538.5 
4 0.0 0.64 -358,824.6 402,828,180.0 





6 40.3 0.64 -338,308.8 -335,701.5 
7 40.3 0.64 -335,703.1 -335,703.1 
 
Table 5-12 Comparison of two methods for the WGM MPECs for one time period 
(2005) 






function value  
Average Canal 




SOS1 (Siddiqui and 






Decomposition  3,640 -335,703.14150 
$22.812/Kcm 
($0.646MMBtu) 40.319 





Figure 5-9 Grid search for optimal solutions, weighted average sales (mcm/d) and 
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5.8 Computational Results for the World Gas Model MPEC Version 
          5.8.1 Base Case Results  
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the Benders-SOS1 method can be 
applied to large-scale MPECs. This WGM MPEC version includes 42 nodes covering 
98 percent of the total world consumption in 2010 (WEO, 2013).  This version of the 
World Gas Model operates with six time periods: 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025, and 
two seasons (high and low demand) in each time period. In this section, we run the 
model up to 2025. Consequently, the model has over 80,025 variables; 21,946 of these 
are discrete variables (SOS1 variables to replace complementarity conditions in the 
lower level) and the rest are continuous. 
A complementarity version of this problem, where the problem has the Panama Canal 
operator as a player at the same level with other market players in the market, was 
solved thus showing that a solution exists, which means that a feasible solution exists 
for this MPEC as well.  Before we applied Benders-SOS1. The MPEC version of the 
problem was tried with the disjunctive-constraints method using the solver SBB in 
GAMS, but it did not provide a feasible solution. In addition, we solved the MPEC 
version of the problem using the SOS1 method proposed in (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 
2012), and obtained an optimal solution. Later, we applied the Benders-SOS1 
decomposition approach to this problem. In that case, we consider the    "0²§  
variables as complicating. A tolerance of 10öE  and a value of  B"C of −1.2 × 10öY 
were selected. Additionally, the value of M (transit demand slope) =-7 was used.  
At first, the Benders-SOS1 algorithm did not proceed due to infeasibility of the 





(5.28) for more details) to make the subproblem always feasible using penalties for 
violating constraints, then the problem was solved.  
The Benders-SOS1 algorithm is slow in the first subproblem solution stage however it 
goes quicker in later iterations. The first iteration takes 20.32 minutes to solve while 
other iterations take less than an average of 20 seconds each. This implies that GAMS 
uses a “warm start” from previous iterations as a starting point for the second iterations 
and later iterations.  Table 5-13 shows the comparison of three methods for this 
particular MPEC. As displayed in Figure5-10, Benders-SOS1 used 31 iterations before 
the difference between the subproblem and master problem was less than the tolerance. 
A validation of the model has been performed as follows; 
• The algorithmic results for the Benders-SOS1 method were verified to 
confirm that all the constraints, such as, production, pipeline and LNG 
capacities as well as energy balances at each node were satisfied by the 
solutions. 
• We compared the results for Benders-SOS1 with the SOS1 approach and 
note that both methods gave similar solution with differences in the decimal 
places. Initially the SOS1 approach was terminated by the SBB solver in 
GAMS. However, this problem was overcome by adjusting the node limits 
(the maximum number of nodes to process in the branch and bound tree for 
a MIP problem) in GAMS, see Table 5-13. 
Table 5-13 Comparison of three methods for the WGM MPECs (up to the year 2025)53 
                                                 
53 We report the results only for 2015 becuase the results for last two time periods (2020 and 2025) are 














Computation time (CPU)   
No solution 
returned  
34.46 minutes  27.28 minutes 
Number of continuous 
variables  53,369 58,079 58,079 
Number of discrete variables  18,836  21,946 21,946 
Upper –level objective 
function value  
NA -899,670.92491 -899,670.6532 
Average Canal transit fees in 
2015 
NA $0.63/MMBtu $0.63/MMBtu 
Sales in 2015 Bcm/y  NA 16.1432 16.1418  
 
 
Figure 5-10 Convergence for WGM MPEC (Year 2005-2025) 
 
 
          5.8.2 Analysis on impact of the leader on U.S. LNG exports  
This section describes the scenarios of U.S. LNG exports analyzed as well as presents 
the results and compares the MPEC version of the problem with the MCP one. To 
clarify, the MCP version has one level where the Panama Canal operator is assumed as 





























For this comparison, we ran the model up to the year 2025.  The Base Case is 
formulated as an MPEC and assumes that the U.S. starts exporting LNG in 2015 from 
three locations with different capacities as follows: the Gulf of Mexico with a capacity 
of 57.88 Bcm/y, 8.25 Bcm/y from the West Coast, and from the East Coast at 10.33 
Bcm/y. In order to analyze the impacts of the leader on U.S. LNG exports, we define 
an additional U.S. LNG exports scenario (Exports2) which allows more export capacity 
for the U.S.  The scenarios descriptions are presented in Table 5-14. 
Table 5-14 Cases and description of cases 
 
As can be seen from Table 5-15 below, the first thing to realize is that the canal 
operator's profit for the two MPECs scenarios is substantially higher than for the MCP 
case. In comparing the Exports2 Case to the Base Case , the canal operator's profit 
increases 6.95% given increased U.S. LNG exports. An important conclusion is that 
level of U.S. LNG exports substantially affects the profits of the leader. Under the 
Exports2 scenario, the flows through the Panama Canal increase 126.15% compared to 
the Base Case, however the weighted average transit fee decreases about $0.20. As the 
LNG flows increase, the new equilibrium prices for transit fees are formed as described 
                                                 
54 We used -7 for the Base Case because the results (canal transit fee) are close to the real world ones 
of 0.30$/MMBtu  for the Suez Canal since actual Panama Canala transit fees were not available at the 
time of this dissertation.. 
Scenario  Description  
MCP 
Mixed complementarity version of WGM and U.S. Gulf Mexico export 
capacity equals 57.88 Bcm/y 
Base 
The Base Case (Slope of transit demand curve equals -7) 54 and U.S. Gulf 
Mexico export capacity equals 57.88 Bcm/y 
Exports2 
The assumptions are the same as the Base Case , but the U.S. LNG export 





in the transit demand approach. Table 5-15 also shows that the transit fees calculated 
in the MCP version are 0. It is important to note that the transit fee for the MCP comes 
from the market-clearing conditions between traders and the canal operator. In the MCP 
form of the problem, total flows in 2015 (17.2 Bcm) by all traders through the Panama 
Canal do not reach the maximum capacity level of the Canal55, so congestion fees are 
zero in this case.   
 In terms of lower-level problem results, when two MPECs scenarios (Base and 
Exports2) are compared with the MCP version, the production and consumption both 
decrease due to higher prices for all regions, see Table 5-15. This can represent the 
influence of the leader on the global gas market.  However, when compared Exports 
with the Base Case, only North American production increases. The rest of the world 
remains the same. This is because we allow North America to export more LNG so that 
it ramps up the production given the increased capacity. Increased U.S. LNG exports 
reduce prices in Asian and Chinese markets. Under the Exports2 scenario as compared 
to the Base Case, the prices in Asian and Chinese markets decrease -4.12% and -1.55% 
respectively. This makes sense since as more supplies come to the market, they will 
reduce prices and increase consumption in the particular market.   
 
Table 5-15 Results for upper level and lower problems in 2015  
 
  MCP Base Exports2 
Canal operator profit (2005-2025) in $ 341,951.08 56 899,670.92 962,173.84 
                                                 
55 The maximum canal capacity is 73 Bcm/y. 
56 It is important to note that the profit displayed in this table is the overall profit from 2005-2025. 
Although congestion fees for 2015 equal zero, which makes revenue for this year equal to zero, the 
congestion fess for the last two time periods are positive with full capacity of the canal utilization (73 





Flows through the Panama for 2015 in Bcm  17.2 16.14 36.5 
Average Transit fee for 2015 in $/MMBtu   $0 $0.63  $0.40  
  
Selected Lower-Level results  
  Wholesale Prices in $/MMBtu  
AFRICA   $3.57 $4.52  $4.49  
ASPACIF $18.04 $20.24  $19.40  
CHINA $10.04 $10.80  $10.63  
EUROPE   $14.04 $14.21  $15.45  
FRSVTUN  $4.92 $6.15  $6.52  
MIDEAST $3.73 $4.31  $4.08  
NRTH_AM  $6.92 $8.35  $8.15  
STH_AM $11.27 $14.94  $13.34  
  Consumption in Bcm  
AFRICA   120.5 81.6 86.7 
ASPACIF 437.6 355.4 378.6 
CHINA 298.2 278.7 284.6 
EUROPE   515.2 519 495.7 
FRSVTUN  757.6 594 509.9 
MIDEAST 472 447.9 376.1 
NRTH_AM  951.4 798.9 727.5 
STH_AM 195.6 109.2 141.5 
  Production in Bcm 
AFRICA   294.9 275.9 275.9 
ASPACIF 272.6 262.9 262.9 
CHINA 266.1 254.2 254.2 
EUROPE   254.3 238.3 238.3 
FRSVTUN  1010.7 1012.3 1012.3 
MIDEAST 654.3 614.9 614.9 
NRTH_AM  992.3 973.3 1165.9 
STH_AM 237.8 217.8 217.8 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
This chapter presents a promising methodology to decompose large-scale MPECs 
using Benders decomposition and SOS1 techniques. The method was first applied to 





the lower level is a complementarity problem. The method solves a large-scale natural 
gas model in which the Panama Canal is the dominant player who can influence the 
market and decide the transit fees. We found that increasing U.S.  LNG exports will 
improve the leader's profit and reduce prices in China and other non-Chinese Asian 
markets such as Japan and South Korea.   
APPENDIX 5-A. A Machine-Independent Measure: Function Calls 
 
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, we measure computational effort of different 
algorithms using a comparison of CPU time. The CPU time represents how quickly the 
algorithm can find a solution. However, CPU times depend on various factors i.e., 
computer platforms.  
A machine-independent measure is required in order to measure and compare 
efficiency of algorithms. Using the number of function calls is a measure of 
computational effort that is machine independent. In general, the number of function 
calls to a nonlinear objective and constraints is a measure of the computational effort 
required to reach the optimum.  The definition of function calls by GAMS (GAMS, 
2010) is the number of times that subroutines FUNOBJ and FUNCON have been called 
to evaluate the nonlinear objective function and nonlinear constraints.   
GAMS (SBB solver) can display the number of function calls using the “option 
sysout=on;” command. The following section shows a comparison of function calls for 
selected test problems (Shale Gas Producer problem and WGM MPECs). It is important 
to note that the number of function calls for the Benders-SOS1 approach is per iteration 





From Table 5 A1, it is clear that the new Benders-SOS1 approach is superior to the 
SOS1 method. GAMS shows only two function calls for tests solved by Benders-SOS1 
approach. However, function calls for the SOS1 approach increase significantly when 
the number of followers goes up.  
 Table 5A-1 Function calls for shale gas problem (Example 2) 
Number of  
followers 
N 
Solution Function Calls 
SOS1 Benders-SOS1 
5 Q=6 q1,..,q5=1 15 2 
10 Q=6 q1,..,q10=0.545 25 2 
50 Q=6 q1,..,q50=0.118 108 2 
100 Q=6 q1,..,q100=0.059 210 2 
300 Q=6 q1,…,q300=0.020 618 2 
500 Q=6 q1,…,q500=0.012 1026 2 
750 Q=6 q1,…,q750= 0.008 1536 2 
1500 Q=6 q1,…,q1500= 0.004 3066 2 
2000 Q=6 q1,…,q1500= 0.003 4086 2 






Next, we compare the number of function calls for WGM MPECs version. The model 
was solved with two approaches and the number of function calls was compared. 
  
SOS1 (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2012) Benders-SOS1  Decomposition  
Number of 
continuous 









The SOS1 approach required 47 function calls while Benders-SOS1 Decomposition 
needed only 6 function calls. Clearly, Benders-SOS1 approach requires less 
computational effort before it finds a solution. One reason is because the complicating 
variables are fixed, the nonlinearity (bilinear term) in the objective function is removed. 
The overall problem becomes easier to solve. That is why it probably needs less number 

















In this dissertation, two applied studies were conducted using The World Gas Model 
(WGM, 2012) in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, the WGM 2012 (Gabriel et al., 2012) 
has been used to investigate the effects of U.S. LNG exports on international gas prices 
and consumption as well as the impact on changes in the distribution of supply and 
demand. A number of scenarios were employed to analyze the resulting prices, 
quantities, flows, and LNG trade patterns.  The main results from Chapter 2 shows that 
U.S. LNG will influence global gas markets, especially Asian and European ones. 
Increased U.S. exports reduce prices significantly in importing markets. For example, 
prices in Spain decrease by $2.7/MMBtu in 2020 compared with the Base Case. when 
the U.S. exports 100 Bcm of LNG to the global gas market. Increased LNG exportation 
results in positive effects on Asia and Europe. 
Chapter 3 uses WGM 2012 (Gabriel et al., 2012) to find the influence of Panama Canal 
tolls on the global gas market. We found that the Panama Canal transit fees affect the 
flow pattern especially for LNG exports from the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago. In 
addition, the wholesale gas prices in Japan/South Korea and Europe are significantly 
affected by the level of the Panama Canal toll. The presence of LNG exports from the 
Atlantic basin (the U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago), leads to lower prices in Japan/S. 
Korea as the Panama Canal toll decreases.  (The zero and regular toll cases though 
provide identical Japanese node prices). The differences in Japan are about $1/MMBtu 





go in the opposite direction for Europe as a function of the counterfactual Panama 
Canal toll. As the Panama Canal toll increases, the gas prices in Europe decrease due 
to the shift of U.S. and Trinidad & Tobago LNG flows from Japan to Europe. 
In Chapter 4, a new version of the World Gas Model (WGM-2014) was presented.  A 
significant extension of the World Gas Model 2012 was developed.  This new version 
called WGM 2014, distinguishes itself from the previous one by adding  more detail 
for LNG markets including more market participants e.g., liquefiers, regasifiers, LNG 
shipping operators, and a canal operator as new players with separate optimization 
problems and market-clearing conditions. Moreover, the LNG shipping costs and 
congestion tariffs for the canal transit fees are endogenously determined inside the 
model as opposed to being exogenously determined before. Also, WGM 2014 has 
flexible LNG routes. In particular, there are three route options for each LNG shipping 
operator: 1. Sending LNG via the Panama Canal, 2. the Suez Canal, or using a regular 
route without a canal. Moreover, WGM 2014 takes into account the limitations of 
maritime transportation by limiting the size of the LNG tankers that can pass through 
the Panama and Suez canals.  The results derived from the WGM-2014 could assist 
decision makers e.g., gas producers, gas traders, and gas transmission operator, to have 
better understand of the gas market, especially the LNG market. WGM-2014 is able to 
identify the possibility of natural gas flow through Panama and Suez Canals and their 
direction. In addition, the model also suggests the future requirements for LNG tankers.  
 
Chapter 5 presents a methodology to solve mathematical programs with equilibrium 





complementarity in the lower-level problem's optimality conditions. Then, Benders 
algorithm decomposes the MPECs into a master and a subproblem and solves the 
overall problem iteratively.  Thus, the name for this new approach is Benders-SOS1. 
In addition, the MPEC version of WGM, a Stackelberg leader-follower game version 
of WGM, was formulated with the Panama Canal Operator as the leader having a 
Stackelberg leader influence on the other market players and solved with the new 
Benders-SOS1 method. The canal operator anticipates the reactions of these other 
market participants in making its own decisions, especially the canal tariff.  This 
problem and other small MPECs were solved in this chapter. 
 6.2 Future Research  
6.2.1 Natural Gas Modeling 
• Future work on natural gas modeling could include the improved presentation of 
long-term contracts (LTC). The complex structure of long-term contracts and the 
flexibility of new current contracts need to be taken into account. In the current 
WGM, the model assumes natural gas prices coming from market-clearing 
conditions. In fact, approximately 85 % of traditional LNG trades are based on 
long-term contracts tied to the price of crude oil. The long-term contracts in gas 
represent risk sharing between sellers and buyers.  Therefore, the contract prices 
need consider better risk sharing.  Future work could improve the structure of LTC 
prices. For example, long-term contracts could be determined endogenously by the 
model.  
• In addition, it is interesting to see the original WGM incorporated with some with 





canal decisions because their decision on shipping are related to integer/binary 
variables. For example, how many LNG tankers will use the Panama Canal route?    
• Future work on U.S. LNG exports could include  optimal U.S. export volume under 
different given conditions, given very limited analysis on how much LNG exports 
from the U.S. and from Canada can be absorbed by the global market. Most studies 
focus on the price impacts rather than volumes.  So examining how much could be 
exported from the U.S. would be a good future research direction.  Also, how much 
U.S. LNG will be on the spot market? 
6.2.2 Extension for Benders Decomposition  
Besides the numerical evidence in Chapter 5 for the Benders-SOS1 decomposition 
method working, the convergence theory still needs to be considered in future research.  
Moreover, the future research on Benders-SOS1 could include: 
• The methods presented in this dissertation were only applicable to MPECs where 
the decision variables for the upper-level problem is continuous. This approach 
should be tried on more complex MPEC, for example, discretely-constrained 
MPECs (Gabriel et. al., 2010) where the upper-level problem has binary variables.  
• Chapter 5 presents deterministic MPECs version of WGM. However future 
research could include a stochastic Stackelberg model where future transit demand 
is still uncertain. This makes sense because LNG tankers need to compete with 
other ships in order to use the canal.   
• Lastly, future research could involve parallel computing because independent 
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